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THE SMALL-BUSINESS EXEMPTION UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT. THE
"ORIGINAL" ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL
AND THE INVERSION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Marc Linder*
A . .. self-respecting democracy can plead no . . . economic reason for chiseling workers' wages or stretching
workers' hours. . . . All but the hopelessly reactionary will
agree that to conserve our primary resources of man
power, government must have some control over... the
exploitation of unorganized labor.'
-President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937
By expanding and increasing the FLSA small business
exemption, we have done much to preserve the admirable
capacity of American entrepreneurs to grow from today's
small employers into the larger employers of tomorrow.
That is good for the economy; it is good for America's
work force.2
-President George Bush, 1989

Professor, University of Iowa. B.A., University of Chicago; Ph.D,
Princeton; J.D., Harvard. Jason Befus's courage on the roof and the ground in
sticking up for his rights, made this article possible and necessary. Larry Norton
subjected the manuscript to embarrassing criticism, while Cathy Kiley
Ruckelshaus brought her demanding standards to bear by insisting on clarifications, documentation and the elimination of oversimplifications.
The PresidentRecommends LegislationEstablishingMinimum Wages and
Maximum Hours, reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: 1937 VOLUME: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS 209,
210-11 (1941).
2 George Bush, Statement upon Signing H.R. 2710, reprintedin 2 PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH: 1989, at
1533 (1990).
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THIS OVERTIME IS ON THE HOUSE

Another issue that has come to our attention is the concern
of many small contractors that they will be placed at a
competitive disadvantage against other contractors who are
not complying with the rule and who may escape OSHA
enforcement. What some contractors may not realize is that
OSHA does not have jurisdiction over sole proprietorships
or other companies where no employer-employee relationship exists. Unfortunately, this may mean that there is not
a level playing field between these different types of
companies in the residential construction industry, so the
concern is understandable. It is not, however, a valid
reason to deny needed fall protection to millions of
workers.3
Hail as big as baseballs pounded Iowa City, Iowa, in the late
afternoon of May 18, 1997.' In 15 minutes the storm damaged
enough houses to qualify as the 1997 Full Employment for Roofers
Act (of Nature). Because the damage outran the capacity of local
roofing contractors to respond to houseowners' calls-spurred on
by an invasion of hundreds of insurance agents detailed by
insurance companies to inspect and authorize payments for roof
repairs 5 -"hailstormers," migrating roofing contractors and their
crews who follow storms around the country, "fill[ing] in labor
vacuums," soon arrived and settled in for months of work.6

OSHA Fall Protection Standards:Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Regulation and Paperworkof the House Committee on Small Business, 104th
Cong. 73-74 (1995) (statement of Joseph Dear, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health).
4 Rain, Hail, Tornadoes Hit Eastern Iowa, DES MOINES REG., May 19,
1997, at 2.
' Associated Press, Insurance Claims Flood in After Hailstorm, (May 21,
1997) <http://thonline.com/news/052197/Iowa/59917.html>.
6 Kathleen Hughes, Hailstormers '97: Transient Roofing Crews Invade
Johnson County, ICON (Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.jeonet.com/icon/backs/1997/08-07-97/cover.html>.
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In June, a 24-year-old local unemployed man noticed a posting
at the Iowa Workforce Development (aka unemployment) office in
Iowa City for a job as a roofer. Although he had never worked as
a roofer, the $8 an hour wage exceeded the pay of the other listed
jobs.7 When he called, the employer hired him on the spot.
As the worker soon discovered, however, the conditions of
employment left much to be desired. Despite the fact that Iowa
City boasted a 2 percent unemployment rate, among the lowest in
the United States, and has enjoyed such low rates for years,' the
employer did not pay overtime (for hours in excess of 40 per
workweek), maintain a workers compensation policy, or pay into
the social security or unemployment insurance systems. The
employer was also often weeks behind in paying wages. Despite the
fact that roofing is very dangerous work-61 roofers in the United
States were killed on the job in 1996 alone 9 -the employer also

7 Nationally the mean hourly wage for roofers was $12.87 in 1996. The
modal wage range-that is, the wage which the largest group of roofers (17
percent) received-was $5.75-$8.49. Roofing was the only construction trade
characterizedby such a low modal wage range. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
OccupationalEmployment Statistics: 1996 National OccupationalEmployment
and Wage Data (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://stats.bls.gov/oes/national/oes87808.html>. The establishment-based wage data collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics ("BLS") are flawed by virtue of being linked to employers'
reports to state unemployment insurance systems. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS 17-19, 32-34, 42-46 (1997). Because
employers who, like the one mentioned in the text, do not comply with their
obligations to pay into that system also tend to pay lower wages, their absence
from the sample distorts the average wage levels and wage range distributions.
The BLS is aware of this flaw and suspects that this uncovered sector of
construction has expanded during the 1980s and 1990s, but does not adjust for
it. Telephone Interview with George Werking, Assistant Commissioner, Office
of Federal/State Programs, Department of Labor (Feb. 17, 1998).
' The unemployment rate was as low as 0.6 percent for 1989 and never
exceeded 3.4 percent on an annual basis in the last 10 years. Iowa Workforce
Development, LMI Bureau, Iowa City Labor Force Summary (visited Apr. 19,
1998). <http://www.state.ia.us/govemment/wd/lmi/etables/cityiowa.txt>.
9 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES tbl.2
(Nov. 24, 1997).
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failed to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's fall protection standards for residential roofing.' °
Arrests throughout the spring and summer of "illegal aliens"
working for "substandard wages" for out-of-state roofing contractors" pointed to another facet of the paradoxical coexistence of12
unfavorable working conditions and a very tight labor market.
Local observers were moved by the illegality of such conditions,
including the failure to report wages to the Internal Revenue
Service, when Mexican workers were involved: 13 "No disability,
no social security, no insurance, nothing. It's not the way to...
sub the work out.' 14 But the almost identical practices of local
roofers vis-A-vis local or, in any event, U.S.-citizen workers, which
had been quotidian for years, remained invisible to them and never
prompted anyone to protest.
Unbeknownst to him, the worker was embarking upon a labor
law odyssey in the course of which he would become the victim of
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, which were best
known for having raised the minimum wage. By the time he was
fired in November for attempting to assert his rights under various
labor and social insurance laws, he would know more about one
particular aspect of those amendments than virtually all the
lobbyists who pleaded for them, the legislators who enacted them,
and the employers' associations and labor unions that are supposed
to monitor such laws.

10 29

C.F.R. §§ 1926.501(b)(13), 1926.502 (1997). Throughout this Article,

the term "residential" does not refer to high-rise apartment houses.
" Dave Gosch, Illegal Aliens Pouring In to Fix Hail-Damaged Roofs,
CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, (July 11, 1997) <http://www.gazetteonline.com/showcase/show934.html>. See also Iowa, STATES NEWS BRIEFs, May 30, 1997.
2 In California, state labor agencies have added construction (together with

restaurants) to agriculture and garment manufacture as industries targeted for
investigation. Construction was selected for investigation because it draws on the
same (immigrant) labor base of "the 'most exploitable' workers." Andy McCue,
State to Expand Crackdown on Labor Law Violations, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 4, 1997, at DI (quoting Jose Millan, State Labor
Commissioner).
J Gosch, supra note 11.
14 Hughes, supra note 6 (quoting Bill Schiefer, President of the Eastern Iowa
Building Inspectors).
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Dissatisfied because the employer was not withholding and
paying in social security taxes, the worker spoke to a local labor
law professor, who deposed him at length about various aspects of
his employment. The professor suggested that the worker request
time and one-half for the hundred hours of overtime that he had
worked. At first the employer indicated that he would acquiesce in
the demand. Later, however, he refused, saying that he had
consulted an attorney, who had informed him that for two reasons
he was not covered by the overtime law: he did not do $500,000
of business annually, and he was not engaged in interstate commerce. The professor, who fancied himself immensely learned in
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), laughed. He knew that
Congress, taking its cue from the U.S. Supreme Court's vindication
of an extremely expansive concept of the congressional commerce
power, had inserted precisely such a broad coverage provision into
the FLSA. He also knew that, apart from farm workers and a few
other groups of marginal workers whose employers had successfully lobbied Congress for exemptions, "virtually every employer is
covered under one or another of the law's coverage tests.' 5 The
labor law sage confidently informed the worker that no matter how
small the employer's business, "if he's got you hammering one nail
or laying down one shingle that was produced outside of Iowa,
you're covered."
Thus, too, began a labor law professor's odyssey and acquaintanceship with an obscure provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1989. His journey would prove to be a lonely and
jarring one since virtually no one else who should have been
familiar with Congress's handiwork expelling employees of small
construction contractors from the minimum wage and overtime had
paved the road.
This Article examines the origins, development, legislative
reality and rhetoric, and economic policy behind and consequences
of the alleged small-business exemption in the FLSA. It explains
how a mandatory fair labor standards regime originally designed to
benefit workers and law-abiding employers by putting an end to
wage-cutting as a competitive tool, has, perversely, been refash-

1'LEwiN G. JOEL Im, EVERY EMPLOYEE'S GUIDE TO THE LAW 68 (1993).
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ioned to authorize and reinforce such sweatshop methods. During
the first quarter-century of the FLSA, small businesses were exempt
because they were, by and large, identical with local economic
activity, which premodern constitutional jurisprudence deemed
beyond the congressional commerce power. Today, when virtually
no constitutional obstacle stands in the way of achieving universal
minimum wage and overtime protection, Congress is, ironically,
excluding more and more workers of small employers from the
FLSA. The Article explains that this exemption is dysfunctional
because the new de facto industrial policy is based on a flawed
theory of capital accumulation: freeing all of the smallest businesses from minimum wage and overtime obligations merely
condemns the vast majority of their employees to working under
substandard conditions without enabling more than a few of them
to capitalize their wage-chiseling into job-generation. Exposing the
juridical forms in which this transmogrification of public policy has
been clothed is the purpose of this Article.
In order to focus attention on the bizarrely unsystematic and
even blind manner in which the national legislature of the world's
leading economy can make and silently invert industrial policy, this
study uses the construction industry, which was the most radically
affected by the 1989 amendments, to illustrate the process. It
should have come as no surprise to Congress that the establishment
of an enclave of unfair labor standards encourages small construction employers-defined as doing less than $500,000 of business
annually, but employing perhaps as many as 10 workers-to use
their lawful exemption from the FLSA as a springboard to create
a sector of outlawry in which they illegally exempt themselves
from the rest of the federal and state labor-protective regime
including social security, unemployment insurance, workers
compensation, and occupational safety and health regulations. The
fact that the roofing contractor mentioned at the outset had been
failing to pay his employees time and a half for overtime long
before a lawyer informed him that he was exempt underscores the
seamlessness of this policy web: Congress was in large part merely
legalizing or ratifying what had been rampant noncompliance

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

409

among small employers, 6 the lawfulness of whose post-1989
compensation practices was purely inadvertent.
The Article begins with an analysis of the congressional
transvaluation of small businesses, which culminated in a revision
of the FLSA largely exempting them from minimum wage and
overtime obligations; this statutory change was designed to
constrain their employees to subsidize their capital accumulation by
depressing wage and hour standards. The Article then proceeds to
a detailed legislative history. First, it is shown that small business
advocates' efforts to characterize the FLSA as having always
embodied a general small-business exemption are misleading: to the
extent that small firms' exempt status was a function of their local
and non-interstate orientation, of which their smallness was an
indicator, it was logical for Congress progressively to eliminate the
exemption as the Supreme Court came to approve a vastly more
comprehensive commerce power. The Article then systematizes the
legislative history of the creation of "enterprise coverage" in 1961,
which implemented the Court's modernized understanding of the
breadth of federal regulation of an increasingly nationalized
economy. After tracing the seeds of reversal of this congressional
policy of ever broader coverage in 1977, the Article offers a
comprehensive analysis of the 1989 amendments, which is enriched
by interviews with many of the crucial participants. A review of
further efforts in the 1990s to convert the small-business exemption
from enterprise coverage into a total exemption by eliminating
coverage of workers individually engaged in interstate commerce
or production of goods for such commerce is followed by an
empirical analysis of the surprisingly broad impact of the 1989
coverage restriction on the employees and employers in the
construction industry. The penultimate section is devoted to
explaining how the national legislative process generated such a
perverse outcome. In the final section the troubling possibility is
16

The Minimum Wage Study Commission found the highest incidence of

overtime violations in establishments with 1 to 9 employees: 26.7 percent of
covered/nonexempt establishments in 1979. Brigitte Sellekaerts & Stephen
Welch, Violations of the FairLabor Standards Act: Inferencesfrom the 1979
NoncomplianceSurvey, in 3 REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION 77, 83 tbl.3 (1981).
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raised that, if large capital and organized labor regard the markets
in which they operate as immune to competitive wage-cutting from
the small-business sector, they might become indifferent to more
extreme efforts to deregulate labor standards.

II. THE NEO-SMITHIAN ECONOMIC POLICY BEHIND THE UNFAIR
LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF

1989

Senator [H. ALEXANDER] SMITH. I have had called to
my attention that the minimum wage legislation in Great
Britain and Australia was an outcome of a socialistic
government ....
Senator [PAUL] DOUGLAS. Historically ...

in Australia

it was put into effect.., by the Liberal Party. But in the
state of Victoria, which is where minimum wages were
tried most, it was by the so-called Conservative Party.
I would like to have the Secretary's statement as to
whether he believes the minimum wage is a socialistic
institution?
Secretary [of Labor JAMES] MITCHELL. No, sir.17

What possible context could link Karl Marx, who spilled
nothing but contemptuous bile on socialist demands for a statutory
minimum wage,' 8 with the U.S. national minimum wage and
overtime law? After all, Marx's account of the 400-year history of
Britain's "Blood Legislation ...

for Depressing Wages," which

imposed a maximum on wages in order to suppress workers' efforts
17

Amending the FairLabor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the

Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
84th Cong. 58-59 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Hearings].
s In 1880, leading French socialists asked Marx and Engels' help in drafting
a labor party electoral program, which included a reformist demand for a
statutory minimum wage, of which Marx said: "If the French proletariat is still
so childish that it requires such bait, so is it not worth while drawing up any
programme whatever." Letter from Karl Marx to Adolph Sorge (Nov. 5, 1880),
in 34 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, WERKE 475-76 (1966) (the latter part

of this quotation is in English in the original); see also Letter from Friedrich
Engels to Eduard Bernstein (Oct. 25, 1881), in 35 MARX & ENGELS, supra at
232.
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to take advantage of temporarily favorable constellations of supply
and demand in the labor market, but never a minimum wage to
sustain their health and welfare, stressed that once the capitalist
mode of production consolidated itself, such state-enforced
measures were no longer necessary. On the contrary: at that point,
refractory workers would be taken care of by capitalism's own
"natural laws."'19
The connection between Marx and the FLSA emerges in the
exemptions and exclusions from that statute. The reason for this
rather curious link is straightforward. The national minimum wage
law fulfills a function analogous to the British maximum hours
statutes-which workers in the United States generally still
lack-that Marx praised: it imposes limits on the exploitability of
especially vulnerable and unorganized workers.20 Once such a
statute protects the vast majority of a national working class and
becomes an integral part of the institutional background of the
labor market, those workers who are excluded from its protections
are exposed to more palpable and brutal conditions of exploitation.
Similarly, their employers, who are exempt from this law, become
legal outlaws, free to impose on them the kinds of unfair labor
standards that also make these employers unfair competitors vis-ivis firms that are subject to and comply with the law.
What is the purpose of privileging the creation of these
economic free-fire zones? Such a deregulatory program suited not
only the rugged individualist rhetoric of the Reagan-Bush decade,
but also the then new iconoclastic economic view that small
businesses created most new jobs.2" As presented by President
George Bush, whose explanation on the occasion of signing into
law the minimum wage increase in 1989 furnishes an epigraph to
this Article, the point of banishing the employees of small firms
from the regime of entitlement to minimum and premium overtime
wages is transparent enough: to enable small capitalists ruthlessly

'9 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE,
ENGELS, WERKE 761-70 (1962) (1867).
20 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE,

23 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH

in
in

23 MARX & ENGELS, supra note 18, at 279-320.
2' David Birch, Who Creates Jobs?, PUB. INTEREST No. 65 (Fall 1981), at
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to use unfettered labor market forces to pay low wages so that they
can accelerate their accumulation of capital and facilitate the
breakthrough to large-scale operations.
Here Marx reenters. He presented a history of the "so-called
original accumulation" of capital to puncture apologetic Adam
Smithian fairy tales of a peaceful "previous" accumulation, which
were supposed to make plausible the mystery of the concentration
of masses of capital and labor power in the hands of commodity
producers, which is the result, but also the prerequisite, of capitalist
production. In Marx's account this prehistory of capital, by
contrast, was a centuries-long bloody process of the violent
and their forced transforexpropriation of the immediate producers
22
proletariat.
modem
the
mation into
In explaining why he and the Congress decided to excuse small
employers from paying the minimum wage and overtime, President
Bush offered a new variant of the story of the previous accumulation of capital. Unlike the Smithian version, however, it was not set
in "that rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation
of stock and the appropriation of land .... Instead of choosing
a fictitious location, Bush unmistakably placed it in the real latetwentieth-century business world. Ironically, what is mythical about
this type of previous accumulation is not its site, but its very
existence: for the typical effect of privileging a sector committed
to unfair labor standards is not to catapult small employers into the
ranks of large capital, but to enable already existing wage "chiselers" to survive and to encourage additional ones to start up.
In one ironic sense, however, the supposed basis for the
exemption is, literally, set in a quasi-Smithian pre-accumulation
state: one-fourth to one-third of all construction business owners
report that they used no capital at all to start or become the owner
of their business.24 The ease with which would-be wage-chiselers

22 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE, in

23 MARX & ENGELS, supranote 18, at 741-91; ADAM

SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 259-60 (Edwin Cannan

ed. 1937)(1776).
supra note 22, at 47.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS: CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS 118 tbl.14a (1997) (indicating that 26.4 percent of
2 SMITH,

24
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can go into the construction business and take advantage of the
exemption from coverage under the FLSA is even greater than
these capital-less origins suggest. Many small special trade
contractors, such as roofers, require their customers to pay for
materials in advance. Moreover, in many cases the customers also
pay the employees' wages: where contractors lack either assets or
credit to meet their payroll, they, like the roofing contractor
mentioned at the outset, unlawfully shifting their entrepreneurial
risk, do not pay their workers until they themselves are paid.
By perpetuating the very conditions that it was the purpose of
the FLSA to eliminate, Bush's approach undermines the law's
underlying proto-industrial policy of driving such "parasitic"
employers out of business and concentrating production in more
efficient firms.25 It also deflects attention from the fact that many
construction employers (who remain or choose to remain) small can
afford to pay high (union) wages and still make "a comfortable, if
not luxurious living."26
It was precisely firms, small or large, that were unable to
increase productivity in the wake of mandated wage increases that
a wage and hour statute was designed to oust from business in
favor of more productive entities. Senator Kit Bond recently
illustrated the inversion of industrial policy that has occurred by
adducing a small firm's very inability to adapt to external stimuli

all construction business owners needed no capital to start their businesses); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987 ECONOMIC CENSUS: CHARACTERISTICS OF
BUSINESS OWNERS 98 tbl.15a (1992) (reporting that proportions ranged from
26.2 percent among women, to 32.3 percent among white men, to 40.0 percent
among blacks). The start-up capital "includes assets and money that were your
own, that were given to you, and that you borrowed." Id. at C-1. Since capital
requirements in the specialty trades, which constitute the bulk of the smallest
employers, are below average for construction, this cross-tabulation, if available,
would presumably reveal an even higher percentage of capital-less business
founders.
25 Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as IndustrialPolicy: A ForgottenRole,

16 J.

LEGIS.

151, 152 (1990).

26 Gay Miller, Union PlumberFightsNonunion Competitorand BarbsAbout
Bills, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1977, at 1, 17 (reporting that plumbing contractor
earns $29,000 a year on revenue of $279,000 paying $12.33 an hour including
benefits to four union journeymen plumbers).
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as the reason for keeping it alive: "If you increase the minimum
wage for the smallest of the employers, there are real tradeoffs. The
smallest of the small employers, American businesses grossing
under $500,000 per year, will, in my view, be forced to lay off
workers. .

.

. An increase in wages with no increase in productivity

and revenues means lost jobs. ' ' 17 Moreover, exempting the very
employers who are most likely not to pay the minimum wage turns
into a farce the carefully orchestrated debates over raising a
minimum wage that will not apply to those who need it most. (That
farcicalness is underscored by the hopelessly obsolete level of the
minimum wage setting: even after it was increased to $4.75 in
1996, it amounted, in real terms, to only 65.9 percent of its all-time
highest value in 1968, and remained far below the level attained in
all years between 1956 and 1984.)28
In an effort to enlist new sources of support for labor market
deregulation, Republicans have more recently taken to suggesting
that it is also a feminist policy: "Almost 8 million women-owned
businesses exist in the United States, and many of those ...

are

very small businesses just getting started. If they are getting started,
if they are making a success, we do not want to penalize them and
their workers by imposing on the smallest of the small businesses
a burden that they cannot handle. 2 9 President Clinton's administrator of the Small Business Administration ("SBA") went even
further, suggesting that subminimum wages in small businesses
were discounted, as it were, by the fee that workers there owed the
owners for employing them in their first jobs, providing general
skills, "hiring a large fraction of part time, seasonal and contingent
workers," and "bearing the cost of turnover associated with
minimum wage jobs."3

27

28

142 CONG. REC. 7410 (1996) (statement of Sen. Bond).
Calculated according to U.S. Dept. of Labor, Value of the Federal

Minimum Wage, 1954-1996, (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://dol.gov/dol/esa/public/minwage/chart2.htm>. See GABRIEL KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 326 (1984) (referring to the FLSA as "irrelevant to human
needs...").
29 142 CONG. REC. at 7464 (statement of Sen. Bond).
30 142 CONG. REC. at 7465 (statement of Sen. Bond quoting from a letter

from Phil Lader to the Secretary of Labor).

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

415

If these alleged "costs ' '31 seem more like the conditions that
enable employers to take advantage of workers with little labor
market power, just how far national economic policy has regressed,
at least rhetorically, since the New Deal can be gauged by Senator
Borah's response in 1937 to Senator Pepper's question as to what
would happen under the FLSA if an employer could not afford to
pay a living wage: "he should close up the business. No business
has a right to coin the very lifeblood of workmen into dollars and
32
cents.
The left-wing Keynesian economist Joan Robinson, adapting
Oscar Wilde's bon mot, tweaked Marx by observing that the only
thing worse than being exploited is not being exploited-namely,
being unemployed. Late-twentieth-century employment policy in
the United States appears to be based on a transvaluation of
Robinson's dictum: it is not so much that the only thing worse than
being superexploited is not being superexploited, but, rather, that
being superexploited, that is, working in the unfair labor standards
sector, is actually good not only for their hyper-accumulating
employers and the economy as a whole, but for the workers
themselves. In contrast, even in the midst of the enormous
unemployment of the 1930s, the original proponents of the FLSA
proceeded from a radically different set of values. Senator Borah,
for example, recognized no exceptions to his principle that
"American industry can pay its employees enough to enable them
to live. . . . [W]e have no right to work slaves in this country,
either white or black.... I start with the proposition that the right
to live is higher than the right to own a business., 33 Sixty years
later, Senator Bond, seeking allies for an amendment excluding yet
more workers from the minimum wage, seemed to suggest that
software-billionaires owed their vertical take-off careers from their
humble beginnings in a garage to an exemption from paying the
minimum wage: "If they become successful, like a Microsoft, as
soon as they hit $500,000 annual gross revenue, then the minimum
wage goes up to the full amount provided in this bill. 34
31 Id.
32

81 CONG. REC. 7796 (1937).

33 Id.

34 142 CONG. REC. at 7464.
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Implicit in this Horatio Alger story is the admonition to those
who work for the vast majority of would-be entrepreneurs who
never grow into minimum wage coverage not to despair: their
sacrifices make possible the Microsofts of the world. The severe
employment-related disruptions associated with the typically brief
lives and brutal deaths of small businesses also fed the new
ideology of universal risk glorified by market-knows-besters in the
wake of the demise of the post-World War II Keynesian boom. In
the words of David Birch, the Reagan-era originator of the thesis
that small businesses create most new jobs: "Those firms that
insulate themselves from fluctuations appear to have cut off the
very vitality that keeps their counterparts going. Just as failure
appears essential to our system, so does instability."35
III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE ANTIQUATED NOTION OF
INTRASTATE COMMERCE AND SMALL BUSINESS
[A]n establishment that is under $500,000 in annual gross
receipts probably would not be substantially engaged in
interstate commerce.36
Initially, the implicit exemption of small employers from the
FLSA in 1937-1938 resulted from the trepidations of the legislative
drafters in the Roosevelt administration and Congress that the
Supreme Court might strike down the statute as an unconstitutionally broad exercise of the legislature's commerce power." A
cautious approach was especially prevalent in the wake of the
1936 decision in Carter v Carter Coal Company--the Court's
atavistically narrow interpretation of the commerce clause as
applied to federal regulation of the coal industry in the midst of the
greatest economic crisis in U.S. history:
"

Birch, supra note 21, at 9.

Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before
the House Committee on Education & Labor, 81st Cong. 95 (1949) (testimony
36

of Harold Nystrom, Chief, Interpretation Branch, Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Dept. of Labor) [hereinafter 1949 Hearings].
" On the drafters' preoccupation with the possibility that the Supreme Court
would strike down the statute, see George Paulsen, Ghost of the NRA: Drafting
National Wage and Hour Legislation in 1937, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 241 (1986).
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The relation of employer and employee is a local relation.
At common law, it is one of the domestic relations. The
wages are paid for the doing of local work. Working
conditions are obviously local conditions. The employees
are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in
producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils,
which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize,
are local controversies and evils affecting local work
undertaken to accomplish that local result. Such effect as
they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may
be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness
of the effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its
character.38
Based on this unambiguous rejection, the Solicitor of Labor
informed the Secretary of Labor in early 1937 that any proposed
labor legislation seeking to regulate "business enterprises of a
purely local nature" "categorically possesses no constitutional
validity."39 Nevertheless, in April, just six weeks before the FLSA
bill was introduced, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act, which empowered the
National Labor Relations Board to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice "affecting commerce. ' 4
4 in effect overturnNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
ing Carter Coal Company, finally made it possible to use an
economically realistic concept of interstate commerce as the basis
of federal labor standards legislation: "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens or obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to

" Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308-09 (1936).
from Charles Gregory to Frances Perkins 1, 4 (Jan. 19, 1937), in
Frances Perkins Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University
Library (Subject: Constitutional Validity of Proposed Collective Bargaining
Legislation) (on file with author).
40 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1994).
'9 Letter

41

301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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exercise that control."'42 The Court, however, did set limits: this
power could not be extended to "effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government. 43 The decision galvanized the Roosevelt
administration to push forward with a fair labor standards bill, but
some of the drafters were still skeptical of whether the Supreme
Court would find that low wages and long hours spawned labor
disputes that obstructed commerce. 44
In his message to Congress on May 24, 1937, the day on which
the FLSA bill was introduced, President Roosevelt conceded that
"there are many purely local pursuits and services which no Federal
legislation can effectively cover."45 Although the original administration FLSA bill was titled, "A Bill To provide for the establishment of fair labor standards in employments in and affecting
interstate commerce," and its preamble or "legislative declaration"
was phrased in terms of the "employment of workers in substandard labor conditions in occupations in interstate commerce, in the
production of goods for interstate commerce, or otherwise directly
affecting interstate commerce,, 46 the more expansive concept of
"affecting interstate commerce" did not survive the conference
committee.47 The elimination of this wider scope was, as the
Wage and Hour Administrator, who was to become increasingly
frustrated by the limits of his enforcement jurisdiction, later
observed, "primarily based on doubts as to whether coverage
Jones, 301 U.S. at 37. See also Robert Stem, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-1946: Part Two, 59 HARv. L. REV. 883, 885
(1946).
41 Jones, 301 U.S. at 37.
42

44 GEORGE PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN: THE

QUEST FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 1933-1941 74-75 (1996). The Supreme

Court finally approved the "'labor dispute' theory" of coverage in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968).
45 The PresidentRecommends LegislationEstablishingMinimum Wages and
Maximum Hours, supra note 1, at 214.
46 S. 2745, 75th Cong. § l(a) (1937).
4' H.R. REP. No. 75-2738, at 13, 28 (1938); Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938).
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would be sustained by the Supreme

Court."

Those small employers that became exempt from the statute did
so by virtue of the design of its narrow interstate commerce
coverage provision, which did not even dare to reach the constitutionally permissible limits: intended to regulate only those industries and firms most unassailably engaged in interstate commerce,
it inevitably left uncovered small companies whose operations were
deemed remote from the national market. Thus Senator Hugo
Black, who introduced the administration bill and chaired the
Education and Labor Committee, reported on behalf of the
committee six weeks later, when its revised bill still included
"affecting interstate commerce," that the bill "carefully excludes
. .business ...of a purely local nature. [I]t is not even intended
to include ...those purely local and small business establishments
that happen to lie near State lines, and solely on account of such
location, actually serve a wholly local community trade within two
States." 49 Black, who presided over the first set of hearings, made
clear the link between small size and noninterstate commerce by
observing that the bill provided "standards for those business units
that are actually engaged in and substantially and materially
affecting interstate commerce . . .[1]eaving to the States and the
local communities .. the power of regulating the small business
units that affect the local community only. 5 Senator Black also
emphasized that by limiting coverage to "goods which are actually
manufactured for transportation and are transported in interstate
commerce," the bill "eliminate[d] ...any idea that this is an effort
to regulate wages and hours in the various service employments.
S.. Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson, the administration's chief spokesman at the hearings, whose task was to address
the constitutional issues of the commerce power, added that as a
*

48 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS
DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 52 (1946).
49 S. REP. No. 75-884, at 5 (1937).

"OFair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on Labor, 75th
Cong. 36 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 Hearings].
1181 CONG. REC. 7648 (1937).
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result of administrative impracticalities, "perhaps it is best at the
present moment not to attempt to regulate ...

[s]mall employers

,,52

This legislative cautiousness, however, soon proved superfluous.
As early as 1941, the Supreme Court, in rejecting a commerce
clause-based attack against the FLSA, signaled that an employer's
size alone did not compel a constitutionally based exemption:
Congress, to attain its objective in the suppression of
nationwide competition in interstate commerce by goods
produced under substandard conditions, has made no
distinction as to the volume or amount of shipments in the
commerce or of production for commerce by any particular
shipper or producer. It recognized that in present day
industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole
and that the total effect of
the competition of many small
53
producers may be great.
Indeed, in 1948, when the Wage and Hour Division ("WHD")
of the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") published data on the
size-distribution of covered establishments, two-fifths employed
three or fewer employees, including 18 percent that employed only
one employee.5 4 And in 1961, when Congress adopted the more
expansive enterprise coverage approach, the use of a dollar-volume
exemption level was designed to "provide more than adequate
assurance that the newly covered enterprises will be those plainly
engaged to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and should
make it abundantly certain that no small local business will be
affected."55 By the 1960s, after the Supreme Court had removed

52

1937 Hearings, supra note 50, at 49.

s United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941).
14 Calculated according to U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE
PUBLIC

CONTRACTS

DIVISIONS,

ANNUAL REPORT

85

AND HOUR AND

tbl.16 (1948).

The

establishments for which no size distribution were available have been omitted
from this calculation. The first such data (for 1950) to include construction
revealed that 42 percent of the establishments employed three or fewer
employees compared to 38 percent for all industries. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 276

tbl.14 (1950).
15

S. REP. No. 87-145, at 44 (1961).
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virtually all commerce-clause restraints on congressional power to
regulate the economy,56 Congress pushed coverage to small and
local sites within the economic network of which the New Deal
drafters of the FLSA could scarcely have dreamt. By the late
1960s, for example, the law required virtually all construction
firms, regardless of size, to pay the minimum wage and time and
one-half for overtime hours.
A few years later Congress was so confident of the reach of its
commerce power that it could even "find[] that the employment 5of
'7
persons in domestic service in households affects commerce.
Indeed, the way in which Congress fashioned this finding in 1974
verged on a constitutional provocation:
The Committee found that domestics and the equipment
that they use in their work are in interstate commerce. For
example, vacuum cleaners are produced in only six States,
and laundry equipment is produced in only seven States,
creating a tremendous flow in commerce of these items
used daily by domestics. Also it is common knowledge that
every domestic handles such items as soap, wax, and other
household cleaners which have moved in interstate commerce. .

.

. In addition, employment of domestics in

households frees time for the members of the household to
themselves engage in activities in interstate commerce.58
Yet three years later, a Democratic-controlled Congress set a
precedent by increasing rather than decreasing the dollar-volume
threshold below which employers were exempt from enterprise
coverage. And in 1989, the Bush administration, by maneuvering
congressional Democrats into acquiescing in an unprecedented
retrograde curtailment of coverage (based on firm size) as the quid
pro quo for an increase in the minimum wage, succeeded in
excluding a large number of additional workers-potentially
56

Even the Supreme Court's stunning reversal of its 60-year-old expansive

and deferential commerce power jurisprudence in holding unconstitutional a
statute that criminalized knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone
expressly reaffirmed the broad reach of the FLSA. United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
17 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1993).
" S. REP. No. 93-690, at 21 (1974).
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including 1.25 million or one-fourth of all construction employees-from the FLSA. In relieving tens of thousands of employers
of the necessity of paying their employees the social wage,
Congress has chosen to re-expose millions of workers to the
bracing experience of total immersion in the sphere of unfair labor
standards.

IV

THE VICISSITUDES OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY COVERAGE

In my judgment, these people are in interstate commerce.
They have been for the last 20 years. However, we have
exempted them from the coverage of the act for economic
reasons, not for constitutional reasons. 59
From the outset, the FLSA was dysfunctionally flawed by the
discrepancy between its broadly declared objectives, on the one
hand, and its narrow scope of coverage, intervention, and protection, on the other. The "Finding and Declaration of Policy" in the
first section of the act announced that Congress sought to regulate
interstate commerce in order to "correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate" "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers" that existed in industries
engaged in commerce and production of goods for commerce and
were spread and perpetuated through interstate commerce.6
However, instead of structuring the statute so as to encompass as
many workers as possible in order to effectuate this policy,
Congress imposed a very narrow conception of coverage and
superimposed on this general framework a substantively irrational
and scandalously extensive hodgepodge of exemptions of employers
and exclusions of workers that made it impossible to block the
ramifying effects of wage-cutting throughout an increasingly
national economy. In 1981, the Minimum Wage Study Commission

106 CONG. REC. S16,678 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1960) (statement of Sen.
John F. Kennedy).
60 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 2(a), (b), 52 Stat. 1060,
59

1060 (1938).
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determined that 10 percent of the employed workforce was not
covered by the FLSA, but exemptions excluded a further 27 percent
and 31 percent from the minimum wage and overtime provisions,
respectively.6 This "bewildering array"6 2 of exemptions and
exclusions, the products of efficacious employer lobbying, have
become even more voluminous over time.63 The commission
calculated that "42 exemptions completely or partially exempt
almost 30 million private-sector workers" from the minimum wage
or overtime provisions.'
The construction industry is an important case in point. When
the FLSA was enacted in 1938, it was generally believed that most
construction workers would not be entitled to the minimum wage
or overtime because few could meet the requirement of being
personally and individually "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce . . .. , That year the Wage
and Hour Administrator issued an interpretative bulletin stating
that: "The employees of local construction contractors generally are
not engaged in interstate commerce and do not produce any goods
which are shipped or sold across State lines. Thus it is our opinion
that employees engaged in the original construction of buildings are
not generally within the scope of the Act, even if the buildings
when completed are used to produce goods for commerce." Some
construction workers, however, the administrator ventured to
speculate, might be covered. Employees of contractors engaged in
the maintenance, repair, or reconstruction of highways, railroads,

61

Stephen Welch, FLSA Coverage, Exemptions and Violations: Some

Institutional Considerations, in 3

REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY

COMMISSION 1, 14 (1981).
62

Id. at 5.

63

29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994).
107 (1981).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 6(a), 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060,

64 1 REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION
65

1062, 1063 (1938). To be sure, many of the construction workers not covered by
the FLSA were protected by the pre-New Deal Davis-Bacon Act, which required
contractors on federal government projects to pay prevailing wages, thus
protecting local wage levels from efforts by itinerant contractors to depress them
by importing workers from other regions to work at lower rates. Act of Mar. 3,
1931, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494; ARMAND THIEBLOT, JR., THE DAvIS-BACON ACT
(1975).
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bridges, pipelines, and other "essential instrumentalities of interstate
or foreign commerce would seem to be engaged in interstate
commerce," while those employed to maintain, repair, or reconstruct buildings "used to produce goods for interstate commerce
would seem to be engaged in a 'process or occupation necessary to
the production' of such goods within Section 30) of the Act" and
thus covered.66
The first estimates of FLSA coverage that the WHD compiled
in April 1939 did not even include construction workers among the
4,632,500 covered nonmanufacturing employees.67 During World
War 11 (1943), the WIlD estimated that only 200,000 of 1,500,000
construction workers were covered and subject to the act's
minimum wage and overtime provisions.68
Despite the enormous amount of large-scale industrial, military,
and infrastructural construction activity during World War II, even
after it ended, the Associated General Contractors of America

66

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETA-

TIVE BULLETIN No.

5, in 1940 WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL 18, 23 (Dec. 2, 1938;

rev. Nov. 27, 1939). Vivien Hart incorrectly asserted that in the course of having
"demolished specific exemptions" in 1966, Congress extended the definition of
interstate commerceto include construction. The Right to a Fair Wage: American
Experience and the European Social Charter, in WRITING A NATIONAL
IDENTITY:

POLITICAL,

ECONOMIC,

AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

ON THE

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 106, 117 (VivienHart & Shannon Stimson eds., 1993).

First, construction was never exempt; second, it was not interstate commerce, but
enterprise coverage that was defined to include construction; and finally, the year
was 1961.
67 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE WAGE AND
HOuR DIVISION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FOR THE CALENDAR
YEAR 1939 at 40-41 (1940). A comparative estimate of coverage in 1939 and

1947 also listed none of the 1,150,000 construction workers as covered in 1939.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS DIVISION,
ANNUAL REPORT 80 tbl.13 (1948). The accuracy of these and all later DOL

coverage estimates mentioned is suspect. According to Allan Moss, the chief
economist of the WHD, the DOL never even revealed the underlying methodology. Moss is supervising preparation of new estimates for the 1990s, which he
says will be the most accurate ever. Unfortunately, he would not pre-release the
data, which were supposed to be available in early 1998. Telephone Interviews
with Allan Moss (Nov. & Dec. 1997, Jan. 1998, Apr. 28, 1998).
68 S. REP. NO. 79-1012, Pt. 2, at 87 tbl.44 (1946).
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complained to the Senate Labor Committee that "the greatest
uncertainty" existed as to FLSA's applicability to construction:
"The extent to which various construction operations constitute
engaging in interstate commerce, or producing goods for interstate
commerce has not yet been determined... although the law was
enacted in 1938. " 69 The committee itself could do no better than
offer its guess that construction was "[p]robably covered ....
That construction firms preferred undergoing the anxiety of "the
greatest uncertainty" to paying their employees overtime voluntarily
and thus avoiding any legal disputes, suggests that construction
workers lacked the labor market power to achieve such premium
rates on their own-precisely
the defect that the mandatory norm
71
was designed to remedy.
These early interpretations and speculations gave a premonition
of the complex, narrow, and quasi-arbitrary judicial glosses that
would follow as courts in the course of deciding coverage disputes
strove to give meaning to cramped statutory language that increasingly conflicted with the FLSA's invasively anticontractual
orientation and the realities of a highly interdependent economy. As
late as 1960, just a year before Congress expansively broadened the
act's commerce-based coverage, the Supreme Court, in yet another
rearguard action denying overtime protection to employees of one
of the country's largest construction firms who had built a dam to
increase a city's water reservoir capacity, adverted to this tension:

69

Amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before a

Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Educationand Labor, 79th Cong. 88384 (1945) [hereinafter 1945 Hearings].
70 S. REP. No. 79-1012, Pt. 2, at 91. The committee's uncertainty was in
part a result of the fact that although the National Labor Relations Act provided
for coverage of activities affecting commerce, construction was "the only major
industry over which NLRB has not asserted jurisdiction." Id. Prior to the
enactment of Taft-Hartley in 1947, "Few cases were filed from the construction
industry because of its widespread unionization and the nature of collective
bargaining prevailing, and the Board had no desire to extend its operations into
that field." HARRY MiLLIs & EMILY BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFTHARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 401
(1950).
7' By the early postwar period, FLSA's unchanged minimum wage of 40
cents was so obsolete as to be economically irrelevant.
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limits on coverage cannot be understood merely in terms
of the social purposes of the Act, in light of which any
limitations must appear inconsistent. For the Act also
manifests the competing concern of Congress to avoid
undue displacement of state regulation of activities of a
dominantly local character. Accommodation of these
interests was sought by the device of confinement of
coverage to employment in activities of traditionally
national concern.72
In upholding the FLSA against a commerce clause-based
constitutional challenge in 1941, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the congressional commerce power "extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the
power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.",73 But
the next year the Supreme Court made it equally clear that: "The
history of the legislation leaves no doubt that Congress chose not
to enter areas which it might have occupied. As passed by the
House, the bill applied to employers 'engaged in commerce in any
industry affecting commerce.'... But the bill recommended by the
conference applied only to employees 'engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce' . ...,,74
With the constitutional obstacles removed, it was up to
Congress to enlarge the scope of coverage. The FLSA underwent
no changes during World War II, but literally within days of the
end of the war, President Truman accorded an important place to
amending the statute in his program for the reconversion period.
Starting from the position that the "foundations of a healthy
national economy cannot be secure so long as any large section of

72

Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 316 (1960). On the

company's size, see H. B. Zachry Co. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 546, 548 (5th Cir.

1959).
" United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
74 A. B. Kirschbaun Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942). The next
year the Court reaffirmed that in the FLSA "Congress did not intend that the
regulation of hours and wages should extend to the furthest reaches of federal
authority." McLeod v. Threkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493 (1943).
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our working people receive substandard wages," Truman proposed
an extension of the act's scope. The basis for the proposal focused
on avoiding a race to the bottom: "There now exists a twilight zone
in which some workers are covered, and others, doing similar work,
are not. Extension of coverage would benefit both workers and
employers by removing competitive inequities. 7 5 Truman's State
of the Union Message in 1946 repeated the recommendation,
shifting the focus to the need for a "decent standard of living" for
those who did not "happen to be covered by the act as it now
'7 6
stands.
In 1946 the Wage and Hour Administrator, who was confronted
with the problem of enforcing the FLSA, was still complaining of
the "serious problem" resulting from the fact that firms operating
on an intrastate basis in competition with interstate firms were
lawfully able to avoid minimum wage and overtime payments. As
a result, the statutory policy of "eliminat[ing] unfair competition in
common is defeated." The administrator accordingly recommended
that Congress amend the FLSA to reach the "activities affecting
commerce" that the Supreme Court has already approved.77
That same year, the Senate Education and Labor Committee
reported out a bill embodying the Truman administration's
coverage recommendations. Senate Bill 1349 sought to exercise the
congressional commerce power vindicated by the Supreme Court
by affording minimum wage and overtime protection to employees
of enterprises engaged in an "activity affecting commerce." This
key term was, in turn, defined to include "any activity in commerce
or necessary to commerce or competing with any activity in
commerce or where the payment of wages at rates below those
prescribed by this Act or where the employment of oppressive child

" Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21 -Point

Program for the Reconversion Period, reprinted in
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY

(1961).
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Harry S. Truman, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and

on the Budget for 1947, reprintedin PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN: 1946 36, 58 (1962).
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U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS

DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 51-52 (1947).
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labor would burden or obstruct or tends to burden or obstruct
commerce or the free flow of commerce., 78 The standards of
"competing with any activity in commerce," reminiscent of the
extraordinarily broad commerce power approved by the Supreme
Court in Wickard v Filburn,79 and of obstructing commerce,
modeled after the National Labor Relations Act ('NLRA"),8
made it perhaps the broadest scope of coverage ever proposed for
the FLSA, especially since the National Labor Relations Board had
never asserted jurisdiction over many of the employers that Senate
Bill 1349 would have covered. 8 The language would keep
reappearing in FLSA bills for years. The bill also limited the
exemption for retail and service employers to those with four or
fewer establishments with a total annual sales volume of no more
than $500,000.82
Despite this expansive amendment, the committee did not
believe that most theretofore excluded workers would be brought
into the act. For example, it estimated that the coverage of
construction workers would be doubled; but since only one-fifth
had been previously covered, three-fifths would remain uncovered.
The committee was, however, also relatively unconcerned about the
level of coverage: because a large proportion of the industry was
unionized, wage rates below the minimum wage or time and a half
did not appear to be a major problem.83 In the event, even without

" S. 1349, 79th Cong. § 2(d) (1946).
79
80

317 U.S. 111 (1942).

Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§ 151 (1994)).
8 1955 Hearings,supra note 17, at 7 (letter from Stuart Rothman, Solicitor
of Labor, to Sen. Douglas discussing same language).
82
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83 S.

1349 § 9.

REP. NO. 79-1012, Pt. 2, at 92 (1946). Calculating the degree of

unionization among construction workers has always been made difficult by the
extraordinary fluctuations in employment within a year and by the fact that the
construction unions represent many workers who are employed outside of the
construction industry. In the late 1940s, total building trades union membership
amounted to about 2.4 million. LEO TROY, TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP, 18971962 tbls.A-1, A-2, A-3 (1965). In 1951, the president of the AFL-CIO Building
and Construction Trades Department estimated the degree of organization at 90
percent, but this figure was unrealistically high. To Amend the NationalRelations
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the amendment, the WHD estimated that in 1947 one-third 84of
construction workers were entitled to protection under the act.
Labor's weakness in 1946 was reflected in the fact that the full
Senate passed the bill without the expanded coverage provision.85
In the House, the Committee on Labor failed
even to include
86
expanded coverage in the bill it reported out.
This legislative failure prompted the Wage and Hour Administrator to reiterate his plea for expansion of coverage. In 1948, he
declared that the "coverage provisions do not make possible the
attainment" of the act's objectives of eliminating substandard labor
conditions in industries producing goods for commerce or unfair
competition in such industries resulting from such conditions.
Moreover, the "unequal treatment of employees who work together
in the same plant" resulting from individual worker-based coverage
caused "dissatisfaction and friction." If, on the other hand, an
employer voluntarily paid uncovered employees the same minimum
or overtime wages as covered workers, it might be "at a disadvantage in competing with other plants producing for intrastate
consumption which do not pay the minimum wage."8'
Despite the Senate labor committee's cavalier attitude toward
the problem, litigation in the 1940s and 1950s brought by construction workers complaining that they had not been paid the minimum
wage and overtime in conformity with the FLSA was voluminous.
The court rulings on the scope of interstate commerce coverage of
the construction industry were tortuous-"matters," as the Supreme
Court fastidiously put it, "of the nicest degree."8 8 A few examples

Act of 1947, with Respect to the Building and ConstructionIndustry: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor Management Relations of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong. 57-58 (1951)
(statement of Richard Gray).
84 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS

DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 80-81 tbls.13, 14 (1948).
8' 92 CONG. REC. 3205 (1946).
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H.R. REP. NO. 79-2300 (1946).

17 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS

DIVISIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 89 (1948).
88 Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 321 (1960). Later opponents
of more expansive coverage argued that many judicial decisions upholding
coverage had been "ridiculous." 106 CONG. REC. S16,315-17 (1960) (statement
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will suffice. During World War II, Brown & Root, Inc., a very
large, profitable, anti-union, and-through its financing of the
congressional election campaigns of Lyndon Johnson in particular
and the Democratic Party as a whole-politically well-connected
national construction firm, built an ammunitions depot for the U.S.
Navy in Oklahoma.8 9 A group of some 60 workers who had
worked 10.5 to 11.5 hours daily every day for a year and one-half
without receiving overtime compensation was rebuffed by the
Tenth Circuit, which hair-splittingly ruled in 1949 that:
It is now well settled that employees engaged in the
original construction of a new building or facility are not
within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act ...,
even though the building or facility, when completed, will
be used for the production of goods for commerce or as an
instrumentality of interstate commerce.
The reason for this rule is that since the new building...
has not yet been dedicated to use in the production of
goods for commerce, although it may be intended to be so
used when completed, such work does not have such a
close and immediate tie to the production of goods for
commerce as to bring such worker within the coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ....90
The DOL not only accepted, but elaborated on this logic. In
1949 the chief of the Interpretations Branch of the DOL's Office
of the Solicitor testified before Congress that: "When the man is
constructing a building in the first instance for a factory, that
building may or may not be used for a factory. There is no way of
telling." 9 ' The perception that such limiting interpretations of
FLSA's reach left little prospect of progressive enlargement of the
universe of covered workers prompted the Democrats, after they

of Sen. Ellender).
" MARC LINDER, PROJECTING CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 119 (1994). Herman Brown,

the owner, "hated Negroes and he hated unions"-the former because they were
"lazy" and the latter because they "encouraged laziness in white men." ROBERT
CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 469 (1982).
90 McDaniel v. Brown & Root, Inc., 172 F.2d 466, 471 (10th Cir. 1949).
9'1949 Hearings, supra note 36, at 61 (testimony of Harold Nystrom).
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regained control of the Congress in the 1948 elections, to seek to
expand FLSA's coverage statutorily. Viewing President Truman's
re-election as a mandate to roll back the pro-employer policies of
the Eightieth Congress, Democrats introduced bills not only to
repeal Taft-Hartley,92 but to modernize the FLSA. In January
1949 administration bills were introduced in the Senate and House
creating enterprise coverage by extending the coverage of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions so that "every employer
who is engaged in any activity affecting commerce" had to pay to
each of his "employees employed in or about or in connection with
any enterprise where he is engaged" the requisite sums.93 Once
again, "activity affecting commerce," was defined to include "any
activity necessary to commerce or competing with any activity in
commerce or where the existence of labor standards below those
prescribed by this Act would burden or obstruct or tend to burden
94
or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce.
With this formulation the administration was frankly trying to
"define the scope to the furthest reaches of the commerce power."
The provision was designed, as the solicitor of labor testified to
Congress, to "reach employees in the States which unfortunately
have no State laws to protect them." 95 Among the categories of
construction workers whom the Truman administration intended to
bring within the FLSA were those engaged in the original construction of new factories, airports, warehouses, office, loft, and other
buildings or structures, "which will be used in commerce or
production of goods for commerce although they will not become
an integral part of existing facilities." In addition, employees
constructing apartment houses; stores, and residences would have

92

R. ALTON LEE, TRUMAN AND TAFT-HARTLEY: A QUESTION OF MANDATE

(1966).
9' H.R. 2033, 81st Cong. §§ 6(a), 7(a) (1949); S. 653, 81st Cong. §§ 6(a),
7(a) (1949).
94 H.R. 2033, 81st Cong. § 3(n); S. 653 § 3(n). The bills also excluded
employees of retail and service establishments whose employer had neither more
than four establishments nor a total sales volume of more than $500,000. H.R.

2033, § 13(a); S. 653 § 13(a).
95

1949 Hearings,supra note 36, at 26, 27 (testimony of William Tyson).
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been covered "if a substantial portion of materials used come from
96
other States.,
The pro-labor Democrats had, however, overestimated their
legislative strength. In the end, a coalition of Republicans and
southern Democrats were able not only to eliminate this approach,
but to insert language, designed to roll back coverage of local
business, restricting the coverage of those engaged in the production of goods for commerce to employees working on such goods
in closely related processes or occupations "directly essential" (in
contradistinction to the previous "necessary" standard) to that
97
production.
In the wake of Congress's failure to restructure coverage so as
to harmonize the act's expansive socio-economic policy with the
potentially almost limitless reach of the commerce power, the
federal courts continued handing down decisions ordaining
constricted and complex patterns of coverage. Even when construction workers prevailed-sometimes, to be sure, only after an
appellate court overturned the trial court judge-the reasoning
remained convoluted. The volume of reported federal litigation
indicates that nonpayment of overtime compensation was a
common practice even among large construction firms on large
projects.
In 1952 the Sixth Circuit, in adjudicating another overtime
claim, ruled that construction of an intrastate highway, which after
completion would carry interstate traffic, fell outside the scope of
the FLSA. A ruling in favor of coverage would, the court observed,
mean that "every passable country road is within the same
classification for practically every country road, however isolated
and however local, at some point carries passengers or freight to or
from some interstate destination." Against the background of such
slippery-slope logic, the court found that such a "sweeping
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1949 Hearings, supra note 36, at 123.

" This language was added to § 3j). For the legislative history, see Paul
Sanders, Basic Coverage of the Amended FederalWage and Hour Law, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 175 (1950). For the Wage and Hour Administrator's realistic interpretation of the restriction, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC
CONTRACTS DMSIoNs, ANNUAL REPORT 221-22 (1950).
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contention is not sustained by the sound and applicable law."' In
1954, the Fifth Circuit chided the parties for even invoking the
original construction doctrine in a case of "simply building housing
units so that the people of the little town of Ville Platte, Louisiana,
could have some place in which to live. Nothing... could be more
local and less integrated in interstate commerce. ' 99
The updated interpretive bulletin on FLSA coverage of the
construction industry that the WHD issued in 1956 summarized
several of the most important obstacles to individual employee
coverage:
Unless the construction work is physically or functionally
integrated or closely identified with an existing covered
facility it is not regarded as covered construction because
it is not closely enough related to or integrated with the
production of goods for commerce or the engagement in
commerce. For this reason the erection, maintenance or
repair of dwellings, apartments, hotels, churches and
schools are not covered projects. Similarly the construction
of a separate, wholly new, factory building, not constructed
as part or as an improvement of an existing covered
production plant, is not covered.'0°
The DOL experienced the difficulties in overcoming these
obstacles in 1959, when it brought suit on behalf of 72 construction
workers of a firm that built a new electronic organ factory that the
Baldwin Piano Company of Cincinnati decided to locate in
Arkansas in order to avail itself of "the favorable labor market and
other advantages ....
The federal district court rejected the
9 Koepfle v. Garavaglia, 200 F.2d 191, 193 (6th Cir. 1952).
99 Billeaudeau v. Temple Assoc., Inc., 213 F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1954).
The plaintiffs were watchmen on the site who received a little more than half the
minimum wage; they argued that they had received building materials shipped
interstate.
100 21 Fed. Reg. 5439, 5440 (1956) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R.
§ 776.26 (1997)). This interpretation is still valid as .applied to individual
employee coverage. Thus, where a small employer is exempt under enterprise
coverage, its employees could still be individually covered under the jurisprudence developed by the courts under the pre-1961 FLSA and embodied at

§§ 776.22b-.29.
101

Mitchell v. Tune, 178 F. Supp. 138, 140 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
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Secretary of Labor's argument that the workers were engaged in
the production of goods for commerce on the grounds that the new
plant extended, enlarged, and improved the original plant so as to
become2 integral and essential to the operation of the Ohio
10
plant.
Even after the Congress added expansive enterprise coverage to
the FLSA in 1961, courts had to strain mightily to find that
workers were entitled to overtime payments in disputes that had
arisen under the pre-1961 act. The Secretary of Labor had to file
suit on behalf of workers whose employer had failed to pay
overtime compensation for work building a woolen fabric manufacturing plant for Burlington Industries in 1959 and 1960. After a
detailed discussion of the relationship between the customer's old
and new plant, the trial judge concluded that the construction of the
new plant was "an integral part of the sequence of activities leading
to the production of a different fabric that was to be placed in the
channels of commerce, not a mere localized activity insignificantly
related thereto." Consequently, the work was "so 'directly essential'
and 'closely related' to actual production in or for commerce as to
be within ... that proximity to commerce which the Act demands
as a predicate to coverage."' 3 The DOL also sued a general
contractor specializing in the construction of manufacturing plants
for having violated the overtime rights of its employees who built
a plumbing brass factory for Crane Company in Arkansas to
replace two others in Chicago and Los Angeles. In 1963, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action,
ruling that it could not "conceive of any new construction more
'closely related' and more 'directly essential' to production of
goods for commerce than the relocation-replacement construction
of this factory, designed and dedicated to take the place of existing
plants and which was to operate as an integral part of Crane's
nation-wide business. ' ' "M
So deeply ingrained was the notion of individual engagement
in interstate commerce as the basis of FLSA coverage that it was

"02 Id. at 144.

'03 Goldbergv. BargerConstr. Co., 210 F. Supp. 752, 755 (W.D.N.C. 1962).
104 Wirtz v. H. D. McDaniel, 325 F.2d 75, 83 (8th Cir. 1963).
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not obvious to all that the novel concept of enterprise coverage had
displaced it. Even with regard to a case that had arisen after the
1961 act had gone into effect, a federal appeals court found it
necessary to instruct at least one trial court judge that he had
erroneously failed to find coverage because he had overlooked the
fact that Congress had added enterprise coverage in 1961.105
V

NATIONALIZING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE SCOPE OF THE

FLSA: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO ENTERPRISE COVERAGE
The amendment would continue to exempt the small
independent tradesman who employs his friends and
neighbors and whose sense of responsibility for their
welfare and his position in the community are the best
10 6
safeguards against his exploiting his employees.
Even where the DOL succeeded in persuading courts that
construction workers were engaged in commerce or the production
of goods for interstate commerce, the uncertainty of prevailing and
the necessity of having recourse to strained interpretations not only
made a mockery of the FLSA's objective of eliminating "labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers,"10' 7 but also made it impossible to establish nationally
uniform enforcement standards. In view of these socio-economically, politically, and administratively debilitating prospects, it was
not surprising that even the Eisenhower administration, joined by
a Democratic congressional majority, set out to enlarge the class of
covered workers and to reduce the volume of litigation over the
interstate commerce basis of coverage. As early as 1955, the
Economic Report of the President observed that "only" 24 million
of 44 million private-sector employees were covered by the FLSA
os
106

Childress v. Whitley Enters, 388 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1968).
H.R. REP. No. 79-2300, at 10 (1946) (publishing democratic minority

views of proposed amendment to impose coverage on retail and service firms
owning five or more establishments with a total annual sales of $500,000 or
more).
107 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060
(1938).
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in addition to 3.5 million covered under 20 state wage and hour
laws. The President's Council of Economic Advisors was not an
enthusiastic supporter of "minimum wage laws, which do not deal
with the fundamental causes of low incomes or poverty. However,
minimum wage laws can assist the comparatively small number of
workers who are at the fringes of competitive labor markets."
Despite its fears of "lower production and substantial unemployment" and inflation, the Council, impelled by the recognition that
both federal and state laws excluded the lowest-paid workers,
concluded that: "It would be well for both the Congress and the
States to consider the question of bringing substantial numbers of
workers excluded from the protection of a minimum wage, under
'
its coverage. 08
In 1955 the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, which was chaired by Paul Douglas,
an internationally well-known labor economist and former University of Chicago professor, held hearings on bills proposing to amend
the FLSA by increasing the minimum wage and coverage. The
subcommittee considered Senate Bill 662, which sought to expand
coverage by defining, once again, as an "activity affecting
commerce" "any activity in commerce, necessary to commerce or
competing with any activity in commerce or where the payment of
wages at rates below those prescribed by this Act would burden or
obstruct or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow
of commerce."' 9 The bill operationalized this definition, which
had been appearing in FLSA bills for years, by creating enterprisebased coverage: the amended minimum wage and overtime
provisions required employers "engaged in any activity affecting
commerce" to pay minimum wage and overtime to all their
employees." 0 The bill did not expressly include construction
employees (who had never been expressly excluded), but did cut
back the exclusion of employees in retail and service establishments
to those employed by an employer having four or fewer establish-

10 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

109S.

662, 84th Cong. § 3(d) (1955).
110S. 662 §§ 5(a), 6(a).

58-59 (1955).
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ments with a total annual sales volume of not more than
$500,000."'
That legislative movement would eventually occur was signaled
by the testimony of President Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor,
James Mitchell, who based his remarks on the recommendation in
the Economic Report. Without redefining the FLSA commerce
coverage, he testified that it would be possible to incorporate
multistate enterprises and other firms engaged "to a major extent"
in commerce or production of goods for commerce. But Mitchell
also revealed the administration's recognition of the necessity to
shift to enterprise coverage:" 2 "No sound reason appears why the
act should not apply throughout these businesses which are
controlled on an interstate basis. The claim may rightly be made
that industries of such interstate character are already covered under
the present language of the act. However, coverage of these
industries is spotty due to the fact that it is on an individualemployee basis rather than on an enterprise basis."" 3 Mitchell's
realism was in part driven by the insight that the "unequal
treatment" inherent in the requirement that individual employees be
engaged in commerce worked an "injustice" not only to the
employees, but also to "the fairminded employer who treats all of
his employees with evenhanded justice with respect to the act's
requirements. He is placed at a competitive disadvantage with the
employer who limits the benefits of the act to some of his
employees.""' 4
Although no legislation emerged from Congress in 1955, the
flurry of similar bills introduced during the remaining legislative
sessions of the first and second Eisenhower administration made it
apparent that expanded coverage based on a more modem and
realistic conception of national commerce was inevitable. Alone the
fact that retailing was no longer local-supermarkets had increased
their share of total food retail sales from less than one-fifth at the
time of the FLSA's enactment in 1938 to more than one-half by

.".S. 662 § 9.
1.2 1955 Hearings, supra note 17, at 45.
113 1955 Hearings, supra note 17, at 43-44.
114 1955 Hearings,supra note 17, at 47.
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5
1960-necessitated a reorientation of commerce coverage."
Enterprise coverage was acceptable to the administration, but the
question of how far the definition of interstate commerce could be
pushed was still open. In 1957, when the chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, Augustine Kelley, introduced House Bill 4575 which
repeated the same expansive definition used by Senate Bill 662 two
years earlier," 6 Secretary Mitchell, rejected it as "broader than
any language ever used by the Congress for application of the com-

merce clause .

. . ."

Nevertheless, he proposed an administration

alternative (enterprise "substantially engaged" in interstate commerce) accompanied by a very narrow wedge of inclusion for firms
employing 100 or more employees and receiving more than $1
million in materials from out of state. These very modest changes
would have added about 2.5 million covered workers including
200,000 in 100 construction firms." 7 Although the AFL-CIO
found the administration's approach disappointingly limited, the
fact that even the unions were, at least verbally and tactically,
"willing to support continued exemptions for small-business firms"
on the grounds that "the Main Street grocery store" should not be
subject to the same federal regulatory power as a large chainstore
betokened the possibility of eventual compromise."'
That the Kennedy administration would eventually engage the
issue was prefigured by Senator Kennedy's prominent role in
galvanizing support for such legislation in the Eighty-Sixth
Congress. As the chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare
Committee, he had introduced in 1959 Senate Bill 1046, which
proposed coverage that was in two respects significantly broader
than the provision that was ultimately enacted. First, going beyond
Senate Bill 662 of 1955, Kennedy's bill defined the key term,
"activity affecting commerce," as including "any activity in
commerce, necessary to commerce, or competing with any activity
"I H.R. REP. No. 87-75, at 8 (1961).
H.R. 4575, 85th Cong. § 3(c) (1957).
"'FairLaborStandardsAct: HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, 85th Cong. 3-4 (1957).
.1.
Id. at 34 (statement of Andrew Biemiller, Director of Legislative Dept.,
AFL-CIO).
116
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in commerce, or where the payment of wages at rates below those
prescribed in the Act, or the employment of child labor prohibited
by this Act, burdens or obstructs or tends to burden or obstruct
commerce or the free flow of commerce... 9 Second, among the
specifically enumerated categories of employers engaged in activity
affecting commerce was that of construction enterprises whose
annual gross sales volume was at least $50,000-a virtually
nominal threshold. 20 A bill, identical in these respects, was
introduced in the House of Representatives by James Roosevelt, the
121
former president's son.
These proposals for a significant expansion in coverage were
driven by the data, which the DOL prepared periodically and were
presented at the hearings, revealing the sectoral distribution of the
included and excluded workers. In 1957, for example, overall, only
24 million or 55 percent of 44 million private-sector wage and
salary workers were both covered by and not specifically excluded
(on some other grounds) from the minimum wage provision of the
FLSA. (This denominator excluded an additional 23 million
proprietors, self-employed, unpaid farm family workers, government employees, and executive, administrative, and professional
employees). This proportion varied from 99 percent in mining and
95 percent in manufacturing to 17 percent in services, 3 percent in
retail trade, and 0 in agriculture and domestic employment. Of
2,909,000 construction workers, the DOL estimated that only 44
percent were covered and not excluded. Failure to meet the FLSA's
definition of interstate commerce accounted for almost all the
1,616,000 excluded construction workers: 1,567,000 fell into this
category, whereas only 49,000 were excluded on some other
grounds. 122 The DOL also estimated that Senate Bill 1046 would

S. 1046, 86th Cong. § 2(c) (1959).
S. 1046 § 2(c).
121 H.R. 4488, 86th Cong. § 3(s), (t) (1959).
122 In contrast, overall, 27 percent of all excluded workers were excluded for
reasons other than a failure to meet the interstate commerce definition. Calculated
according to Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
86th Cong. 56-57 tbls. 1, 2 (1959) (attached to statement of Stanley Ruttenberg,
Director of Research, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter 1959 Hearings].
"9

120
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have offered minimum wage protection to about 40 percent of all
excluded workers. In construction, the low exemption threshold of
$50,000 would have brought in about 85 percent of all excluded
workers. To be sure, whereas almost one-half of all the additional
workers entitled to the minimum wage had been receiving less than
the proposed minimum of $1.25, only 10 percent of the newly
covered construction workers would have fallen into that group.
But a much larger proportion of construction workers would have
23
become newly entitled to time and one-half for overtime.
In a special legislative message in May 1960, during the last
congressional session of his presidency, Eisenhower characterized
an expansion of coverage (to include three million more workers)
as the most urgently needed change in the FLSA.124 After his
nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate in the summer
of 1960, Kennedy successfully pushed Senate Bill 3758, which
contained coverage based on an "enterprise engaged in an activity
affecting commerce," through the Senate. 125 Kennedy's bill
originally covered construction enterprises with annual gross sales
in excess of $50,000, but after considerable and complicated
legislative maneuvering, the threshold was ultimately set at
$350,000. 126
The corresponding House bill lacked the same expansiveness
(the original bill did not even include construction among the
enterprises engaged in an activity affecting commerce), and the
congressional conference committee failed to reach a compromise,

123

1959 Hearings,supra note 122, at 56-57 tbls. 1, 2. Charts 1-3 present the

tabular data in the form of graphs. 1959 Hearings,supranote 122, at 17-19. The
data on overtime coverage was not presented. For reasons that are not clear,
although the aggregate data was similar four years earlier, the DOL estimated
that in 1953 only 614,000, or 24 percent, of all 2,565,000 construction workers
were covered by the FLSA. 1955 Hearings,supra note 17, at 49 tbl. 1.
124 Special Message to the Congress on the Legislative Program,reprinted
in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D.

EISENHOWER: 1960-61, at 385, 392-93 (1961) (May 3, 1960).
125

126

S. 3758, 86th Cong. § 2(s), (t); S. REP. NO. 86-1744 (1960).
106 CONG. REC. at S16,214 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1960) (explanation of

Sen. Goldwater). Goldwater himself had unsuccessfully proposed to amend the
bill to provide for a $500,000 coverage threshold. Amendment to S. 3758 (June
29, 1960).
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in large part, because the two strong fair labor standards advocates
among the seven House conferees (Roosevelt and John Dent) were
outnumbered by conservatives and southern Democrats. 27 Rather
than attempt to reach an agreement under these unfavorable
conditions, Kennedy preferred to wait until after the election.' 28
Barely two weeks after taking office, the Kennedy administration, through Representative Roosevelt, introduced House Bill 3935
to extend coverage to several million additional workers by
including those employed in certain specified classes of enterprises
in which employees handled, sold, or otherwise worked on goods
that had been moved in or produced for commerce. Construction
establishments were covered under this definition if their annual
gross volume of sales amounted to at least $350,000; the salesvolume threshold for retail and service enterprises was set at $1
million. 2 9
Conservatives, sensing the potential for eventual universal
coverage, bitterly opposed the enterprise coverage approach to
interstate commerce. Senator Barry Goldwater, its most vociferous
foe, already in 1960 had to "resist to his utmost the term 'activity
affecting commerce"' because he could "see no end to the Federal
Government's following through." The new basis of coverage was
"probably the opening wedge ... to completely negating" the
Tenth Amendment to the constitution, "the keystone of our
Republic. If that goes, we go.' 130 Even under the guise of vindicating states rights, 3 ' the chief opponents in 1961 in the Senate,
Goldwater and Everett Dirksen, were unable to mask the fact that
despite their solicitude for small local businesses-"It does not take
a very large construction business to do an annual volume of
127

(1960).
128

H.R. 12677, 86th Cong. § 2(c) (1960); H.R. REP. No. 86-1933, at 21-22
Robert Leiter, Coverage Confusion Under the FairLabor StandardsAct,

13 LAB. L.J. 139, 145 (1962).
129 H.R. 3935, 87th Cong. § 2(b) (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 1823-25 (1961).
130 106 CONG. REC. 16,212 (1960).
31 Senator Goldwater asserted that he was "not sitting here as a complete
advocate of States rights" because although he believed that minimum wage
regulation should be left to the states, he had "also told the States that if they did
not act in this field, the Federal Government will have to act in this field." 1959
Hearings, supra note 122, at 30.
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$350,000"' 3 2 -what they were purportedly seeking to shelter such
firms from was not so much federal regulation as precisely the
unmistakable nationalization of the labor market and the economy
overall:
The dollar volume standards... are designed to create the
impression that the minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements are directed exclusively at "big business" and
that "small business" falling below these dollar standards
will continue to be free from the act's requirements and
will thereby be unaffected by the economic effects of the
extended coverage. Actually, this is mere surface appearance; the reality is otherwise. A small business, in all of its
activities, competes directly with large enterprises in the
same industry; it also competes with all other industries in
the same labor market for the available supply of labor.
If the larger enterprises are compelled by law to pay higher
wages, small business operating in the same labor market
must pay the same rates in order to secure or retain
employees. Thus, the exemptions or the freedom from
coverage the committee bill seems to extend to some small
133
business is nothing but delusion.
In other words, Goldwater was arguing a variant of the dictum
134
that "[t]he laws of trade are stronger than the laws of men."'
The twist here was that because covered and exempt sectors were
communicating vessels, the laws of the market would in effect
bring about the universalization of coverage that the legislature
could not. Goldwater's concern seemed to lie with the alleged
market-mediated impact of the legal regime on small businesses. In
fact, however, Goldwater did not believe in the reality of the
underlying economic model that he postulated. His real objective

132

S. REP. No. 87-145, at 101 (1961). Goldwater had noted a year earlier

that a "substantial segment of those in the construction industry would satisfy
these tests, because many of them have at least one employee who receives some
materials from out of the State, and do a gross annual business of at least
$350,000." 106 CONG. REc. at 16,213.
13 S. REP. No. 87-145, at 77.
134 1 WILLIAM COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS vi (4th

ed. 1898).
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was to protect larger businesses from the "unfair and arbitrary" and
"harshly discriminatory" dollar-volume criterion that would
privilege the smaller competitor "across the street" not to have to
pay the minimum wage and overtime. Since Goldwater was himself
the owner of a larger retail enterprise, his passion about the
competitive disadvantage was not surprising.35
As enacted, the statute incorporated the $350,000- and
$1,000,000-dollar-volume threshold for construction and retailservice enterprises, respectively, 136 and defined an "enterprise
engaged in commerce or production of goods for commerce" as
meaning "any of the following in the activities of which employees
are so engaged, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods that have been moved in or produced for
commerce by any person.' 37 Congress estimated that about one
million of the 4.1 million newly covered employees-leaving 16

31 106 CONG.
136

REc. at 16,213.

Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30,

§ 2(c), 75 Stat. 65, 66 (1961). The $350,000 exemption level for construction
appeared in the same new definitions section as § 3(s)(4). In addition to
exempting retail and service enterprises doing less than $1 million of business,
the amendments excluded any employee employed in an establishment with sales
of less than $250,000 even if it was part of an enterprise with sales of more than
$1 million. § 9, 75 Stat. at 71.
131§ 2(c), 75 Stat. at 66. Five years later a covered enterprise was
definitionally simplified to mean "an enterprise which has employees engaged in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce, including employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or
produced for commerce by any person.. . ." Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 2(c), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (1966). In 1974, Congress
amended the last part of the provision again to read, as it still does: "or
employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials.. .."
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(5), 88
Stat. 55, 59 (1974). The point of substituting "or" for "including" was to
emphasize that the clause "was intended as an additional basis of coverage." S.
REP. No. 93-690, at 17 (1974). Congress added "materials" to "make clear the
Congressional intent to include within this additional basis of coverage the
handling of goods consumed in the employer's business, as, e.g., the soap used
by a laundry." Id.
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million nonsupervisory private-sector employees still outside the
38
reach of the FLSA-were construction workers.1
The crucial point about enterprise coverage was and remains
that the law did not treat firms situated on opposite sides of the
dollar-volume threshold as mirror images of each other: whereas
the test was designed to create expanded, blanket, coverage in the
larger firms for all employees, regardless of whether they were
individually engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce, 39 it did not create a corresponding blanket small
business exemption for the smaller firms. Small firms remained
covered, as they had always been, with respect to those employees
who were engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce. The advent of enterprise coverage did not affect
individually based coverage at all in firms below the enterprisecoverage threshold.
A construction employer sought to have enterprise coverage
declared unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress lacked the
power to regulate firms engaged in handling goods that have left
the stream of interstate commerce and come to rest within the state
in which they are exclusively used. But the court upheld the
innovation to the extent that the employer's activities "exert a
substantial impact upon commerce among the several states, which
commerce is integrally related to the national economy and the
general welfare of the workers therein."' 40
The expanded enterprise coverage of the 1961 amendments did
not, however, afford protection to all workers. The $350,000
131S.

REP. No. 87-145, at 31 (1961).

13'The Supreme Court erred in stating that the effect of the introduction of

enterprise coverage "was to extend protection to the fellow employees of any
employee who would have been protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge
the class of employers subject to the Act." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188
(1963). Enterprise coverage did significantly enlarge the class of employers
subject to the FLSA by encompassing for the first time employers whose
employees are engaged in "handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person." § 2(c), 75 Stat.
at 66. For tactful recognition of the Supreme Court's misunderstanding, see
Dunlop v. Indus. America Corp., 516 F.2d 498, 501 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975); Wirtz
v. Melos Constr. Co., 408 F.2d 626, 628 n.5 (2d Cir. 1969).
140 Wirtz v. Mayer Constr. Co., 291 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D.N.J. 1968).
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coverage threshold for construction enterprises still excluded
616,000 nonsupervisory construction employees as of 1964. Of this
number, 423,000 or 69 percent were also not covered by state
minimum wage laws. 14' The Eighty-Ninth Congress of 1965-66,
the executor of President Johnson's Great Society, completed the
work of extending coverage to virtually all construction workers by
4
establishing zero-dollar enterprise coverage. 2
Three identical administration bills were filed on May 18, 1965
by Representatives Powell (the chairman of the House Education
and Labor Committee), Roosevelt, and Dent, which would have
enlarged coverage by creating an across-the-board threshold of
$250,000 in annual sales for enterprise coverage. 43 The hearings
that began a few days later provoked hardly any response from
construction employers. The only testimony came from the National
Electrical Contractors Association, whose public relations director
stated that the industry was composed primarily of small businesses
employing fewer than 10 workers. He never mentioned the lower
coverage threshold at all, instead focusing on the proposed double
pay for overtime, which at $9.42 "would seriously be personally
attractive enough to me to make me want to enter the industry
tomorrow, on the union side."'" The first appearance of firstdollar coverage for construction employers was House Bill 10518,
which Representative Roosevelt introduced on August 17, 1965.
The bill established this expanded coverage for enterprises engaged
in laundering, cleaning, and repairing clothing or fabrics as
well. 45 The House Committee on Education and Labor reported
the bill out a few days later. The report offered no explanation for

141 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS

DivIsIoNs, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS STANDARDS UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT 4 tbl.3 (1966).
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§ 102(c), 80 Stat. at 832.
8259, 89th Cong. § 202 (1965). See also H.R. 8260, 89th Cong.
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(1965); H.R. 8261, 89th Cong. (1965).

'"Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments, 1965: Hearings Before the General
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th
Cong. 1662-63 (1965).
145H.R. 10518, 89th Cong. § 102(c) (1965).
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the change, stating merely that: "There is no dollar volume test for
' 46
laundries, drycleaning, or construction enterprises.'
The minority members of the committee stressed that the new
coverage threshold "thrusts deeply into the 'small business'
segment of the American economy," which all administrations were
"dedicated to protecting against the threat of ultimate obliteration."
The minority was too preoccupied with yet another "emasculation
of the interstate commerce clause" to focus on the lack of a dollarvolume test for construction. Indeed, it pessimistically viewed the
"few meager dollar volume limitations" as having "thinly disguised" the disappearance of that clause. Projecting the trajectory
of reduced coverage thresholds, the minority "predict[ed] that
eventually, and the time is not far off, even these limitations will
be eliminated, and the National Government will become the
regulator of all business, private as well as public, local as well as
interstate, unless those of us who are concerned to protect the
Federal-State character of our Government effectively call a
halt.' ' 147 More than two decades would pass before this exhortation would bear fruit.
The process of enacting amendments to the FLSA, which was
complicated by the strong resistance mounted against the inclusion
for the first time of some farm workers, was prolonged into the
next session. In 1966, the main bill was House Bill 13712,
introduced on March 16, 1966 by Representative John Dent. A
former union official and long-time vigorous advocate of minimum
wage regulation, once again included zero-dollar coverage for
construction in his bill. 148
The sole congressional voice in opposition to the full coverage
of construction in 1965-1966 was Representative Dave Martin of
Nebraska, a Republican member of the subcommittee of the House
Education and Labor Committee that considered the FLSA
amendments, who was himself a small business owner. His animus,
however, was hardly confined to the construction provision. Rather,
he regarded the whole bill as a "continuation of the socialistic trend
146
147

H.R. REP. No. 89-871, at 10 (1965).
Id. at 76-77, 79-80.
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1 49
which started in these United States some 30 years ago."'
Regardless of his ideologically confused nomenclature, Martin had
accurately foreseen in 1961 that the purpose of the new commerce
coverage language was "to get the concept accepted that retail
businesses should be included, and then, eventually, every single
retail store in the United States .... ,
At one of the minimum wage hearings Martin referred to the
"inequity" that laundries, drycleaners, and construction businesses
would "not have any exemption from total sales" and would
"automatically come under the provisions of the minimum wage
law."' 15' That these businesses were "completely covered by the
law" would, Martin asserted, "work a severe hardship" on small
laundries and drycleaners
as well as the construction industry and in small towns. I
am thoroughly familiar with this because I am in the
business. In smaller towns we have these fellows who go
out, smaller contractors, carpenters, with one employee. In
the summer months when the weather is good and it is
proper for construction, they got in and work 10, 12, 14
hours a day and they work on Saturdays. They do not pay
any attention to overtime. This is traditional. Yet they are
not going to have any exemptions. They are fully covered
and are subject to the severe penalties of time and a half
and you are going to find ... that it is going to raise the
cost of housing and remodeling, and so on, in many of
your localities throughout the entire country. It is not a fair
shake for these people not 5to
give them the same exemp2
others.
give
tions that you
Dent was eager to respond to this attack. His answer with
respect to the laundry industry was straightforward and was situated
on the national organizational level: for the first time ever, "a
complete agreement has been obtained from all" sectors of the
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industry-commercial, home, and linen. "No one has received a
letter from a responsible laundry association against this legislation." Dent's approach to construction was, in contrast, personal
and anecdotal: "In the construction field, where I am having
construction done right now, I cannot get a big contractor to do a
remodeling job. I am paying $4.60 an hour for carpenters and
$2.10 for labor. They are not even union; they are not organized.
And my town is as small as yours.... You are talking of the past
when you refer to wages below $1 an hour. You are not talking
about the present day.', 153 The absence of any reference to organizational agreement with employers' associations may, possibly,
have been even more significant than its presence in the case of
laundries-as suggestive of employers' indifference to the commands of the state at a time when the commands of the labor
market made minimum wage and overtime regulation moot. In the
mid-1960s, as construction wage rates rose strongly in conjunction
with the Vietnam War-driven military-industrialization of the
economy to the irritation of nonconstruction firms as well, and
construction employers offered scheduled overtime hours as a
method of recruiting workers in a tight labor market,1 54 avoiding
the minimal requirements of the FLSA was hardly a high priority
for construction employers.'
Martin was also alone in seeking to remove the first-dollar
coverage provision for laundries and construction from the bill on
the House floor. In offering his amendment on May 25, 1966,

53

Id. at 12. Martin was aware of the involvement of employers' organiza-

tions. Later in the hearing he explained to another congressman that "the Dent
bill, was not written, I must admit, really, by the committee itself. We considered
it after it was drawn up, but the subcommittee chairman after consultation with
people in various industries and trade associations that are affected wrote up this
legislation himself and then subcommittee was called into session and the bill
was presented to us." Id. at 83-84.
'14 E.g., Chicago Employer Groups Impose Overtime Ban
in Effort to
Restrain 'Pirating'of Workers, CONSTR. LAB. REP., No. 546, Mar. 9, 1966, at
A-3; Don Sider, The Big Boondoggle at Lordstown, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at
106, 109; BuSINESS ROUNDTABLE, COMING TO GRIPS WITH SOME MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1, 7 (1975)(1974).
"' See generally Marc Linder, US. Construction Worker Wages Duringthe
Indochina War (on file with author).
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Martin pointed out that in the original administration bill of the
previous May these industries had been included under the general
dollar-volume provision: "But somewhere along the line, it was
removed." Once again playing his foil, Dent emphasized that all the
laundry and cleaning employers' groups had "endorsed this
legislation unanimously." If, as Martin asserted, segments of the
coin-operated laundry industry opposed the provision, Dent saw all
the more reason not to "exempt an industry that automates .... "
Moreover, Dent found on his own examination that "most of the
coin-operated laundries, where they have employees, are owned by
persons who play golf regularly, who go to Florida regularly, and
have come here to Congress crying about being put out of business,
riding here in Cadillacs." Finally, Dent refuted Martin's claim of
inequity by replying that "the best measure of fairness has to come
from those affected. If those affected are not protesting, then we
cannot accept the charge of unfairness." At that point the House
rejected Martin's amendments. 56
Dent's rule-of-thumb is plausible-but only if the affected are
aware of what the legislature has in store for them. At the time of
the 1989 FLSA amendments, that proviso would be invalidated: it
is doubtful whether a single affected worker was aware of the
exemption of small businesses from enterprise coverage.
Congress unabashedly boasted of the expanded coverage that
the new amendments created. The Senate report declared that its
bill would bring under coverage 7.2 million of the 17.7 million
uncovered private nonsupervisory employees.' 57 When the leading
construction trade journal reported in September 1966 that the
additional coverage of eight million was the greatest extension in
the history of the FLSA, and that the added coverage of 583,000
construction workers had been achieved by "dropping all dollar
volume restrictions," the Engineering News-Record did not even
hint that this "legislative plum" to the AFL-CIO would be
problematic for employers. 5 ' Indeed, despite the evidence of any
156
157
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public lobbying in the formal legislative history, one AFL-CIO
official recalled that while most construction firms were indifferent
to the change, some actually supported it on the grounds that it
disposed of a problem that had arisen under the 1961 enterprise
coverage dollar-volume threshold: they did not know at the
beginning of the year whether they would be covered. 159
As a result of the first-dollar enterprise coverage, the 1966
amendments "extended coverage to .. . the entire construction
industry,"' 16 entitling virtually all construction workers to the
minimum wage and premium overtime.' 6' For the next two
decades, only one-half of one percent of the three to five million
construction workers were excluded. Presumably the only reason
that even a minuscule 17,000 to 22,000 workers annually fell into
this category 62 was that Congress defined a covered enterprise as
having "employees ... handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce
..
163
Regardless of whether Congress thought about the
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question and literally meant that enterprise coverage required an
employer to employ at least two employees, the DOL
and the
l
manner.6
that
in
it
interpreted
consistently
have
courts

VI. TRIAL RUN FOR THE 1989 SMALL-BUSINESS EXEMPTION:
THE 1977 FLSA AMENDMENTS
Small businesses are the most vibrant segment of our
economy. They are responsible
for the lion's share of job
65
ingenuity.
and
growth
In spite of this clear thrust toward universal coverage in the
1960s, the reversal of progressive reductions in the coverage
threshold in 1989 was not unprecedented. A Democratic-controlled
Congress initiated the process in 1977 when it increased the dollar
volume for retail and service enterprises in stages from $250,000
to $362,500 from 1978 to 1981.66 Neither the House nor Senate
bills nor committee reports contained such a provision, which was
added as a last-minute floor amendment in both Houses.67
The differences among the various amendments revealed
congressional ambivalences on the subject of privileging small
employers to impose unfair labor standards on their employees that
were remarkably absent from the 1989 debates. In the House,
congressmen explicitly viewed the three proposals in 1977 as
embodying more and less radical programs. Representative Michael

§ 102(c), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (1966).
" Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division, Fact
Sheet No. 14: Coverage Under the FairLabor StandardsAct (visited Apr. 19,
1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/regs/compliance/whd/whdfsl4.htm>;
Rhude v. Jansen Construction Co., 369 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1966); Robertson
v. Dailey Electric Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
165 H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 61 (1996).
16 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 9(a),
91 Stat. 1245, 1251 (1977).
167Former Representative Michael Blouin, who played a significant part in
the debates in 1977, stated that the fact that the amendment was added in the
floor debates indicated that the issue was too difficult to resolve in committee
even if the floor debate was choreographed. Telephone Interview with Michael
Blouin (Dec. 12, 1997).
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Blouin, a Democrat from Iowa, offered the first amendment, which
would have required the Secretary of Labor annually to adjust the
dollar-volume threshold for retail and services enterprises by the
same percentage by which the price index increased. Blouin, who
was concerned that inflation had subverted the $250,000 threshold,
proposed to confine the increase to a prospective application to
businesses that he estimated employed no more than seven
employees. His reason for not raising the level immediately to the
$475,000 range that inflation-indexing would have suggested was
the "real inequity" of "uncover[ing]" four million workers who had
become entitled to the minimum wage. Although Blouin believed
that Congress could deal with the four million uncovered workers
for the future, it is unclear how he envisaged solving the problem
caused by every creation of an enlarged sector of lawful unfair
labor standards-namely, that "no one wants to force a smaller
concern into a negative, competitive situation against a bigger
concern that can afford the added impact of higher wages when the
168
smaller company cannot.'
Republican Representative John Ashbrook had no patience with
Blouin's long-term approach. Instead, he proposed an immediate
increase of the threshold to $500,000 and application to all
businesses. Ashbrook intended to avoid "wage slicing" by prohibiting employers who had been covered from decreasing the wage of
any employee who had received the minimum wage while the
employer was so covered' 69 -a clause that Congress would
thenceforth self-congratulatorily call "preservation of coverage.' 70 Democratic Representative Jake Pickle of Texas liked to
think of his amendment as a compromise between the other two in
that his neither extended beyond retail and service businesses nor
applied indexing. Driven by complaints that he had received from
gas station operators among his constituents whose profit margins
had shrunk even without having been covered by the minimum
wage, Pickle sought to protect them from business failure as
inflated gasoline prices pushed their sales above the threshold,
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subjecting them to the FLSA. More generally, he argued that the
$250,000 threshold was "grossly unfair to small businesses. It must
be updated or we will drive out of business thousands of small
businesses... ." Like other proponents of an increase, he distorted
the history of the FLSA by claiming that "[t]here has always been
a basic exemption for small business under the minimum wage
law."' 71 This conflation of a business's intrastate character with
small size served to justify Pickle's indifference to the fate of the
workers whom he intended to uncover:
the only real argument that can be made against my
amendment is that it might take a lot of people out from
under coverage of the Minimum Wage Act. I admit that.
... But it is also a fact that many of these same people
were brought under the act simply because of inflation. We
are not removing new people from coverage, but rather
putting them back in the same status they would have been
[in] prior to the increase of wages and prices since 1969 or
1973....
The committee would want you to believe that we are
ruthlessly removing millions from the Wage and Hour Act,
that it is a march backward. That is not so. Over 80
percent of the present workers covered are drawing over $3
per hour now-and would not be affected. All we are
172
doing is restoring the equivalent level of 10 years ago.
Pickle's lack of concernas to the future impact was unjustified
since employers would have been legally free under his amendment
to cease paying the minimum wage even to those previously
covered. His position did, however, have the virtue of consistency
in one respect: by excluding construction and the other first-dollarcoverage industries from his proposal, he was able to avoid the
obvious objection that Congress had not intended to link the
proportion of covered workers to some inflation-adjusted sales
volume standard. But even with regard to the retail and service
industries, the fact that the Congress in 1961 and 1966 had planned
to drive down the thresholds over time, strongly suggested that its

"71 123 CONG. REC. at 29,469.
172 Id. at 29,470.
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objective was not a stationary proportion of employee coverage, but
a progressively rising one as more modem conceptions of interstate
commerce permitted the legislature to make plausible the federal
regulatory role over labor markets that had once appeared peculiarly committed to local-or, more realistically,-no governmental
control at all.
In an instrumental sense, however, Pickle's distorted legislative
history was irrelevant: the FLSA, like any other statute, is not a
constitution requiring a complicated amendatory process or
supermajority favoring change. A majority in each Congress is free
to rewrite future history by altering that body's intent. That the new
majority found it inadvisable to declare the new pro-employer bias
all too bluntly, instead hiding behind an erroneous or perhaps even
mendacious rewriting of legislative history, suggests that the
residual force of the older impulse toward universal coverage was
still potent. The success in 1977 insured that it would no longer be
potent by 1989.
After the House defeated Ashbrook's amendment and passed
Pickle's, 173 the Senate took up the same question in debating
various amendments to Senate Bill 1871. Senator John Tower was
the first to take up the cudgels for "'small, small businesses'-those
retail and service establishments which range from the traditional
'Mom and Pop' stores to those which may employ ... 15 or 20
workers."17' 4 Unable to buttress his claim that "[t]hroughout the
history of the minimum wage law, Congress has recognized the
need to provide some sort of relief for these smaller businesses,"
Tower was constrained to concede that the original exemption for
1 75
intrastate commerce did not involve a "dollar volume test.
Unable to deal with the universalist thrust underlying the creation
of first-dollar coverage for construction and laundries in 1966,
Tower evaded the issue by claiming that: "From what I have been
able to determine, there was very little discussion of this action
Id. at 29,471-72.
174Id. at 32,893.
173

171Id.
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during floor debate."' 76 To provide a rationale for his proposed
restoration of the $1 million threshold from 1961-which Senator
Harrison Williams called "a giant step backward in terms of the
whole scope ... and coverage" of the FLSA 177 -Tower stood the
original purpose of the act on its head. Whereas the Congress in
1937-1938 had striven to weaken if not eliminate wage cutting as
a competitive tool that kept inefficient firms afloat, Tower argued
that the exemption was necessary to "offer some assurance to these
very small firms that they will be able to maintain a position of
competition; that they will not be swallowed up by huge companies
or forced out of business altogether. 1 78 Tower sought to justify
his expulsion of 4.8 million workers from protection--"only 1
million" of whom were below the minimum wage-by asserting
that even some small employers earned less than the minimum
wage. 179 Tower received his most vigorous support from Senator
Goldwater, who, reminiscing about how he had considered
$300,000 good sales when he first went into business ("Today we
do $31 million"), would have raised the threshold to $2 million. 180
Senator Leahy then proposed an alternative amendment under
which the threshold would have been raised to $500,000; thereafter
it would have been raised by the same percentage by which the
minimum wage was raised. Leahy, too, was little concerned with
the minimum-wage workers whom his proposal would have
expelled from the FLSA: after all, "the vast majority are part-time
unskilled workers who are in marginal jobs." And in any event, the
exemption would be doing them a favor since "[i]t would be tragic
if their employment prospects would disappear because the small
'8
business employers could no longer afford to keep them hired.' '
Because Tower was convinced that his side had been dealt a
"stacked deck"..-"organized labor has dictated that there can be no
exemption for any small businesses"-he agreed to accept Leahy's
123 CONG. REC. at 32,894.
Id. at 32,896.
178 Id. at 32,894.
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lower threshold. 82 In a further effort to secure Democratic votes,
Tower and Leahy then accepted a grandfather amendment offered
by Senator Pell, which prohibited newly uncovered employers from
lowering the wage of any employee who had previously received
the minimum wage.'83
At this point Senator Harrison Williams offered what was
perhaps the most historically and analytically accurate accounts of
the function of the threshold. One of the staunchest congressional
advocates of labor standards, in 1971 Williams had introduced a
bill in the Senate that would have eliminated the enterprise
coverage dollar-volume test, thus including within coverage all
enterprises engaged in commerce.' 84 Measured against the
FLSA's "principal thrust and purpose" to expand coverage, the
proposal to increase the dollar-volume test to reflect price increase
misconceives the history and purpose of the enterprise
definition in the act. In 1961, Congress established a
$1,000,000 enterprise test of coverage to assure that the act
would reach all employees of firms engaged in interstate
commerce. However, individual employers [sic] who were,
themselves, engaged in interstate commerce were still
entitled to the minimum wage, even if their employer did
not meet the enterprise test.
At the same time, Congress adopted a separate dollar test
for retail and service establishments [which] were given a
complete exemption from minimum wage and overtime
provisions, even with regard to their employees who were
individually engaged in interstate commerce, if the establishment had a gross annual dollar volume of less than
$250,000.
Five years later, in 1966, the Congress purposefully
reduced the dollar volume test for coverage under the
enterprise definition... as a means of expanding the act's
coverage. As this was done, it became unnecessary and
182
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redundant to maintain the lower dollar volume test of
coverage in the retail and service establishment exemption
in section 13(a)(2) .... Accordingly, in conjunction with
the reduction of the enterprise dollar test, the act was
amended to delete the dollar test for the retail and service
establishment exemption. That exemption, under present
law, depends upon the dollar test under the enterprise
provision ... in section 3(s).
Thus, the proposed amendment would, in effect, not only
create an exemption for 400,000 workers employed in
enterprises, but it would also reduce coverage to an
unprecedented degree, by removing from coverage 3.8
million employees of retail and service establishments.
There is no predicate for this drastic reduction in ...
coverage .... It is not needed as a means of providing
protections for "mom and pop" stores. That is already done
explicitly by the act."'5
Tower evaded a discussion of the history of the relationship
between the enterprise coverage thresholds and the exemption
thresholds. He charged in rebuttal that instead of denying workers
a raise by increasing the threshold, Congress would be denying
them a job altogether by failing to exempt small businesses.' 86
An increase in the enterprise threshold was foreordained when
Senator Dale Bumpers, a Democrat from Arkansas, proposed a
compromise, raising the level in stages to $325,000 by 1980.
Bumpers would have accepted a higher level, but recognized the
"incalculable damage to millions of employees" that it would do.
The fact that the House had already passed a bill with a $500,000
level made it clear to Bumpers that some figure between his and
that figure would become law. Yielding to the same realism,
Williams immediately expressed his support.187 Pro-labor supporters were also able to secure a "step-grandfather clause," permitting
newly uncovered employers not to pay the higher minimum wage
to existing employees, but requiring them to pay those workers no

1.
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less than the old lower minimum wage and overtime.18 True to
Bumpers' prediction, from the conference between the two Houses
emerged a compromise provision under which the exemption level
was raised in stages to $362,500 effective 1981.189
VII.

EXPANDING THE CLASS OF EXEMPT SMALL BUSINESSES:

THE

1989 AMENDMENTS

I regret that today we give up territory that Congress has
fairly claimed, that we take a backward step from the
measures Congress designed to protect the lowest paid and
weakest group of wage earners in the Nation. 9°
If a Democratic administration and a Democratic Congress
found no way to avoid an increase in the enterprise coverage
threshold as the price to pay for increasing the minimum wage in
the 1970s, it should have been a foregone conclusion that the two
would, at the very least, have to be yoked to each other during the
Reagan years-if that most anti-labor presidency since the 1920s
ever supported an increase in the minimum wage on any terms.
Nevertheless, despite these unpropitious circumstances, Senator
Edward Kennedy and Representative Augustus Hawkins, the
chairmen of the Senate and House labor committees, introduced
short bills at the beginning of the last Congress of Reagan's
presidency in 1987 to raise the minimum wage to restore the
purchasing power that had been eroded since the last increase to
$3.35 in 1981. In addition to increasing the wage to $4.65 by 1990,
they provided for indexation, which had long been sought but never
achieved by labor supporters: the minimum wage was to be revised
annually so as to equal 50 percent of the average private,
nonsupervisory, nonagricultural hourly wage. The bills manifestly

"' Id. at 32,900. The final vote on the whole bill was 63
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embodied maximalist demands since they contained no other
provisions.19 '
That a minimum wage increase unaccompanied by an increase
in the enterprise coverage dollar-volume threshold was politically
unacceptable became clear at a hearing later that year before the
House Committee on Small Business. Titled, Minimum Wage
Increase, the hearing highlighted "horror stories . .. from small
businessmen who are virtually making less than their employees."
To mitigate this inversion of the natural class order, congressmen
immediately proposed raising the threshold to $500,000 or
$600,000.192 Because 55 to 60 percent of the membership of the
National Federation of Independent Business ("NFIB"), one of the
most potent congressional lobbyists, had annual sales of less than
this amount, this threshold would have conveniently exempted more
than half of that organization's members. Ominously, Sar Levitan,
arguably the most vociferous academic proponent of the minimum
wage, when asked his opinion about such a step, responded that it
"might be worth considering." Unsurprisingly, the committee
displayed no interest in his further remark that, because some
$500,000-per-year businesses were "prosperous and highly
profitable" and thus "not struggling to make a living," he would
need more information before judging a universal $500,000
exemption. 93 The next year the House Committee on Small
Business issued a report recommending a study of the impact of
this exemption since retail and service firms with less than
$362,500 in sales employed the largest number of uncovered
workers-6 million. To be sure, the committee was concerned with
the impact on the "many employers whose gross volume of sales
... has gone above $362,500" and had thus 'slipped under'
minimum wage coverage," rather than with the consequences for
their employees.' 94

'91

S. 837, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 1834, 100th Cong. (1987).

192

Minimum Wage Increase:HearingBefore the House Committee on Small

Business, 100th Cong. 29 (1987) (statement of Rep. Bilbray).
193 Id. at 32-33.
194 The Minimum Wage andSmall Business: A Staff Report of the Committee
on Small Business, 100th Cong. 28-29 (1988).
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By March 1988 it became clear that the maximalist demands
were unrealizable. At a mark-up session of House Bill 1834, the
House Subcommittee on Labor Standards not only voted to drop
the indexing feature, but approved an amendment, submitted by
Representative Bob Wise, a Democrat, by 6 to 3, to increase the
enterprise coverage threshold to $500,000. The three no votes came
from Republicans, who voted for an even more expansive amendment of Representative James Jeffords-who would soon play a
key role in the exemption debates-to raise the level to $1
million. 195
At the mark-up session of the full House Committee on
Education and Labor on March 16,196 Jeffords offered another
amendment to House Bill 1834 concerning enterprise coverage. It
would have raised the threshold to $500,000 and extended it to all
enterprises with the exception of public agencies. 97 Jeffords, who
later received the Guardian of Small Business Award from the
NFIB, 91 8 described his goal as "trying to. . . basically, get us one
set of rules to cover small businesses so that they will know as to
whether they are or are not exempt, and to reduce the amount of
confusion and therefore the amount of potential violations." In
contrast, merely raising the threshold, as Wise's amendment did,
"did not undo many of the complicated differentiations among
different types of businesses"-the "host of special rules that make
compliance and enforcement much too difficult." In this context

195 House Panelto Take Up Minimum Wage Legislation, DAILY LAB. REP.,

Mar. 3, 1988, at A-7; House Subcommittee Approves Minimum Wage Increase
by Vote of 6-3, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 4, 1988, at A-14. Jeffords' amendment

limited the exemption to companies with 20 or fewer employees. Id.
196 See generally House Labor PanelReports Out Bill IncreasingMinimum
Wage, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 17, 1988, at A-10.

19 Amendment to Committee Print of House Bill 1834 Offered by Mr.
Jeffords, § 3(a) (on file with author). The amendment, which is marked
"JEFFOR378" and dated "3/15," is included in a file, "Full Cmte. Mtg., March
16, 1988, H.R. 1834, Fair Labor Standards Act (continued)," which Silvia Riley,
an employee of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce," made
available in Room 2181 of the Rayburn House Office Building on Jan. 14, 1998,
to Bruce Goldstein, who photocopied it. In 1988 Riley had been the Republican
Clerk of the committee.
'9" LAB.

L.J., Feb. 1997, at inside cover (1994 award).
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Jeffords mentioned that merely "engaging in laundering or cleaning
or repairing of clothing triggers coverage, as does being in the
construction business."' 199
Chairman Hawkins opposed the amendment as "highly defective
and highly destructive. It turns the clock back, actually, several
years." He contended that some industries, such as industrial
laundries, did not want to be exempt by a higher dollar-volume
threshold because they wished to avoid "cutthroat competition."
Hawkins also argued that many health care workers would lose
minimum wage coverage. Finally, he urged rejection of an acrossthe-board exemption on the grounds that small businesses received
subsidies and other government assistance. 00 Even Representative
Wise, who had proposed increasing the enterprise coverage
threshold to $500,000, based his opposition to Jeffords' amendment
on the "concern . . that it would eliminate some of the traditional
areas where minimum wage has applied."2''
Republican Representative Steve Bartlett voiced his support for
the expansion of the threshold by embellishing on the reasons
advanced by Jeffords. He asserted, without empirical corroboration,
that because there were too many different rules, "you won't find
a small business that is employing the small business exemption. It
202
is not usable because it is not understandable."
Following the 14-19, virtually straight party-line vote rejecting
Jeffords' amendment,2 3 the full committee approved the increase

1 Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the Committee on Education
and Labor, House of Representatives, Markup of H.R. 1834, Minimum Wage
Legislation Wednesday March 16, 1988 at 55-56. [hereinafter Stenographic
Hearing Transcript]. This transcript, which was also included in the file, "Full
Cmte. Mtg., March 16, 1988, H.R. 1834, Fair Labor Standards Act (continued),"
apparently, like all mark-up transcripts, may not be duplicated. The quotations
in the text are taken from Bruce Goldstein's extensive and verbatim notes.
200 Id. at 60-61.
201 Id. at 62.
202 Id. at 63.
203 Id. at 68-71. Rep. Penny, a Democrat from Minnesota, not only voted for
the Jeffords amendment, but spoke in favor of it on the grounds that small
businesses should be subject to state minimum wage laws. Id. at 65-67.
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in the enterprise test to $500,000 for retail and services businesses
alone. 2°
The House Education and Labor Committee in reporting out the
bill took numerous liberties with historical truth. The committee
declared that by "proposing an adjustment in the definition of an
enterprise engaged in commerce," it "continues to support the
principle of a true small business exemption." Apart from the fact
that Congress lacked a tradition of articulating, let alone enacting,
a small business exemption, the committee's account of the "history
of periodically adjusting the enterprise threshold test" conveniently
omitted Congress's act of "adjusting" it down to $0 for the
construction and laundry industries. Instead, it stressed that "[iln
recent years the movement has been upward"--suppressing the fact
that the downward and upward "adjustment" embodied radically
different labor standards policies. Since the vast majority of U.S.
workers were employed in large enterprises, the committee's belief
that the $500,000 level "preserv[ed] coverage for the vast majority
of workers" was misleading. Then in a tour de force of double talk,
the House committee report argued that the "hold harmless"
provision prohibiting newly exempt employers from reducing
existing employees' wages below the previous minimum wage "will
insure that no employee will be adversely affected by the Committee amendment. 20 5 The committee failed to explain in what sense
it had not "adversely affected" workers who, unlike their relatives,
friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and most of the working class,
would no longer be entitled to the current minimum wage.
Moreover, all workers employed in the labor market penumbra of
such exempt firms would feel the downward pressure of their
lawfully unfair labor standards.
In the following months, members of Congress were "bombarded" with claims that an increased minimum wage would injure
small businesses.2 06 By June, when the Senate Labor Committee
met in executive session, even Kennedy was constrained to offer a
204 H.R. 1834, 100th Cong. § 3 (1988) in H.R. REP. No. 100-560, at 1, 2
(1988).

H.R. REP. No. 100-560, at 11 (1988).
206 Backers of Minimum Wage Increase Seek Support Among House
205

Members, DAILY LAB. REP., May 6, 1988, at A-11.
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substitute bill that not only scaled back the minimum wage
increase, but raised the exemption level to $500,000.207 Kennedy
was presumably retreating in the face of Republican amendments,
mobilized by Senator Dan Quayle, to increase the level to $600,000
for all businesses. °8 In the event, Quayle and the other Republicans decided not to press their amendments, which had no chance
of passage in committee, waiting instead for the floor debates. 20 9
Chairman Kennedy, in reporting out a bill with the higher $500,000
enterprise threshold, took a different justificatory tack than his
House counterpart. Without explaining why, he declared that the
committee took the position that "with the increase in the minimum
wage there should be a commensurate increase in the Retail-Service
Enterprise Test." The committee boasted of having achieved an
almost mathematical equality-35.8 percent and 37.9 percent,
respectively. Unlike the House committee, the Senate committee
refrained from claiming that the higher exemption had not
adversely affected any worker; it even conceded that 1.15 million
workers would be added to the group of the exempt.210
Although the stage had been set for floor debates in both
Houses over more far-reaching exemptions, they failed to materialize. After Senate Democrats withdrew the bill in September in the
face of a successful Republican filibuster, the House never debated
the bill at all in 1988.211
In the wake of Vice-President Bush's election as president,
Hawkins and Kennedy continued to accommodate political realities.
House Bill 2 and Senate Bill 4, which they introduced on January
3, 1989, both retained their earlier bills' higher $500,000 enterprise

207

Minimum Wage, Plant Closing Bills Are Focus of Attention in Senate,

DAILY LAB. REP., June
20

23, 1988, at A-5.

Senate Labor Panel to Vote on Minimum Wage, House Republicans

Weigh Compromise Offer, DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 1988, at A-12; Senate
Panel to Vote June 29 on Minimum Wage Compromise, DAILY LAB. REP., June
24, 1988, at A-8.
209 Senate Labor Committee Clears Bill to Raise Minimum Wage to $4.55
an Hour, DAILY LAB. REP., June 30, 1988, at A-1.
210 S. REP. No. 100-430, at 24 (1988).

134 CONG. REC. 25,290 (1988). No proposals for a higher or broader
exemption were discussed during the Senate debate.
211
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coverage threshold for retail and service employers.212 Following
testimony by Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole to the labor
committees in both Houses of Congress on March 3 and 4 that
President Bush would not sign a bill increasing the minimum wage
unless the amendments extended what she erroneously called the
"small business exemption" (at the $500,000 level) to "all businesses, ' 213 the Senate committee on March 13 reported out a bill
containing "a revised enterprise test ... almost identical to the
provision sought by the Administration." Covering up the fact that
construction workers, for example, would, for the first time in
almost a quarter-century, lose their universal coverage, the
committee chose to describe the radical change euphemistically:
"the test for small business enterprises is altered to a uniform
$500,000 in gross annual sales, eliminating several of the separate
tests." The committee stressed that "this more streamlined version
of a threshold test . . .goes a long way toward simplifying this
2 14
section."
This emphasis on uniformity and streamlining accommodated
the concerns of Senator Jeffords, who a year earlier, as a member
of the House, had unsuccessfully proposed a similar amendment.
Jeffords purportedly articulated the change as a mere "housekeeping" measure designed to "harmonize" coverage.215 Since Jeffords

212
213

H.R. 2, 101st Cong. § 3(a) (1989); S. 4, 101st Cong. § 3(a) (1989).
Minimum Wage Restoration Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Senate

Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 26 (1989) (statement
of Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Labor).
214 S.REP. No. 10 1-6, at 29 (1989). The reports in the Daily Labor Report
overlooked this change. Senate Panel Oks Minimum Wage Hike, Rejects
Administration's Proposal, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 9, 1989, at A-14; House
Subcommittee Reports Bill Reports Bill to Raise Minimum Wage, DAILY LAB.
REP., Mar. 10, 1989, at A-9.
21' Telephone Interview with Mark Powden (Dec. 4, 1997). In 1988-89,
Powden had been Jeffords's legislative director; at the time of the interview, he
was staff director of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, of
which Jeffords is chairman.
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was not viewed as an enemy of labor,2 16 his sponsorship of this
change enhanced its appearance as a neutral measure.
The Senate committee also suggested that the higher threshold
for enterprise coverage would not lead to a net reduction in the
total number of workers covered because the newly excluded
employees would be approximately equal to the number of
employees "added to the coverage of the Act by the removal of the
section 13(a)(2) and 13(a)(4)., '217 Although the report nowhere
explained this step, it was referring to the bill's conforming
amendment that proposed deletion of sections containing exclusions
of employees of certain local retail and service employers. 28 This
clear statement of the additional coverage that would result from
the deletion, which Jeffords had also proposed in his unsuccessful
1988 amendment, 219 is significant because it refutes the claim
made by small employers and Republicans in 1990 and later that
a drafting error had produced the deletion as a result of which
some workers retained individual coverage.
The one respect in which the Senate provision did not conform
to the Bush administration's requirements was the preservation of
first-dollar coverage for public hospitals. This exception was the
result of expeditious lobbying by the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees. 220 That success suggests the
possibility that prompt and coordinated lobbying by the construction unions to retain universal coverage might have produced the
same result.221
The House bill, reported out on March 20, which continued to
include the higher $500,000 coverage threshold, lacked the across-

216

Telephone Interview with Jim Riley (Dec. 9, 1997). Riley was chief

majority counsel to the Labor Standards Subcommittee of the House Education
and Labor Committee from the mid-1980s to 1995, and is currently a Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission commissioner.
217 S. REP. No. 101-6, at 35.
218 S.4, 101st Cong. § 3(c)(1) (1989); S.REP. No. 101-6, at 7.
29 Amendment to Committee Print of H.R. 1834 Offered by Mr. Jeffords,

§ 3(c).

220

Telephone Interview with John Zalusky (Dec. 9, 1997). Zalusky was an

AFL-CIO economist at the time and involved in the FLSA negotiations.
221 Telephone Interview with John Zalusky (Jan. 26, 1998).
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the-board extension.222 The committee's explanation of the
increase differed from the one that it had issued a year earlier only
in having deleted the misleading claim that "the vast majority of
workers" remained covered. Instead, it inserted another misleading
claim-namely, that the $500,000 level was less than "the historic
$1,000,000 threshold" from 1961.223 Since that level had already
been reduced to $250,000 by 1966, it is unclear in what sense the
threshold that had prevailed for only a few years could qualify as
"historic."
But almost immediately following the issuance of the House
report on March 20, a "deal" was struck that the committee would
support floor amendments embodying the extension of the $500,000
threshold to industries other than retail and service. 224 On March
21, the House Rules Committee recommended passage of a House
Resolution, according to which Representatives William Goodling
and Austin Murphy, the ranking Republican on the Education and
Labor Committee and the chairman of the Labor Standards
Subcommittee, respectively, would be permitted to offer for debate
an amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the higher
across-the-board threshold.225
The House debate on March 22-23, 1989, took place as
choreographed by the deal. Representative Murphy, bowing to the
"political reality" of an offer by the Bush administration to do what
Reagan had refused for eight years-namely, to sign an increase in
the minimum wage-met the other "[c]oncerns of the business
community" by agreeing to a $500,000 "exemption ceiling for all
businesses" except hospitals. 226 In contrast, Representative
Hawkins recorded his surprise-disingenuously, since he had
already acquiesced in the higher threshold a year earlier-that his

222

223

224

H.R. REP. No. 101-11, at 3 (1989).
Id. at 14.
Telephone Interview with Jim Riley (Dec. 9 1997), who emphasizedthat,

like many such deals, this one was-and had to be-concluded within a few
hours.
225 H.R. REP. No. 101-13, 4-5 (1989). Interestingly, the provision
in
Goodling's amendment was labeled "Small Business," whereas in Murphy's it
was called "Change in Enterprise Test."
226 135 CONG. REC. 5142-43 (1989).
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maximalist demand had not sailed through the Reagan administration: "I never dreamed, as the author of this little bill merely
calling for some adjustment in the [minimum rate] rate based on
the erosion that inflation has caused, that the bill would have
picked up such baggage as it has-the tip credit, the small business
exemption, the training wage. Unfortunately that is so.227
No member of the House spoke against the increase in, or
expansion of, the enterprise threshold. Among the very few
speakers who even mentioned the issue, two Democrats, including
one of the sponsors of the Murphy amendment, misstated the scope
of the proposed enterprise coverage provision. Representative
Thomas Ridge, the co-sponsor, stated that: "As I interpret the
exemption, even agribusiness of $500,000 or less is included in this
particular exemption . ..., And Representative Bill Richardson, who admonished his colleagues not to "break the backs of
small business owners who provide employment for many
minimum wage workers," opined that "many of the small farm and
cattle ranches in my district will be exempted from minimum wage
requirements. ,22' Although none of their more knowledgeable
colleagues corrected them, their understanding was incorrect: since
"[v]irtually all" farm workers are individually engaged in the
production of goods for commerce,230 those working for farmers
with annual sales below the enterprise coverage threshold remain
subject to individual coverage. Only in the extraordinary case of
farms that produced crops to be sold to consumers exclusively
within the same state would the farm workers be excluded from
coverage.23 The misinterpretation was, to be sure, largely aca227

Id. at 5155.

228

Id. at H860.
Id. at H849.
Wage and Hour Div., Fact Sheet No. 012: AgriculturalEmployers Under

229
230

the FairLabor StandardsAct (FLSA) (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/regs/compliance/whd/whdfsl 2.htm>.
231 "Goods are produced 'for' such commerce wh°tere the employer intends,
hopes, expects, or has reason to believe that the goods ... will move" in
interstate commerce. If such movement "can be reasonably anticipated by the
employer" when his employees work on them, "it makes no difference whether
he himself or a subsequent owner ...of the goods put the goods in interstate
... commerce." 29 C.F.R. § 776.21(a) (1997).
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demic: 62 percent of nonsupervisory agricultural employees were
already excluded from the minimum wage and 100 percent from
overtime by various other provisions.232 As expected, the House
then voted 248 to 171 for the compromise, the negative votes
coming largely from those opposed to an increase in the minimum
wage.233

The debate in the Senate in April also generated no substantive
discussion of the expanded enterprise coverage exemption. Despite
the fact that Congress then passed a FLSA bill that embodied many
of the preconditions that the Bush administration had laid
down-including the almost universal $500,000 threshold for
enterprise coverage-the president vetoed it on June 13 on the
grounds that the increase in the minimum wage (from $3.35 to
$4.55 in three years) was "excessive. 234 Once the House proved
incapable of overriding the veto (the 247 to 178 vote being very
similar to the original vote),235 Democratic legislators were forced
to accommodate the administration further, but not with respect to
the enterprise coverage threshold. 36
VIII.

THE HIGH PRICE OF A SMALL INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM
WAGE

[I]n 1989, the Senate agreed to increase the small business
exemption from $362,500 to $500,000. The clear intention
was to protect the jobs of those who work in the smallest
companies from the backlash of a higher Federal
2 37

wage.

232

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1994); S.REP. No. 101-117, 22 tbl.2, 24 tbl.4

(1989). Agricultural workers are excluded principally by virtue of their
employment by employers "who did not, during any calendar quarter during the
proceeding calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of agricultural

labor." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(A).
233

234

135 CONG. REC. at 5256-57.
Message to the House ofRepresentativesReturning Without Approval the

FairLabor StandardsAmendments of 1989, in PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH: 1989 724 (1990).
235 135 CONG. REc. at 1i,776.
236 S. REP. No. 101-117 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-260 (1989).
237 137 CONG. REC. S1584-85 (1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
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The changes ultimately embodied in Public Law 101-157
(enacted on Nov. 17, 1989, and made effective April 1, 1990)
included the increase of the enterprise coverage threshold to
$500,000 and its extension to all businesses except public and
private hospitals, schools, and institutions for the aged.238 Under
the heading, "Preservation of Coverage," the amendment also
required any enterprise that on March 31, 1990 was subject to the
minimum wage provision of the FLSA, but is, as a result of the
amendment, no longer subject to it, "to pay its employees not less
than the minimum wage in effect ... on March 31, 1990" ($3.35),
and to pay its employees time and one-half for overtime hours.239
This "preservation of coverage" clause, which the committees
had falsely characterized as a hold-harmless provision for the
benefit of workers, was deeply flawed. To begin with, the requirement that employers continue to pay $3.35 per hour in perpetuity
became, as soon as the higher minimum wage went into effect on
April 1, 1990, a government-enforced invitation to impose unfair
labor standards; with time, as the wage level rose, it could only
become even more grotesque. Newly exempt enterprises' ongoing
obligation to pay overtime was subject to the same criticism in the
sense that to minimum wage workers they were required to pay
time and one-half only on that obsolete $3.35 or whatever
substandardly depressed wage rates they were paying their workers.
In addition, even this diluted duty was undermined by employers'
practice of going out of business and reopening as a new entity in
order to extricate themselves from even this stepgrandfather clause.
Such churning is a particularly prevalent ploy in construction,24 °
where large numbers of small firms without any self-detriment
seasonally "go in and out of business" anyway.24 ' DOL enforcement officials acknowledge that such disappearances and reappear-
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Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, § 3(a),

103 Stat. 938, 938 (1989).
239

§ 3(b), 103 Stat. at 939.

240

Telephone Interview with Rudy Oswald (Dec. 4, 1997). Oswald, now

retired, was for many years the chief economist of the AFL-CIO.
241 The Family Friendly Workplace Act: HearingBefore the Subcommittee
on Employment and Training of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 105th Cong. 9 (1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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ances have made a dead letter of the provision in construction.242
Moreover, since the DOL is prohibited from requiring firms to
keep records more than three years, it is, in its view, by now no
longer able to prove that employers owe any residual obligation
dating back to the period before April 1, 1990.243
But even apart from such tactics, the robustness of the so-called
hold-harmless provision becomes moot over time: given the
enormous turnover rate among small construction entities, as pre1990 small firms go out of business forever and wholly unrelated
new small ones are formed, the only ones who will be held
harmless, as it were, are these post-March 31, 1990 start-up firms,

242

Telephone Interview with Don Chleborad, Enforcement Officer, DOL

(Nov. 21, 1997). Strong grounds exist for believing that the DOL has yielded too
quickly on this point. Even in the more tenuous case of a bona fide buyer of a
corporate employer, courts have held that such a successor may be held liable for
the seller's FLSA liabilities where "the new business retains common aspects of
the prior business sufficient to allow the legal conclusion of 'successorship"' and
the successor knew of the FLSA violations at the time it bought the business.
Criteria for testing retention of common aspects of the business include:
substantial continuity of the same business operation; use of the same plant; the
same or substantially same work force; the same jobs under the same working
conditions; the same supervisors; the same machinery, equipment, and methods
of production; and the same product manufactured or service offered. Brock v.
LaGrange Equipment Co., 107 Lab. Cas. 34,967 at 45,209 (D. Neb. 1987). See
also Steinbech v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1995); 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.107(a) (1997) (factors for determining whether an employer is a successor
in interest under the Family and Medical Leave Act). The case of a small
construction business owner who merely goes in and out of business would be
much easier to resolve. First, it would be unnecessary to prove that he knew of
the minimum wage or overtime liability. Second, if he merely closed down one
sole proprietorship and opened another, his person would create the identity.
Third, even if he closed down a sole proprietorship and incorporated or closed
one corporation and reincorporated, if the business were otherwise unchanged,
the requisite "degree of business continuity" would be proven. Since Congress's
purpose was "Preservation of Coverage," permitting such alter ego transactions
to wipe out residual overtime liability would make a mockery of congressional
intent. Finally, if small construction companies customarily suspend operations
during the winter anyway, it would, likewise, contravene congressional intent to
recognize such temporary closures as terminating overtime coverage.
243 29 C.F.R. § 516.5; Telephone Interview with Richard Brennan,
DOL,
Division of Policy and Analysis, (Dec. 8, 1997).
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which are freed from FLSA obligations and free to compete with
larger firms on the basis of lawfully lower wages. And even if
construction labor market forces compel payment of wages in
excess of the minimum wage, the more important issue is nonpayment of overtime, which is "'a very big problem"' even among
covered employers. 44 Finally, Congress drained whatever residual
force remained in the "preservation of coverage" provision by
failing to codify it as it had in 1977. Consequently, only the utmost
diligence or serendipity would lead even a lawyer to stumble
over
24
Code.
States
United
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to
notes
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law
it in the session
Congressional justification in 1988-1989 of the increase in the
enterprise coverage dollar-volume threshold as merely adjusting for
inflation might have made sense if it historically had been
Congress's intent to maintain coverage at some fixed level. But the
structure of the 1966 amendments, which lowered the threshold for
retail and service enterprises from $1,000,000 to $500,000 and
$250,000 in two stages, clearly pointed in the opposite direction.
One of the conservative Republican opponents of minimum wage
regulation underscored this intent in 1966. Senator Paul Fannin,
objecting to the lowering of the enterprise coverage threshold to
$250,000, quoted the 1961 Senate report to the effect that the $1
million threshold established in that year for retail and service
enterprises was designed to insure that "small local business" would
not be affected. He then asked rhetorically: "Is it possible that in
the short space of 5 years our opinions on this vital point have
changed 75 percent? Is it now felt that a small store with, say, six
or eight employees, should be subject
to the voluminous provisions
2 46
of the Fair Labor Standards Act?
Creation of first-dollar coverage for construction and laundry
enterprises was an unambiguous answer: in pushing out to the
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Stephanie Armour, More Workers Puttingin Free Overtime Hours, USA

Jan. 14, 1998, at 5B (quoting John Fraser, Acting Wage and Hour
Administrator). Charles Ciccone, The Small Business Exemption in the Fair
Labor StandardsAct: Number of Employees Subject to the 1989 Amendments, in
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5, 6 (Cong. Res. Serv., 91-307 E, Apr. 2, 1991),
totally overlooks the question of overtime in construction.
245 29 U.S.C. § 203, at 60 (1994).
246 S. REP. NO. 89-1487 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3043.
TODAY,
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limits of its interstate commerce powers, Congress made clear not
only that it regarded as engaged in activities affecting commerce
more and more businesses that it once classified as merely local,
but that the "small" in "small local business" would have to
dwindle in tandem with the "local." Congress's attempt in 1989 to
justify the increase and extended application of the enterprise
threshold level on the grounds that "a single small business
threshold" was obviously superior to the existence of "several
confusing standards to determine applicability of the Act" and
"should make it much easier to determine which enterprises are
covered and which are not, 2 47 overlooked the fact that nothing
could be less confusing than the universal first-dollar coverage that
had prevailed in construction for a quarter-century 24 -nothing,
that is, except the universal exclusion associated with repeal of the
2 49
FLSA, which was not yet on the practical agenda at that time.
IX. HERE AN EXEMPTION, THERE AN EXEMPTION: TODAY
ENTERPRISE COVERAGE, TOMORROW INDIVIDUAL
COVERAGE?

There is a certain number of marginal industries which for
one reason or another cannot pay a wage which ...all of
us might believe to be a desirable wage. Society must
choose whether it wishes to have those marginal industries
continued on a basis of what might be termed marginal
wages, or whether it wishes to eliminate them from
H.R. REP. No. 101-260, at 39, 18 (1989).
Confusion did not, however, disappear entirely. The judge in Donovan
v. Doyon Drywall, Inc., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13705 (M.D. Fla. 1982),
proceeded from the misunderstanding that in order to meet the enterprise
coverage test, construction employers had to do at least $250,000 of business.
Since the employers did reach that level, the error was harmless.
249 Despite the expanded small business exemption, Senator Hatch still
believed that small business people would suffer as a result of the passage of the
amendments. He therefore (unsuccessfully) proposed an amendment prohibiting
the 101st Congress from increasing the business costs of any small business
(defined as employing 50 or fewer people or having gross receipts of less than
$1 million) by enacting legislation requiring additional paperwork, capital
expenditures, compliance costs, or taxes. 135 CONG. REc. 15,228 (1989).
247
248
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industry and their production taken off the market, and
support them on relief or by other means.25 °
The provision in the 1989 FLSA amendments dealing with
enterprise coverage included "conforming amendments," which
deleted §§ 213(a)(2) and (4) of the FLSA.251 Section 213(a)(2)
had, beginning in 1961, excluded even from individual coverage
under the minimum wage and overtime provisions any employee in
any retail and service establishment more than one-half of whose
sales were made intrastate if the establishment was either exempt
from enterprise coverage or was in a covered enterprise but the
establishment's annual sales were less than $250,000.252 As of the
time of the 1989 amendments,253 section 213(a)(2) stated that the
minimum wage and overtime provisions did not apply to "any
employee employed by any retail or service establishment ... if
more than 50 per centum of such establishment's annual dollar
volume of sales of goods or services is made within the State in

1937 Hearings, supra note 50, at 658 (testimony of Noel Sargent,
secretary, National Association of Manufacturers).
251 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157,
250

§ 3(c)(1), 103 Stat. 938, 939 (1989).
252 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(1),
75 Stat. 65, 71 (1961). From 1938 to 1949, the provision referred simply to retail
and services establishments "the greater part" of whose sales was in intrastate
commerce. Fair Labor Standards Act, §213(a)(2), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938).
The use of 50 percent as a marker of local businesses was inserted in 1949 to
"obviate" Supreme Court decisions and rulings by the Wage and Hour
Administrator that Congress deemed to "sweeping." Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 11, 63 Stat. 910, 917 (1949); H.R. REP. No.
81-1453 (1949), reprintedin 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2251, 2263-64.
253 When the 1966 amendments lowered the retail and service enterprise
coverage dollar-volume threshold to $250,000 as well, the separate but identical
dollar-volume for establishment exemption from all coverage became redundant;
it was finally deleted as of 1977, from which time forward the enterprise
coverage dollar-volume threshold also determined the establishment threshold.
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1964, 1970, 1976, repealed 1989). For a good overview
of the history of the changes in § 213(a)(2), see Conrad Fritsch, Exemptionsfrom
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Retail Trade and Services, 4 REPORT OF THE
MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION 1, 13-18 (1981). The very complex
regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.300-343 (1997).
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which the establishment is located, and such establishment is not in
an enterprise described in section 203(s).... .254
This exclusion relieved such locally oriented retail and service
establishments of minimum wage and overtime obligations vis-A-vis
an estimated 3,415,000 employees as of September 1988.55 The
obvious purpose and effect of the deletion of this exclusion were,
as President Bush's Secretary of Labor observed in her statutorily
required annual (1990) report to Congress on minimum wage and
overtime coverage,256 to entitle employees of such formerly
doubly and wholly exempt enterprises to minimum wage and
overtime payments "insofar as they are individually engaged in
commerce, in the production of goods for commerce or an activity
which is closely related and directly essential to such production,
in a workweek. ' ' 257 That the intent behind the combined increase
in the threshold and deletion of the former exclusions was not to
exempt all small firms entirely is clear from the statement in the
final House committee report that the amended enterprise test in
conjunction with the deletion of §213(a)(2) would "exempt most
small businesses from the FLSA if their annual volume of sales...
is less than $500,000.258
About the time the higher minimum wage of $3.80 was to go
into effect in April 1990, small business owners and congressional
Republicans began claiming that a drafting error had vitiated the
increase in and expansion of the enterprise coverage exemption.

254

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (repealed 1989). The other section that Congress

repealed, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(4) (repealed 1989), excluded from minimum wage
and overtime coverage employees of an exempt retail establishment (under
§ 213(a)(2)) if it was recognized as a retail establishment despite making or
processing at the retail establishment the goods that it sells "Provided, that more
than 85 per centum of such establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of
goods so made or processed is made within the State in which the establishment
is located."
235 S. REP. No. 101-117, at 23 tbl.2 (1989). 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(4)
affected
only 8,000 employees.
256 29 U.S.C. § 4(d)(1) (1994).
257 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION,
MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT 4 (1991).
258

H.R. REP. No. 101-260, Pt. 1, at 39 (1989) (emphasis added).
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As an official of the chief lobbyist on this matter, the National
Restaurant Association ("NRA"), declared: "This was absolutely a
mistake .... ",,s9They complained that no one had foreseen that
the deletion of §213(a)(2) would mean that individual coverage
would be preserved for some workers individually engaged in
commerce or production of goods for commerce even in enterprises
falling below the enterprise coverage threshold.
The NRA spearheaded claims by small businesses that the
deletion of § 213(a)(2) "in effect, repealed the small business
exemption" that had been in existence since 1961, making it
"virtually useless in most instances." The NRA complained that a
restaurant that had, under prior law, been exempt both under
enterprise coverage and with regard to individual coverage by
virtue of § 213(a)(2), was now for the first time, even if it did less
than $500,000 of business, liable for the minimum wage vis-A-vis
"employees who handle or process cash, checks, and credit card
charge slips, take telephone reservations from customers calling
from out-of-state, unload goods shipped from another state, and
deliver mail to the post office." 2' 6
A few months after the 1989 amendments had gone into effect,
some legislators began trying to undo the survival of individual
coverage in firms exempt from enterprise coverage. On July 20,
1990, Representative Penny and 17 others introduced a bill to
amend the FLSA so as to confine coverage only to employees of
enterprises engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce. 261 A few days later, Representative Murphy introduced his "Fair Labor Standards Technical Amendments," which
239

White House Pushing To Modify Minimum Wage, LAB. REL. REP., Dec.

10, 1990, at 463, 464.
260 Id. at 464. The DOL takes the position that "a waitress or cashier who
handles a credit card transaction would in all probability be subject to the Act."
Wage and Hour Div., Fact Sheet No. 002: Restaurantsand FastFood Establishments Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (visited Apr. 19, 1998)
<http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/ regs/compliance/whd/whdfs2.htm>. On the
very widespread violations in restaurants unrelated to the exemption of small
businesses from enterprise coverage, see Brian Tumulty, Work Violations Rob
Employees: Unpaid Overtime Is the Worst Problem, Agency Says, IDA1-O
STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1997, at la.
26!

H.R. 5340, 101st Cong. (1990).
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would have achieved the same end.2 62 No action was taken on
these efforts to deprive workers of individual coverage, but on
October 17, 1990, Secretary of Labor Dole informed Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell that the so-called conforming
amendment had the "'inadvertent effect' of bringing individual
employees of small firms under the law for the first time. 2 63 The
next day, the House considered two unrelated issues left over from
the 1989 bill. Representative Murphy, the chairman of the Labor
Standards subcommittee, sought to "accommodate two separate
groups of employers" with regard to matters that the 1989 act had
not made "clear" or had "failed to exempt." Representative Bartlett
tried to use the occasion to persuade his colleagues that these points
were only "two of the four mistakes, drafting mistakes, that were
264
made in the passage of the Minimum Wage Act of 1989.
Bartlett considered it "important for Members to understand" that
these other two "mistakes ... were generally acknowledged to be
mistakes." Who had made these "mistakes" and how, Bartlett did
not reveal, although he certified they had not been made by
Murphy or Goodling, the ranking Republican. Unable to state
comprehensibly (or grammatically) what in fact Congress had done,
Bartlett, who urged that "the mistakes.., be corrected... at some
point" that session, asserted that:
[T]he words of the committee report in section 3, section
3 amends the enterprise test to exempt most small businesses from the FLSA [i]f their annual volume of sales or
business done is less than $500,000. Nevertheless, the
drafting of the 1989 act, drafted the small business exception which had been in effect since 1961 to totally remove
the exemption from small business, not a result that anyone
so far as I know had intended, and clearly not the intent of
265
that act.
Although it is admittedly impossible to know what Bartlett
meant, others soon made it clear. On the last day of the 101st
262

H.R. 5382, 101st Cong. (1990).

263

White House Pushing To Modify Minimum Wage, LAB. REL. REP., Dec.

10. 1990, at 464.
264 136 CONG. REC. H10,563 (1990).
265

Id. at H10,564.
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Congress, Senator Dale Bumpers, Democrat of Arkansas, on behalf
of himself and 16 Democratic and Republican colleagues, introduced the last bill in the Senate, which would have eliminated
individual coverage, retaining minimum wage and overtime
coverage only for employees employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.266 Bumpers
immediately returned to the issue in the next session. Early in
1991, two southern Democrats, Dale Bumpers in the Senate and
Mike Espy in the House, introduced bills identical with the earlier
proposal. These proposals were disingenuous in the sense that their
sponsors falsely advertised them as a mere technical correction
designed to restore the status quo ante 1989. In fact, they were a
radical break with a half-century of FLSA coverage: they would
not merely have reinstated the limited exemptions for local retail
and service establishments under §§ 213(a)(2) and (4), but would
have eliminated individual-based interstate commerce coverage
entirely in all businesses with less than $500,000 of sales in all
industries.

67

In explaining the basis of his proposal, Bumpers distorted the
history of the FLSA. First, he claimed that: "Since the enactment
in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act has provided an exemption
for small businesses. . . . Unfortunately, under current law, that
exemption does not exist for all practical purposes. ' '268 Both of
these claims are incorrect. The FLSA from the outset excluded
from coverage firms, regardless of size, not engaged in interstate
commerce or production of goods for commerce. The exemption
from enterprise coverage, which did not begin until 1961 and which
Congress increased and expanded in 1989, continues to exist for
retail and service firms, but Congress expressly meant to trade it
off for inclusion of those employees who are individually engaged
in commerce.
The other Democratic senator from Arkansas, David Pryor,
supplemented the distortion with respect to its operation. He
asserted that "through an unintended deletion of a section of the

266
267

268

S. 3271, 101st Cong. (1990).
S. 349, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 1237, 102d Cong. (1991).
137 CONG. REC. S1584 (1991).
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...
FLSA ... , all businesses that had employees engaged in
interstate commerce would be covered in full . ... ,69 This claim
is false: no employer forfeits its enterprise coverage exemption with
respect to employees not engaged in interstate commerce merely
because other employees are so engaged. Senator D'Amato offered
the most extreme attack by falsely asserting that the "deletion
error" not only had left the DOL with "no choice but to determine
that all businesses with employees engaged in interstate commerce
are not covered under the small business exemption," but that it
"will place hardships upon small businesses that have been unheard
of in over 50 years of labor law., 270 A determination by the DOL
that some employees are individually covered in no way affects a
small business's exemption from enterprise coverage vis-A-vis its
other employees. Outside of the retail and service sector, newly
uncovered construction firms also refute D'Amato's claim since
very few if any of their employees are individually engaged in
interstate commerce.
The success of small business lobbyists' in securing 48
senatorial co-sponsors for Bumpers' bill sufficed to persuade the
Democratic leaders of the Labor Committee that they would "have
to negotiate some kind of compromise with him to try to limit the
damage."27 ' In the event, the adamant rejection by Representative
William Ford, the new chairman of the House Education and Labor
Committee, of a proposal that would expel so many workers from
coverage doomed the initiative. 2
The allegation that no one realized the consequences of deleting
§ 213(a)(2) or that it was a drafting error is directly contradicted by
the contemporaneous legislative history. During the debate over

269

Id. at S1585.

270

Id. at S2241.

271

Sarah Fox, Background on Bumpers' Minimum Wage Amendment 6

(July 19, 1991) (on file with author). Fox wrote this internal memo while she
was chief majority counsel of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee.
272 Telephone Interview with Ross Eisenbrey (Dec. 18, 1997). In 1988-89,
Eisenbrey was legislative director to Representative William Ford, the second
ranking Democrat on the House Education and Labor Committee and ex-officio
member of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards. Eisenbrey is currently
Associate Director for Legislative Affairs at the DOL.
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House Bill 2 on March 23, 1989, for example, Representative
Goodling, a senior Republican member of the Labor Committee,
inserted into the record the DOL's estimate of the economic effects
of the increase in the small business exemption. This Bush
administration DOL document is important because it refutes the
claim that no one understood that the deletion of the exemptions in
§§ 213(a)(2) and (4) meant that individual coverage would survive
the exemption from enterprise coverage. The DOL unambiguously
stated that the increase in the enterprise threshold to $500,000
"would exempt additional jobs from the minimum wage, as
additional establishments would revert to individual coverage.
",273

Still more pertinent to understanding the purpose of the deletion
is its author. Jeffords, a Republican, as a member of House labor
committee in 1988 and the Senate labor committee in 1989,
proposed the deletion of § 213(a)(2) in tandem with his plan to
raise, universalize, and make uniform the various dollar-volume
tests.274 One purpose of the deletion was to simplify the small
business exemption rules and to reduce the number of violations. 275 The other purpose was to accommodate pro-labor members who were concerned about the loss in coverage that would
result from the higher and expanded threshold. Jeffords expressly
viewed the deletion of § 213(a)(2) and (4) as bringing into
coverage about as many workers as the higher threshold would
exclude-3 million. He and his staff characterized this trade-off as
a "wash.9 276 When he explained his proposal to the House Labor
Standards subcommittee in 1988, to be sure, the "members' eyes
glazed over" in reaction to the complexities, but "what everyone

273
274

135 CONG. REc. 5244 (1989).
James Riley, the chief counsel and staff director of the House Subcom-

mittee on Labor Standards in the late 1980s, speculated that Jeffords used the
across-the-board $500,000 threshold as a "cover"-to appear to be "carrying
water for the president," and thus not to be "suspect" to the Republicans.
Telephone Interview with James Riley (Dec. 9, 1997).
275 White House Pushing To Modify Minimum Wage, LAB. REL. REP., Dec.
10, 1990, at 465.
276 Fox, supra note 271, at 3; Telephone Interview with Mark Powden (Dec.

4, 1997).
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understood was that it was a 'wash."' 77 Most importantly, at the
full committee mark-up hearing in 1988, although Jeffords
conceded that "precise figures were not available" and that
minimum wage coverage would decrease in some occupations, he
definitively declared that "there is no question..,
that there will
27 8
probably be a net increase in coverage.,

This clear contemporaneous record that the trade-off was public
and known 279 is, curious as it may seem at first blush, not inconsistent with evidence that some heavily involved employers'
associations nevertheless did not understand that individual
coverage survived. 280 Staunchly pro-labor congressional staffers

277

Telephone Interview with Ross Eisenbrey (Dec. 18 1997). Independently,

John Harvey, the chief labor counsel on the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee in 1989, stated that when he and Mark Powden, Jeffords' legislative
director, went to the DOL to figure out exactly how many employees would be
excluded and included by the amendments, the answer was that it was "a wash."
Telephone Interview with John Harvey (Dec. 9, 1997).
27.StenographicHearing Transcript, supra note 199, at 57-58.
279 Harvey stated that he and Powden realized that small business was still
subject to individual coverage. Telephone Interview with John Harvey (Dec. 9,
1997). Inconsistent with this account is the version furnished by James Riley,
chief counsel and staff director of the House Subcommittee on Labor Standards.
He stated that he and the other staffers who drafted the deletion "sort of pulled
a fast one." Telephone Interview with James Riley (Dec. 9, 1997). As part of a
"word game" in which staffers and opposing lobbyists are continually engaged,
they were testing the skills of their opponents' lawyers: "If they're so much
smarter, let them figure it out." Id. Stressing that the game was "not deceitful,"
Riley observed that staffers were "obstinate" and enjoyed showing how "clever"
they were. Id. Eisenbrey strenuously discounted this version, but agreed that
Riley did try to "pull the wool over the eyes" of the other side by writing a
committee report that was not truthful. Telephone Interview with Ross Eisenbrey
(Dec. 18, 1997). As a result of the incident, Murphy felt constrained to support
the "correction" in 1990. Id. Eisenbrey did not find it inconsistent with his
account that Riley had related that after the controversy had broken out, Murphy
had smiled and said to Riley: "I see you're up to your old tricks again." Id.
20 Senator Kennedy conceded seven years later that: "It is clear that some
Members of Congress thought they were voting for a blanket small business
exemption when they voted to increase the threshold for the enterprise test to
$500,000. But those Members of Congress were ignoring the longstanding
principle of individual coverage-which the 1989 act did not abandon, and with
good reason." 142 CONG. REC. S7355 (1996).
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freely admit that small business representatives were being honest
when they protested that they had not understood that the trade-off
resulted in the preservation of individual coverage. The majority
counsel of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, for
example, wrote that in mid-1990, a few months after the amendments had gone into effect, the NRA "lobbyists realized what
they'd agreed to and started screaming bloody murder." 281 A
House labor committee staffer and later DOL legislative affairs
director explained the ignorance as the result of the fact that some
lobbyists are simply "lazy"; and although such "incompetence" is
not extraordinary, he conceded that this issue had been a "pretty
big one" for them to have missed.282
The suspicion that few legislators, lobbyists, or employers
understood enterprise coverage and its relationship to individual
coverage is confirmed by the fact that even a quasi-official source
fell victim to a primitive misunderstanding. A 1991 study of "The
Small Business Exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Number of Employees Subject to the 1989 Amendments,"
published by the Congressional Research Service, a department
within the Library of Congress that analyzes the advisability of
legislative proposals for congressional committees, 283 cited,
without correction, a complaint that a cashier working in a
restaurant with less than $500,000 in sales would be covered
"because the cashier worked with a cash register that was 'moved
in or was produced for commerce'. .. 284 In fact, the cashier
would be no more covered than the waiter who served food on
dishes produced for commerce, or the roofer, employed by a
construction business doing less than $500,000 of business, who
used nails produced for interstate commerce. They would not be
covered because their employers are not subject to enterprise
coverage and they are not individually engaged in interstate
commerce. If a relatively simple key concept in a statute as brief
and straightforward as the FLSA is so mystifying to professional
participants in the legislative process, the level of legislators'
281

Fox, supra note 271, at 4.

282

Telephone Interview with Ross Eisenbrey (Dec 18, 1997).
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2 U.S.C. § 166(d)(1) (1994).
Ciccone, supra note 244, at 2.
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comprehension of something as impenetrable as the Internal
Revenue Code can only be imagined.
Despite the failure of the Bumpers bill in 1991, the NFIB and
NRA have continued to lobby Congress to broaden the exemption
of small businesses. In 1996 they again prevailed upon legislators
to renew the effort to eliminate individual coverage for employees
of employers not subject to enterprise coverage. This insistence that
small employers should be free to propagate unfair labor standards
is remarkable in light of the astounding results that the NFIB has
published from polls of its own members on this issue. When the
NFIB asked its members-who typically employ five people and
gross $350,000 in sales annually 285 -in 1987: "Should the exemption for minimum-wage laws for small retail and service firms be
increased?," 47 percent were opposed and 9 percent undecided.
Even in 1995, five years after the $500,000 enterprise coverage
threshold had gone into effect, 23 percent were opposed and 10
percent undecided when asked: "Should all small businesses with
less than $500,000 in annual gross sales be exempt from FLSA
requirements?" 286 Little wonder that in 1996 Representative John
La Falce, formerly chairman of the House Committee on Small
Business and then its ranking minority member, found that small
businesses are not "notably concerned about" an increase in the
minimum wage. He related that when the SBA brought to the
attention of tens of thousands of small business owners in connection with the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business that
bills had been introduced to increase the minimum wage, "the top
403 recommendations coming from the regional conferences to be
considered at the National Conference did not include the minimum
wage issue. This was not even on the radar screen of the small
business community. '287

The Family Friendly Workplace Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Employment and Training of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 105th Cong. 65 (1997) (statement of Senator Dodd).
286 NFIB, Mandate(visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://www.nfibonline.com/cgibin/search.pl/mandatesearch/>.
287 Small Business and Entry-Level Employees: How to IncreaseTake-Home
Pay andKeep America Working: HearingBefore the House Committee on Small
Business, 104th Cong. 5 (1996).
285
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Nevertheless, the legislative push to increase the minimum wage
in 1996 prompted renewed efforts to eliminate individual coverage.
Representative Goodling, the chairman of what was formerly the
House Labor Committee and which the Republican majority
renamed Committee on Education and Workforce Development,
offered a "poison pill amendment" 288 that would, again, have
totally eliminated individual coverage with respect to the minimum
wage and overtime. 289 Despite the fact that Goodling himself in
1989 had inserted into the CongressionalRecord the DOL report
that clearly stated that the small businesses losing their § 213(a)(2)
exemption would revert to individual coverage, in 1996 he asserted
that the legislation had "inadvertently" produced that result; indeed,
he went so far as to claim that such individual coverage was
precisely "what they tried to correct in 1989. "29o
The one respect in which Goodling's logic was unassailable was
the argument that it was "silly" for the law to treat differently two
people working next to each other performing exactly the same
duties except that one made interstate telephone calls and the other
only in-state calls. 29 1 The Wage and Hour Administrator had
made the same argument after World War II, President Truman
repeated it, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor echoed it in
the 1950s, and the legislators who amended the FLSA in 1961
finally crafted a remedy for this anomaly. That remedy for this
obsolete residue of federalism was enterprise coverage-precisely
the institution that Congress began whittling away in 1977 and that
Goodling wished to eliminate for as many firms as possible. The
difference between him and the earlier advocates was manifest:
whereas they wished to create uniformity by conferring coverage
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142 CONG. REC. H5506 (1996) (statement of Rep. DeLauro).

289 Id. at H5534.
290

Id.

291

Id. at H5541.
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on both intra- and interstate commerce workers,292 Goodling's
goal was coverage for neither.
In an era in which employers and politicians ceaselessly
admonish workers that no one, big or small, is immune from the
competitive forces of one globally interconnected economy, which
imperiously demands dislocations and belt-tightening, it is grotesque to base the national wage and hour law of the world's
largest economy on an antiquated distinction between intrastate and
interstate commerce "that would serve only an 18th-century
economy .
"..."293
To condition an entitlement to overtime on
whether a roofer happens to unload a truck that just crossed a state
border with shingles manufactured in another state degrades
industrial policy to a childish game.2 94 No political-economic or
moral reason can justify FLSA protection for the maids who clean
houses while denying it to those who repair the roofs on the selfsame houses--especially since only the roofers work for profitmaking commercial enterprises. Goodling, if he focused on it,
would presumably resolve this anomaly by leveling the maids down

Goodling's predecessors were, however, not completely consistent: the
1961 amendments, after all, were the origin of the § 213(a)(2) and (4), which
deprived employees of local retail and service establishments, which fell below
the enterprise coverage threshold, of minimum wage and overtime protection
even if they were individually engaged in interstate commerce.
293 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). For well-reasoned arguments that eighteenth-century discourse and
early nineteenth-century and some early-twentieth-century Supreme Court
decisions embodied much more expansive understandings of the congressional
power to regulate commerce, see 1 WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
292

CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 17-292 (1978)(1953),

Robert Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. REv. 645, 647-53 (1946).
294 FLSA applies to construction "employees who are regularly engaged in
ordering or procuring materials and equipment from outside the State or
receiving, unloading, checking, watching or guarding such goods while they are
still in transit. For example, laborers on a not covered construction project who
regularly unload materials and equipment from vehicles or railroad cars which
are transporting such articles from other States are performing covered work."
29 C.F.R. § 776.23(d)(1) (1997). "Similarly, employees who regularly use
instrumentalities of commerce, such as the telephone, telegraph and mails for
interstate communication" are subject to the FLSA. Id. § 776.23(d)(2).
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to the roofers' excluded status, but only universal coverage avoids
the distributive injustice of making impoverished workers subsidize
wealthier consumers or employers.
The so-called preservation of coverage provision in Goodling's
amendment was much narrower than that adopted in 1989: it would
have required newly uncovered employers to pay the old lower
minimum wage and overtime only to employees who had been, but
were no longer, entitled to the minimum wage.295 Despite this
blatant contraction of coverage, Goodling boasted that he had
"grandfathered all of these people who are now inadvertently
receiving this money." And even if Goodling had not preserved
their entitlement to the obsolete minimum wage, the number of
affected employees would, he argued, not be significant anyway:
"if we look at all the exemptions that are presently in the law, we
will find that there are not that many [employees] left . ...
Goodling seemed oblivious of where the logic of his (empirically
unsound) argument led-namely, to the recognition that the
problem he was seeking to solve could also not have been
significant. What he had not overlooked, however, were the
possibilities that the amendment would open up for small employers: "He acknowledged that some employers might use the
opportunity to cut the pay of new hires below the minimum wage,
' 297
'if they can find people willing to work for it."'
Even if the Goodling amendment had not been defeated 229 to
196,298 President Clinton, who pronounced the initiative "a giant
fraud on the American people," threatened to veto the minimum
wage bill: "Eliminating the minimum wage is no way to increase
it. We must not tolerate sweatshops and a repeal of wage protections for millions of Americans as a condition of assuring a living
wage for some workers." 299 The sentiment was as economically
and morally sound as it was historically disingenuous: Democrats

295

142 CONG. REc. H5534.
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Id. at H5535.
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David Hess, GOP Move Could Scuttle Wage Hike, Would Exempt

Millions of Jobs, BERGEN RECORD (N.J.), May 23, 1996, at A10.
298 142 CONG. REC. at H5543.
299 Republicans Want Wage Hike Limits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May

23, 1996, at IA.
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had been agreeing to that compromise since 1977 when they voted
to reverse the pattern set in 1961 and increased the enterprise
coverage threshold. The same historical caveat is applicable to the
impeccable logic behind Clinton's threat to veto the counterpart
amendment in the Senate a month later: "It doesn't matter the size
of your employer, you can't raise a family on $4.25 an hour."3°°
The Democrats' spirited pro-labor defense of residual individual
coverage in small businesses exempt from enterprise coverage
should, finally, not deflect attention from the marginal importance
of individual coverage for marginalized workers. The apprehension
of retail and service employers exempt from enterprise coverage
that DOL enforcement agents might, in the course of investigating
them, discover violations with respect to employees individually
engaged in interstate commerce may, to be sure, deter such firms
from committing minimum wage and overtime violations.3 0° But
given the meager level of DOL enforcement in general, vindication
of rights under the FLSA must rely on workers' self-reliance. And
here the preservation of individual coverage in otherwise exempt
firms is much too arcane and convoluted to expect many workers
to be aware of, let alone understand, what legislators and lobbyists
had not.
X. DOES THE FLSA Now HAVE OR HAS IT EVER HAD A
SMALL-BUSINESS EXEMPTION?

"The legislative history [of OSHA] ... clearly shows that
every amendment or other proposal which would have
resulted in any employee's being left outside the protections afforded by the Act was rejected. The reason for

'00 Minimum Wage Bill Faces Veto over GOP Amendments, Clinton Says,
DAILY LAB. REP., July 2, 1996, at D13.

Sarah Fox related that the Field Labor Directors Association, which
represents managers and supervisors in DOL regional offices, had advised the
Senate Labor Committee that the removal of individual coverage would impede
enforcement even with respect to workers subject to enterprise coverage because
proving individual coverage does not require access to employers' records to
determine whether they are producing $500,000 worth of business. Fox, supra
note 271, at 5.
301
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excluding no employee, either by exemption or limitation
on coverage, lies in the most fundamental of social
purposes of this legislation which is to protect the lives and
health of human beings in the context of their employ302
ment.
Without any doubt, Congress knows how to write a smallbusiness exemption into a labor-protective statute when it so
desires. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act define a covered "employer"
as employing 15 or more employees.30 3 The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act sets the threshold at 20 employees .3 ' The
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act does not apply
to employers with fewer than 100 employees.3 5 Other federal
and state statutes also use such employee size-class thresholds to
exempt small businesses from regulation and thus deprive their
employees of the relevant protections.30 6 Congress chose not to
create such an express small-business exemption in the FLSA in
1938 despite the example of the Social Security Act, which in 1935
imposed unemployment taxes only on employers of at least eight
employees. 30 7 Nor did Congress in the intervening years amend
the FLSA to add a general employee-size-based exemption,
although it has in a very few instances established such a criterion
excluding employees of employers in certain industries. 0 8
Congress's reasons for creating small-business exemptions vary
from statute to statute. The basis for privileging owners of small
businesses to discriminate against black (or other nonwhite or
302

29 C.F.R. § 1975.3(b) (1997).

303

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994);42 U.S.C § 12111 (5)(A) (1994). Originally,

Congress set the threshold under Title VII at 25 or more employees.
'04 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
305 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1994).
306 For a catalog, see Clark Judge, Thresholds of Pain, WALL ST. J., Aug.
10, 1994, at A8.
307 Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 907(a), 49 Stat. 620, 642 (1935).
3" For example, forestry workers are excluded from overtime if their
employer employs fewer than nine workers. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(28) (1994).
Agricultural employees are excluded from minimum wage and overtime if their
employers did not use more than 500 man-days of agricultural labor in any
calendar quarter in the previous calendar year. Id. § 213(a)(6)(A).
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female) workers was an analogy between such workplaces and
private social settings: the legislature would no more compel him
to rub shoulders with a black person in the shop he owned than it
would require him to invite that person to dinner at his home.
"[W]hen a small businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons
selects an employee," Senator Cotton declared, "he comes very
close to selecting a partner; when a businessman selects a partner,
he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces when he
selects a wife., 30 9 In contrast, when legislators, unsuccessfully,
sought to insert an employer size-exemption in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSHAct"), proponents argued that
coverage was unnecessary: the close employer-employee relationship means that small employers keep close contact with their
workers and have an obvious interest in the safety.3 l0
Thus whereas at least some legislators were willing to concede
that small employers might discriminate against black workers, and
openly advocated grandfathering in such prejudice at close quarters,
they denied that employees of small employers were exposed to
significant safety or health risks. Unlike the situation with regard
to discrimination, small-business advocates were constrained to
deny their opponents' empirical premise that an exemption from the
OSHAct "would almost give a license to kill." '' Neither of these
justifications, however, applies to the FLSA. No legislator has
argued that small employers should be privileged to exploit their
workers because it would be sociopsychologically presumptuous of
Congress to prohibit employers from taking advantage of workers
with whom they rub shoulders every day. By the same token, no
legislator has asserted that FLSA coverage is superfluous because
small employers have an obvious interest in paying their workers

309

110 CONG. REC. S13,085 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton).

310

118 CONG. REC. H31,314 (1972) (statement ofRep. Rousselot). In 1972,

the House and Senate both voted in favor of a rider to an appropriations bill that
would have created a small-employer exemption, but President Nixon pocket
vetoed the bill. 118 CONG. REC. at 31,307-20, 37,203. In order to stave off
further congressional action, OSHA in 1977 issued a regulation creating an
exemption from paperwork requirements for employers of 10 or fewer
employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.15.
'" 118 CONG. REC. at 21,103 (statement of Rep. Flood).
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well: the whole point of the exemption is to enable them to
accumulate and reinvest the difference between the minimum wage
and overtime that they are not required to pay and the lower wage
that the unfettered labor market permits. One important reason that
even Democrats and liberals have accepted a small-business
exemption from the FLSA must be that they reject the analogy to
the OSHAct-they must deny that the exemption "would almost
give a license to starve."
Despite this aberrant statutory history, pro-employer partisans
have taken absolutist positions on the question of whether the
FLSA provides a small-business exemption. Senator Dole belonged
to the fringe of the pro-employer extreme by virtue of adding a
chronological component: "There has always been a basic exemption for small business under the Minimum Wage law."3 12 In fact,
however, it is more accurate to state that the dollar-volume
thresholds for enterprise coverage, which were not introduced until
1961, did "not establish, and w[ere] not intended to establish, a
'small business exemption,"' and that the (erroneously labelled)
"Exemptions" section of the FLSA, "does not include-and has
'
never included-any general exemption for small businesses." 313
Representative Goodling, in pleading for adoption of his
amendment to eliminate individual coverage under the FLSA, cited
the aforementioned statutes as proof that "the small-business
' If
exemption .. .is what we do in every piece of legislation."314
Congress were to insert a general small-business exemption into the
FLSA, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court would hold that
Congress faces no insuperable constitutional due process or equal
protection obstacles in choosing to permit small employers to
subject their workers to the kinds of exploitation and discrimination
that it has otherwise outlawed. Indeed, on the very day that the
original FLSA bill was introduced in 1937, the Supreme Court
rejected such a challenge to the Unemployment Compensation Act
312

123 CONG. REc.

313Fox,

32,907 (1977).

supra note 271, at 1, 2. On how exclusions of employees in § 13

came to be misleadingly labelled exemptions, see Marc Linder, Closing the Gap
Between Reich and Poor: Which Side Is the Departmentof Labor On? 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4-6 (1993-94).
314 142 CONG. REC. H5535 (1996).
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of Alabama, which in conformity with the unemployment tax
provisions of the Social Security Act, did not tax employers of
fewer than eight employees:
[T]his is the type of distinction which the law is often
called upon to make. It is only a difference in numbers
which marks the moment when day ends and night begins,
when the disabilities of infancy terminate and the status of
legal competency is assumed. It separates large incomes
which are taxed from small ones which are exempt, as it
marks here the difference between the proprietors of larger
businesses who are taxed and the proprietors of smaller
businesses who are not.
[I]t cannot be assumed that the legislature could not rightly
have concluded that generally the number of employees
bears a relationship to the size of the payroll and therefore
to the amount of the tax, and that the large number of
small employers and the paucity of their records of
employment would entail greater inconvenience in the
collection and verification of the tax than in the case of
larger employers.315
The Supreme Court's deference to legislative economic policy
decisions of this type long antedated the New Deal and remains
robust.316
To be sure, the original FLSA bill required the Labor Standards
Board (which was ultimately never established) to provide by
regulation that payment of substandard wages or maintenance of
substandard hours by "any employer employing less than [blank]
employees shall not be deemed to constitute a substandard labor
condition . . . ." Yet even this concession to small employers was
to be withdrawn when the board found that "the maintenance of the
appropriate labor standard by such class of employers is necessary
or appropriate in order to carry out the purposes, or prevent the
circumvention" of the FLSA.3 17 Congress, however, promptly
1 Carmichaelv. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1937).
316

E.g., Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 159 (1919)

(upholding state workers compensation statute that did not apply to employees
of employers of five or fewer employees).
117 S. 2745, 75th Cong. § 6(a) (1937).
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decided not to proceed further with even such a conditional acrossthe-board exemption for small employers as defined by the number
of employees or any other size criterion. The floor debate in the
Senate two months later revealed the political-economic and moral
reasons for eschewing a general small-business exemption.
After an amendment was proposed exempting any firm
employing 10 or fewer persons, Senator Black explained that the
original bill had left the employee-threshold blank both because he
was unsure as to whether there should be such an exemption and
because he believed that the Education and Labor Committee and
the whole Senate should debate the issue.3" 8 Black then noted that
numerous statutes (such as the unemployment tax provision of the
Social Security Act enacted by Congress just two years earlier)
exempted employers with fewer than eight workers, while some
state compensation laws set the threshold at three or five workers.
Some people had taken the position that enforcement problems
suggested the wisdom of exempting very small employers, while
others-in particular, large employers-believed that "the law
should apply to all employers, whether they employ 1 or 20 or
5,000 persons." Ultimately the committee decided that "the law
should apply to all alike."3 1 9
The discussion leading up to the vote on the exemption
amendment was dominated by the following dialogue between
Senator Robert Wagner and Senator David Walsh:
Mr. WAGNER. Would not the effect of the amendment
be that the character of competition which we are seeking
to prevent, namely, exploitation as against efficiency,
would continue, because the small sweatshop, employing

Black did not draft the bill, which was drafted by two New Deal insiders,
Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen. Their April 30, 1937 draft left the
number of employees blank. "Confidential Revised Draft April 30, 1937," § 5(a),
National Archives, Labor Dep't Records, Labor Standards-i 937 File, Fair Labor
Standards Bill File. In their May 20, 1937 draft, which is otherwise identical
with the actual bill, the number "15" is written in the blank, but it is unclear by
whom. "Confidential Revised Draft May 20, 1937," § 6(a), National Archives,
Labor Dept. Records, Labor Standards-1937 File, Fair Labor Standards Bill
File.
319 81 CONG. REC. 7863-64 (1937).
3"'
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just a few persons, would continue to pay low wages in
competition with the employer who pays reasonable
wages?
Mr. WALSH. The Senator from New York is absolutely correct. If this bill . .. has any merit at all ...it is
that it is designed to protect and prevent the exploitation of
men and women wage earners in small establishments,
Those working in establishments having less than 10
employees number approximately 200,000. The bill is on
the theory that such workers cannot organize, cannot enjoy
collective bargaining, cannot have the benefit of the large
units of employees who can organize and bring the
pressure of a great labor organization to bear against the
employer in order to obtain decent wages and reasonable
hours of employment.
...
The theory upon which the bill has merit ... is
that small-wage earners in small industries scattered all
over the country in competition with large industries,
because of their locality, because of the fact that they
cannot organize, because of the objections of their employers to organized labor unions, have no power of asserting
their human right to social justice.
What is social justice? Social justice means that we as
legislators should extend to the unfortunate human beings
those social rights which they could demand if they had the
power of unity of action. Social justice means that government will take a hand in helping to uphold and support
individuals and small groups of individuals who have not
the power of pressure possessed by labor organizations.
Senators can visualize the kind of men who operate
sweatshops in the great cities of the country suddenly
dividing their 60 or 70 or 80 employees into units of 8 or
9, with a brother-in-law or cousin or aunt or uncle in
alleged ownership of the establishment, and thus evading
...the application of the law; then sending their goods
...
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into the central markets in competition with large employers who obey and respect the law.320
Fully aware that the exemption for firms with fewer than 10 or
fewer employees would have exempted a large proportion (more
than one-half) of the estimated universe of covered employers,
32
employing only about one-twentieth of all covered employees, '
the Senate, scarcely two months after the original bill had been
introduced, rejected the amendment by a vote of 52 to 31.322 This
fleeting and unenacted existence of a real small-business exemption,
taken together with intense congressional concern over the
possibility that the Supreme Court would invalidate any statute that
sought to regulate non-interstate commerce, strongly suggests that
any exemptions of local and small businesses were not grounded in
the firms' size per se, but merely used size as an indicator that they
were not "seriously competing with and having a substantial effect
upon the flow of interstate commerce., 32 3 Consequently, by the
mid-1940s, once the Supreme Court had made it clear that it would
uphold a much broader exercise of the commerce power, it was
foreseeable that Congress would eventually provide wage and hour
protection to ever larger numbers of workers employed in firms
formerly deemed "local and small."

XI. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE SMALL-BUSINESS EXEMPTION

Congress made it clear that by fixing a dollar volume test
it was not concerned with profit, but 324
with impact on
money.
of
inflow
by
measured
commerce
Even if the boosterist claim that small firms are a job growth
machine were valid, the mere creation of jobs in firms that on
average offer lower wages, fewer and inferior nonwage financial
320 Id. at 7885-86.
32' 81 CONG. REC.

at 7800-01. The proportions are not precise because the

data referred to employers with 1-5 and 6-20 employees.
322 Id. at 7887-88.
323 Id. at 7648 (statement of Sen. Black).
324 Mack Player, EnterpriseCoverage Under the FairLabor StandardsAct:
An Assessment of the First Generation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 283, 331 (1975).
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benefits, worse working conditions, fewer opportunities for
acquiring greater skills, and less job security is no reason to require
their employees to subsidize them to the detriment of larger firms.
A recent study of wage levels by size of employer indicates that the
average hourly wage earnings of full-time workers in firms with
500 or more workers were 43 percent to 28 percent higher than
those in firms with fewer than 100 employees between 1983 and
1993. This gap is an understatement because it excludes presumably
lower-paid part-time workers, who are more prevalent in small
firms. If wage data were available for firms with fewer than 10
workers, the wage gap would presumably be even wider.3 5 The
fact that wage levels rise directly with firm size is closely linked to
3 26
the fact that unionization rates are similarly differentiated.
Promoting small construction businesses by exempting them
from labor standards laws not only deprives workers of the
protections of those mandates, but also subjects them to other
substandard conditions that are, to be sure, not unlawful, but are
manifestly consequences of this sector's small and stagnant
character. Health insurance is a prime example. As the Small
Business Administration concedes: "Most companies without
coverage are in the retail trade and construction industries ...
More than 50 percent of all small construction companies with
fewer than 10 employees . . .are without insurance plans. 32 7 In
1993, only 22 percent of employees of construction firms with
fewer than 10 employees were covered compared with 61 percent
in firms with more than 500 employees. 328 In general, small firms
offer markedly fewer benefits than their larger competitors. Only
one-fifth of workers in firms with 1-24 employees had pension
plans compared to almost nine-tenths of those in firms with 500 or
more workers.329

32"

Richard Boden, Changes in Wages and Worker Attributes by Firm Size,

1983-1993, Bus.

ECONOMICS, July 1997, at 37.
326 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

tbl.4.15, 271 tbl.4.19 (1984) (data for 1978 and 1979).

327 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT:

262
1994

68 (1995).
328 Id. at 92 tbl.2.15.
329 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

266
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Moreover, empirical confirmation of disproportionate job
creation in small firms would not in itself be grounds for according
them preferential legal treatment: "The relevant question is what
market failure the preferential policies are expected to address. The
small business sector is not obviously undersized because of
product or labor market imperfections ....""'
In raising the dollar-volume threshold of and incorporating
construction employers into the exemption, Congress ignored and
contradicted the recommendation of its Minimum Wage Study
Commission, which it established in 1977 to report on the social,
political, and economic ramifications of the FLSA with particular
reference to exemptions."' The commission in 1981 urged the
complete elimination of the exemption for retail and service
enterprises because such a move was consistent with the FLSA's
major objective of placing a floor under all workers' wages. The
change would not only have brought under the act the largest group
of excluded nonsupervisory workers, but would have imposed only
a "minimal" cost on employers since three-fourths of the workers
were already receiving the minimum wage and one-half of the
exempt firms would not experience higher wage costs.332
It is by no means unimaginable that a majority of the Congress
will one day decide to impose the same type of discriminatory yet
constitutional universal small-employer exemption on the FLSA
that it has incorporated into more recently enacted labor-protective
statutes. But if and when the national legislature decides that the
same small employers whom it has privileged, for example, to
withhold a livelihood from workers against whose race, ethnicity,
or gender they are prejudiced, must also be permitted to operate
otherwise unlawful sweatshops, this ill-advised step should be done
openly and not in some convoluted fashion through the use of
exemptions from exemptions, which even many legislators and
lobbyists are intellectually incapable of grasping. The Congress

tbl.4. (1984) (data for 1979).
330 STEVEN DAVIS, JOHN HALTIWANGER, & SCOTT SCHUH, JOB CREATION

AND DESTRUCTION 171 (1996).
3

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151,

§ 2(e)(1)(H), 91 Stat. 1245, 1247 (1977).
112

1 REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION

121 (1981).
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should be required to state directly to the affected workers that it
has chosen to sacrifice them on the altar of an unproven, ideologically driven speculation-namely, that the smallest firms grow into
large ones and provide the bulk of new employment in the United
States-and to confine minimum wage and overtime coverage and
the ban on oppressive child labor to those firms that, as a result of
the operation of market forces, are more likely to comply with fair
labor standards anyway.
A direct criterion of labor use intensity (such as the number of
workers) may, as the Minimum Wage Study Commission noted in
198 1,333 be more rationally related than annual sales to the
purported objective of the exemption. Its straightforwardness
would, in any event, subject legislators to more focused scrutiny of
the impact. Neither criterion, however, can claim to be optimally
suited to the purpose of the small-business exemption, which is to
relieve small firms that are not profitable enough both to accumulate capital for expansion and to offer standard working conditions
of the obligation to pay fair wages. Both sales and number of
employees suffer from overbreadth: neither size criterion is
unambiguously positively correlated with profitability. As the
Minimum Wage Study Commission noted: "The most common
rationale ... to justify the existing minimum wage exemptions...
is the perceived relationship between small size and low profit
rates.

' 33 4

If profitability is the criterion that Congress is targeting, why
should small but profitable firms not be required to pay the
minimum wage? Why should small firms that have remained small
for many years not forfeit the presumption of being rising stars of
job creation? Why should larger firms that by virtue of contraction
have fallen into the status of small businesses be entitled to impose
unfair labor standards on their workers? Even advocates of a smallbusiness exemption acknowledge the need to differentiate. In the
words of a Republican congressman: "If we are going to grant a
small-business exemption under the Federal minimum-wage
requirement, it ought to apply only to businesses that are in a

131
114

Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 112.
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startup mode during that first year or two of operation when the
' Such an apprensurvival of the small business is so tenuous."335
tice-entrepreneur approach would be a quasi-counterpart to the socalled training or opportunity wage that Congress enacted in 1989
and 1996, permitting employers to pay newly hired teenage workers
the out-of-date lower minimum wage for the first 90 days.33 6
.If, as advocates of small business assert, "[s]mall size, in and
of itself, does not dictate low profitability, 337 why do such firms
require any government-enforced subsidies from their employees?
This question is so much the more appropriate since boosters
suggest that many workers of "start-up firms" are themselves so
entrepreneurial that they willingly accept "as little cash wages as
the workers need to survive. All workers are [independent]
contractors so as to reduce cash flow during the critical early startup period. It is difficult to criticize these firms for abusing the law,
for, if they had to pay cash wages, unemployment insurance, and
Social Security, they probably would soon exhaust their cash
resources and go out of business. '338 By freeing small employers
from the mandates of fair labor standards, 339 Congress has privileged them to impose such entrepreneurialism on workers too riskaverse to forgo wages in order to catapult themselves to millionaire-status in the service of the next Bill Gates.
Bruce Kirchhoff, a former chief economist of the SBA and one
of the foremost academic boosters of small business, concedes that
in addition to "potential creative destroyers that need encouragement" and "eventually come into the tax system," "some small-firm
owners are dishonest and have no intention of ever entering the tax
system. They and their firms remain in the underground economy
331 142 CONG. REC. H5539 (1996) (statement of Rep. Frank Riggs).
336

29 U.S.C. § 206(g) (1994). The training or opportunity small business

exemption would still be more capacious because it does not require employers
to pay even the lower minimum wage to new employees.
331 BRUCE KIRCHHOFF, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND DYNAMIC CAPITALISM: THE
FIRM FORMATION AND GROWTH 30 (1994).

ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS

331 Id. at 112.
339 DAVID BIRCH,

JOB CREATION IN AMERICA: How OUR SMALLEST

COMPANIES PUT THE MOST PEOPLE TO WORK 17 (1987), also praises the

"aggressive, ambitious people who are in the shop weekends and labor at low
wages for a chance at a piece of the action."
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for their entire existence." Nevertheless, Kirchhoff not only offers
no method of distinguishing between the two for enforcement
purposes, he fears that "efforts to force compliance could easily
create additional barriers to entry of new firms." Consequently,
with regard to the 2 million firms that purport to have no employees at all, he holds that "the problem of firms failing to comply
with the intent of the unemployment insurance and Social Security
laws is a trade-off between allowing for 4 percent noncompliance
or instituting more enforcement, thereby discouraging potential
growth firms from starting. The present system seems acceptable
when analyzed this way. '340 To make it even more acceptable,
Kirchhoff transmogrifies criminal violations of the Internal Revenue
Code into a neutral "opt[ing] out of the formal employer role., 341
If boosters are not too embarrassed to condone outright illegalities
for the greater good of small businesses, no wonder they fervently
support lawful exemptions from minimum wage and overtime
obligations.
Kirchhoff's framework demonstrates that the FLSA exemption
for small construction employers is not an isolated or idiosyncratic
development in public policy. It fits in snugly with the self-help
measures that employers, especially in construction, have increasingly adopted over the last 20 years to rid themselves of the costs
of what they view as financially obnoxious government-mandated
social and labor protections. In order to evade employment taxes,
for example, construction employers have been pioneers in-as a
congressional committee entitled a hearing on the subject in
1991-Exploiting Workers by Misclassifying Them as Independent
Contractors.342 As the president of the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO, recently testified to Congress:
"Every day, we see construction sites where there are scores, or
even hundreds of workers, and yet every single worker is being

340 KIRCHHOFF,

supra note 337, at 112-14. The 4 percent figure refers to

national noncompliance with respect to 4 percent of all employees.
341 KIRCHHOFF, supra note 337, at 107.
342

Exploiting Workers by Misclassifying Them as Independent Contractors:

Hearing before the Employment and Housing Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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treated as an independent contractor. ' 343 The WlD reports that
construction contractors' practice of misclassifying employees as
independent contractors for FLSA purposes is one of the most
common in the United States. 3' That larger firms resort to
illegalities in order to be able to impose the same unfair labor
standards that their smaller rivals are lawfully privileged to offer is
hardly surprising in a competitive industry 345 Indeed, labor
market standards appear to be so debased in residential construction
that only a "severe shortage" can force builders to "adopt[] all
manner of tactics" including even "paying overtime. ,346
Small firms, however, generally make more intensive use of socalled independent contractors than large firms. A survey commissioned by the SBA found that in 1989 the number of days worked
by independent contractors as a proportion of all days worked by
"regular employees" were 84 times greater in firms with fewer than
25 employees than in firms with 500 or more.347
Since the Census Bureau derives its sample of construction
employers with payroll from the "list of all construction companies
in the active records of the Internal Revenue Service . . . which
were subject to payment of Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) taxes, ' ' 348 a rise in the number of construction establishEmployment ClassificationIssues: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on
Oversightof the House Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 311 (1996)
(statement of Robert Georgine).
344 U.S. Wage and Hour Div., FactSheet No. 013: Employment Relationship
Under the FairLabor Standards Act (FLSA) (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/regs/compliance/whd/whdfsl3.htm>.
34' Roofing Company Pays $857,000 in Back Wages, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Nov. 5, 1997, at 2D (residential roofer failed to pay overtime); see also Drywall
Settlement May Spur Other Workers, 141 LAB. REL. REP. 400, 403 (1992)
(dozens of suits filed against most of the major drywall contractors in southern
California for violating the overtime provision of the FLSA).
346 Lew Sichelman, Labor Shortage: Nationwide Problem Impacts
NewHome Quality and Completion, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 19, 1997, at H-i.
14'

147 U.S.
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ADMINISTRATION,

THE

STATE

OF

SMALL

BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 63 (1991). The figures were 2.52
percent and 0.03 percent respectively.
341 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRIES: SUBJECT SERIES: LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION AND TYPE OF
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ments without payroll as a share of all establishments serves as an
indicator of the spread of the independent contractor scam. Indeed,
this proportion has steadily increased in the construction censuses
from 52.5 percent in 1972 to 70.2 percent in 1992.349 Among
special trade contractors, establishments without payroll accounted
for 75.6 percent of all (1.5 million) establishments in 1992. Since
it is implausible that, for example, in 67.9 percent of roofing
establishments only the owner works,35° presumably hundreds of
thousands of special trade contractors are classifying their workers
as nonemployees. The explosion of firms that report having no
employees and the concomitant phenomenon of "[e]very independent contractor becom[ing] a zero-employee firm"--both of whom
"choose to avoid government payments for benefits they think they
do not need"--are, for Kirchhoff, positive manifestations of a
"changing society...

And change is the stuff of dynamic

capitalism."351
Relegating workers to employment in the subminimum wage
sector thus reveals itself to be part and parcel of the same approach

OPERATION vi (1992).

349 Why it declined slightly from a high of 71.8 percent in 1987 is unclear.
The figures in 1967, 1977, and 1982 were 53.6, 59.9, and 66.9 percent
respectively. Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES, 1967: TYPE OF OPERATION AND LEGAL FORM OF
ORGANIZATION 1-3 tbl. 1 (1970); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS
OF

CONSTRUCTION

SUMMARY-STATISTICS

INDUSTRIES:

INDUSTRY

FOR CONSTRUCTION

SERIES:

UNITED

ESTABLISHMENTS

STATES

WITH

AND

WITHOUT PAYROLL 1-2 tbl.Al (1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982
CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: U.S. SUMMARY:

ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 3 tbl.1 (1984); U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, 1987 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY
SERIES: U.S. SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 7 tbl. 1
(1990); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: U.S. SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND

WITHOUT PAYROLL 27-5 tbl.1 (1996).
35 Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: U.S. SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 27-5 tbl.1 (1996).
351KIRCHHOFF, supra note 337, at 111.
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that encourages self-employment for the unemployed.352 Those
who see small firms as Schumpeterian creatively destructive
engines of job growth praise them as peculiarly suited to the U.S.
economy, which "is a seething mass of pushing, shoving, and
manipulating firms that are attempting to acquire market share and
win profits." In such an economy workers figure as "probably the
most flexible resource. . . They can be hired, fired, transferred,
'
trained, and retrained."353
Excluding more and more workers
from mandatory labor standards regimes serves as a kind of protoderegulatory experiment; and if the new devotees of entrepreneurialism favor macroeconomic "turbulence, not equilibrium, 354
depriving workers of protections such as the minimum wage and
overtime appears optimally suited to the intensification and
acceleration of their degradation into mere "flexible resources."
Exempting small employers from compulsory fair labor
standards as a means of promoting capital accumulation355 and
their expansion into larger enterprises would make sense from this
neo-entrepreneurial perspective only if experience demonstrated that
small firms typically grow into large ones. In fact, however, the
typical pattern is that only a tiny minority of firms doing less than
$500,000 of business annually develop into larger businesses even
when they are legally privileged to impose unfair labor standards
on their workers. Even Bruce Phillips, the director of the Office of
Economic Research of the SBA, a federal agency whose mission is
advocacy, coficedes that perhaps 5 percent of firms of such size

312

MARC LINDER, FAREWELL TO THE SELF-EMPLOYED: DECONSTRUCTING

A SOCIOECONOMIC AND LEGAL SOLIPSISM 94-96 (1992); see generally U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, SELF EMPLOYMENT

PROGRAMS FOR UNEMPLOYED WORKERS (1992).
353 KIRCHHOFF, supra note 337, at
144.
314 KIRCHHOFF, supra note 337, at 144.

Marx noted that the subversion of the customary standard of living played
an important role in the real world: "The forcible reduction on the wage below
this value [of labor power] ... transforms, in fact, within certain limits, the
worker's necessary consumption fund into an accumulation fund of capital." 1
3s1

KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE, in 23 MARX

& ENGELS, supra note 18, at 626.
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grow, whereas "most vegetate" or go out of business.35 6 And in
a study that Phillips published using the SBA's establishment
longitudinal microdata based on Dun and Bradstreet files, he found
that: "New construction firms face a lower chance of survival than
firms in any other industry. 3 7
But even if very small firms generated a disproportionately
large volume of employment, two questions would have to be
posed concerning this development. If, on the one hand, this growth
takes place by means of displacement of the production, market
share, or employment accounted for by higher-wage larger firms,
why should the state intervene to achieve or reinforce such a
debasement of labor standards? On the other hand, if small firms
can generate large numbers of jobs without having to rely on a
statutory exemption from fair labor standards, why is the state
imposing a superfluous detriment on their employees?
Close observers of the roofing business confirm the inapplicability of neo-entrepreneurial theory to the industry. A roofing
contractor in the Iowa City area-whom both the Roofers Union
and the National Roofing Contractors Association characterize as
a good employer-states that only one small roofing contractor
among the scores that have come and gone during the previous 15
years became a larger and reputable employer. A combination of
their exemption from the FLSA and their violation of the social
security, unemployment and workers compensation laws, and
OSHA regulations enables small contractors to submit bids 30
percent lower than larger reputable firms can and to monopolize the
residential roofing sector. Since the small contractors' unlawfully
lower labor costs are proportionally even lower than their bids,
356Telephone

Interview with Bruce Phillips (Dec. 2, 1997). These 5 percent

("gazelles") account for three-fourths of new jobs created by small businesses.
William Dennis, Jr., Bruce Phillips, & Edward Starr, Small Business Job
Creation: The Findings and Their Critics, Bus. ECONOMICS, July 1994, at 23,
25. The SBA formerly leased Dun & Bradstreet data files covering the years
1979 to 1990 that would have made it possible to do longitudinal cohort studies
answering the question as to what happens to such firms. When the Congress cut
off the funding for the data program, the SBA had to return to the data files.
117 Bruce Phillips & Bruce Kirchhoff, Formation, Growth and Survival:
Small Firm Dynamics in the U.S. Economy, I SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS 65,
70 (1989).
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such contractors, who on average employ five to seven workers,
can secure annual profits in the $30,000-$50,000 range on
$250,000 of business."'
Calculating the profitability of small firms on a national level
was made impossible, ironically, by the Reagan administration,
which terminated publication of Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
data broken out for size-classes and sub-industries.3 9 In the last
year (1980) for which the IRS published such data for sole
proprietorships, which constitute 81 percent of all special trade
contractors, 360 net income as a percentage of business receipts
declined almost monotonically-from 44 percent in firms with
receipts between $5,000 and $10,000 to 4 percent in those with
receipts between $5 million and $10 million. Firms with receipts
between $100,000 and $250,000 and between $250,000 and
$500,000 achieved quite solid profit margins of 14 percent and 11
percent, respectively. 36' This monotonic ordering could indicate
that the smaller the firm the more the owner generated profits by
scrimping on personal consumption, 362 but given small special

358

Telephone Interview with Kurt Tjemeland, T & K Roofing, Ely, IA (Dec.

2, 1997).
359 1980 was the last year for which such data were published for sole
proprietorships, and 1981 was the last year for which the IRS issued sole
proprietorship income statistics in a separate publication as it had for many years.
Thereafter the IRS published data only in very abbreviated form in an annual
article in SOI Bulletin. IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1981: SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP RETURNS iii (1982); Raymond Wolfe, Sole ProprietorshipReturns, 1982,
SOI BULLETIN, Summer 1984, at 17. The IRS refuses to run the data even for
researchers who offer to pay for them. Telephone Interview with John Comisky,
IRS, Statistical Information (Jan. 2, 1998).
'60 Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: SUBJECT SERIES: LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION
AND TYPE OF OPERATION 6 tbl.1 (1995).
361 Calculated according to IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME 1979-1980: SOLE

PROPRIETORSHIP RETURNS

169 tbl. 11 (1982). The category "net income" is net

of deficits. This perfect monotonicity was not a quirk of 1980. In 1972, for
example, special trade contractors' net profit as a proportion of business receipts
declined from 49.9 percent in the $2,500-$5,000 receipts class to 4.0 percent in
the $1 million-and-over class. Calculated according to IRS, STATISTICS OF
INCOME 1972: BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS 20 tbl.2.3 (1976).
362 Bruce Phillips, Director of Economic Research, Office of Advocacy, U.S.
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trade contractors' relatively meager capital investment expenditures,
it is also possible that the profits are consumed instead of reinvested. This latter scenario of prodigality would indisputably
contradict the purpose behind the FLSA exemption for small
employers. But even the former scenario of prudent thrift would
not support the exemption: for if small entrepreneurs can achieve
the requisite level of profitability by temporarily cutting back on
their own consumption, why should the state exempt them from
this Faustian conflict between accumulation and consumption by
imposing this "self-denial ' 363 on their employees? After all, it is
entrepreneurs' very "abstinence," according to one strand of
economic theory, that entitles them to part of their profit. 3"
The data that the IRS still publishes for corporations reveal a
somewhat different pattern. But here, too, construction firms with
business receipts between $250,000 and $500,000 are shown to be
more profitable than most finns in larger size-classes.365
A unique study carried out by the Bureau of the Census in
connection with the 1987 and 1992 Economic Census revealed how
profitable many small businesses are. Based on a sample of the

Small Business Administration, suggested this interpretation. Telephone Interview
with Bruce Phillips (Jan. 5, 1998).
363 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 729 (W.
Ashley ed., 1926) (1848).
364 EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, GESCHICHTE UND KRITIK DER
KAPITALZiNS-THEORIEN 241-61 (4th ed. 1921) (1884).
36' The IRS does not publish data, broken out for size-classes,
on corporate
special trade contractors; these data refer to all construction corporations. Net
income (less deficits) as a proportion of total receipts amounted to 1.2 percent
in corporations with $250,000 to $500,000 of business receipts. The highest
proportion, in corporations with business receipts between $5 million and $50
million, was 1.6 percent. Calculated according to IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME1992: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 49-50 tbl.5 (1995). The only data
that the IRS currently publishes on special trade contractors broken out for size
classes refer to assets size-classes. Net income as a proportion of total receipts
in the smallest class (having less than $100,000 in assets) amounted to 1.6
percent. This level exceeded that in the classes with $100,000 to $5 million in
assets; the highest proportion, 3.3 percent, was found in corporations with $100
million to $250 million in assets. Calculated according to IRS, SOURCE BOOK:
STATISTICS OF INCOME: ACTIVE CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, JULY
1991-JUNE 1992 28 (n.d.).
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universe of more than 17 million firms in 1992, the Bureau
determined that of firms with receipts between $100,000 and
$199,999, 4.8 percent recorded net profit of $100,000 or more,
while 32.4 percent achieved net profit of $25,000 to $99,999. The
corresponding proportions for firms with receipts between $200,000
and $249,999 were 9.3 percent and 27.4 percent, respectively; for
those with receipts between $250,000 and $499,999, the proportions
were 13.7 percent and 28.7 percent. If the universe is restricted to
the 10 million "nonminority male-owned businesses"--special trade
contractors are overwhelmingly white men-these proportions ran
even higher. In the $250,000-$499,999 size-class, for example, 15.7
percent of the firms recorded net profit of $100,000 or more, while
30.3 percent reported $25,000 to $99,999. (The corresponding
proportions in 1987 had been very similar: 13.5 percent and 31.5
percent.) The total of 46 percent was only marginally lower than
the 47.8 percent in the $500,000-$999,999 size-class.366 Why
state-enforced subsidies from their
firms this profitable 3 require
67
unclear.
is
employees

366

Calculated according to U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

1992 ECONOMIC

CENSUS: CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS 224 tbl.27b (1992); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987 ECONOMIC CENSUSES: CHARACTERISTICS OF
BUSINESS OWNERS 156-57 tbl.21b (1987). These proportions are understated
because the denominator includes owners who did not respond to the question.
367 To be sure, not all of these firms had employees. The Census of
Construction Industries cannot be used to calculate profit rates because it does
not collect comprehensive data on costs, but it does permit comparisons among
size-classes of employers with respect to a kind of profits category-value added
minus payroll, rental cost for machinery, equipment, and buildings, and capital
expenditures. A crude surrogate for the rate of profit results from dividing this
figure by value added. In 1992, this "rate of profit" was 40.8 percent among
special trade contractors doing $250,000-$499,999 of business and 40.4 percent
among those doing more than $10 million of business. Calculated according to
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES:
INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES

SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND

WITHOUT PAYROLL 27-15 tbl.9 (1996). The corresponding figures for 1987 were
41.5 percent and 42.8 percent, respectively. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987
CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES
SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 19 tbl. 10 (1990).

The minuscule difference between small and large firms suggests that the former
require no state-enforced subsidies from their employees to become profitable
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Despite such profits, the representative small construction
employer has not used its exemption from mandatory fair labor
standards to invest in additional capital equipment or to hire
additional workers. The quinquennial Census of Construction
Industries reveals that from 1987 to 1992, while the overall value
of business done by special trade contractors rose by 8 percent,
average annual capital expenditures in establishments doing less
than $500,000 of business declined 17 percent, from $3,884 to
$3,239. The average number of employees employed by such
establishments also declined-from 3.4 to 2.9.368 Admittedly,
these census data cannot reveal whether individual employers doing
less than $500,000 of business expanded into larger size-classes.
Nevertheless, the impact of the FLSA exemption should also be
observable within the small business sector: new (or already
existing) small businesses should be using the additional profit that
the payment of lawfully substandard wages makes possible to hire
more workers and invest in more capital equipment.
Why profitability on this scale fails to lead to capital investment
and expansion is a question for small-business boosters to explore.
Why employers raking in such profits should be entitled to
government-enforced subsidies from their workers in the form of
substandard wages is a troubling labor policy question that
Congress has not troubled to answer. The burden rests with the
national legislature to explain why condemning the vast majority of
employees of such firms to vegetate in perpetuity in the backwaters
of substandard labor conditions in order that a tiny minority of
firms might advance is not an irrational industrial
policy---especially since some of those few dynamic firms would
have expanded even if they had been subject to the FLSA.
enough to accumulate competitively.
368

Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF

THE CENSUS,

1987 CENSUS OF

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES:

INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES SUMMARY:
ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 19 tbl.10 (1990); U.S. BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY
SERIES: UNITED STATES SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS

WITH AND WITHOUT

PAYROLL 27-15 tbl. 9 (1996). Total capital expenditures among all special trade

contractors declined 3 percent from 1987 to 1992; they increased in the largest
entities. The monetary amounts are not adjusted for inflation.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Moreover, contrary to small business boosters, who assert that
small business has become the job growth engine of the U.S.
economy, 369 the kinds of small firms that benefit from the FLSA

small-business exemption have not produced any increase in their
share of total jobs. Table 1 shows that the share of the total number
of employees accounted for by the smallest establishments and
enterprises 370 in recent decades has actually declined margin371

ally.

369

E.g., BIRCH, supra note 339. For a critique, see DAVIS, HALTIWANGER,

& SCHUH, supra note 330, at 57-81. CHARLES BROWN, JAMES HAMILTON, &
JAMES MEDOFF, EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 24 (1990), argue that small
firms' disproportionate share of new employment is an accident of birth-new
firms happen to be born small. Since new businesses account for more than 100
percent of the net increase in employment, and new businesses rarely start out
with 100 or more employees, it is almost inevitable that small firms will account
for a disproportionate share of new employment. Once established, however,
small firms are not on average very hardy.
370 Data for establishments are available for years prior to 1974, but not for
the size-classes used here.
"' The stagnant or declining share of the smallest establishments/enterprises
could be masking the growth of such entities into larger ones; the stagnant or
declining share could, however, also mask an even stronger decline caused by the
reverse process of the shrinkage of larger entities into smaller ones. Only
longitudinal studies of identified individual businesses could settle this question.
If the long-term stagnant share of total employment accounted for by the smallest
entities means that the number of jobs annually created and disappearing are in
equilibrium, this sector cannot qualify as the especially dynamic growth machine
that boosters have vindicated for it. Zoltan Acs & Bruce Phillips, Why Does the
Relative Share of Employment Stay Constant? (Ms. Babson Entrepreneurship
Conference, Apr. 16-20, 1997) (on file with author), concede the stagnant share
of employment in small firms generally over time, but contend that it is the
result of many of the highest growth small firms' becoming or being acquired
by large firms. Even using longitudinal data, however, Kirchhoff found that firms
with 1 to 19 employees accounted for only 26 percent of the net employment
increase between 1976 and 1986. Part (perhaps half) of this increase was
accounted for by the growth in small firms that became large. KIRCHHOFF, supra
note 337, at 125-28.
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Table 1: % of Employees in Small and Large Establishments/Enterprises, 1963-1995
Establishments with ...
employees

Year

1-4

5-9

Enterprises with...
employees

500+

1-4

5-9

500+

1963

7.7

6.9

47.1

1967

6.8

6.7

46.8

1972

6.4

7.0

46.5

1974

7.2

8.2

24.3

1977

7.4

8.8

22.5

6.2

7.0

47.5

1982

6.9

8.9

21.3

8.0

8.4

41.3

1987

6.7

9.1

19.4

6.0

7.5

43.3

1989

6.3

8.8

20.1

1992

6.5

9.1

20.0

5.7

6.7

47.3

1994

6.3

8.8

19.8

6.2

8.6

19.9

1995

3 72

Sources

Table 2, which displays the same data for the construction
industry, reveals a different pattern. The increase in the share of
employment accounted for by the smallest construction establishments during the years following the creation of the $500,000
enterprise coverage threshold in 1990 is--despite some fluctuations
over time---consistent with the hypothesis that the lawful privilege
to impose unfair labor standards has promoted the competitiveness
of such firms.

372

See infra note 373.
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Table 2: % of Employees in Small and Large Construction
Establishments/Enterprises, 1963-1994
Year

Establishments with...
employees
1-4

5-9

500+

Enterprises with...
employees
1-4

5-9

500+

1963

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

1967

12.7

12.3

13.5

1972

12.1

12.3

14.3

1974

10.9

12.2

10.0

1977

13.8

14.6

11.4

13.8

14.3

17.9

1982

12.0

13.0

12.7

13.0

12.7

18.8

1987

11.5

14.1

6.7

12.5

14.5

11.7

1989

11.0

13.7

6.6

1992

13.5

15.3

6.0

14.9

15.0

9.9

1994

13.3

15.1

5.7

1995 12.8
Sources373

14.6

5.6

373 Establishments: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS
PATTERNS 1974: U.S. SUMMARY 3, 8 tbl.lB (1977); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1977: UNITED STATES 3,8 tbl.1B (1979);

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1982: UNITED
STATES 3, 8 tbl.lB (1984); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS
PATTERNS 1987: UNITED STATES 3, 7 tbl.lb (1990); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1989: UNITED STATES 3 tbl.lb (1991);
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1992: UNITED
STATES 3, 6 tbl.lb (1994); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS
PATTERNS 1994: UNITED STATES 3, 6 tbl.lb (1996); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1995: UNITED STATES 3, 6 tbl. lb (1997).
Enterprises:U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1967 ENTERPRISE STATISTICS, PART
1: GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 164-67 tbl.3-1 (1972); U.S.
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Aggregate data for the construction industry, however, are
misleading since small entities are much less prominent in certain
sectors than in others. Examining the special trades contractors, the
stronghold of small businesses, sharpens the focus. In the years
immediately following the increase in the enterprise coverage
threshold from 0 to $500,000, special trades contractor establishments with fewer than 10 employees raised their share of total
employment every single year; the increase, from 27.0 percent in
1989 to 31.2 percent in 1993, amounted to 15.6 percent overall. In
roofing, the monotonic increase from 24.3 percent to 28.8 percent
in 1994 amounted to 18.5 percent.374 These increases much more
robustly confirm the prediction that small firms legally privileged
to superexploit their workers will secure a competitive advantage.
These proportions and increases are, moreover, underestimates
because the annual County Business Patterns data for singleestablishment firms derive from employment tax filings with the
IRS and thus exclude workers whom small employers disproportionately and increasingly treat as nonemployees. 37' The quinquen-

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

1972

ENTERPRISE STATISTICS, PART 1: GENERAL

REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142, 144 tbl. 1 (1977); U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS,

1977

ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATION 146. 148 tbl.3 (1981); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982

93,
96 tbl. 3 (1986); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987 ENTERPRISE STATISTICS:
COMPANY SUMMARY 17 tbl.3, 13 tbl.2 (1991); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: GENERAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS-ENTERPRISE

STATISTICS (visited Apr. 19, 1998)

<http://www.census.gov/agfs/ent/view/usemp.txt>.
Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY
BUSINESS PATTERNS 1989: UNITED STATES 7 tbl.lb (1991); U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1993: UNITED STATES 7 tbl.lb
(1995); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1994:
UNITED STATES 7 tbl. lb (1996). Roofing includes siding and sheet metal work.
174

Data on the number of employees in each size class are not published for Iowa,
but roofing establishments with 1 to 4 employees as a proportion of all such
establishments rose from 56 percent to 63 percent from 1989 to 1995. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1989: IOwA 3 tbl.lb
(1991); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1995:
IOWA 3 tbl.lb (1997).
375 On the data source, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS
PATTERNS 1992: UNITED STATES v (1994).
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nially collected firm-level data reveal a similar pattern: the
proportion of all employees accounted for by firms employing
fewer than 10 employees rose from 30.9 percent in 1987 to 33.1
percent in 1992.376
Finally, the congressional policy exempting small employers
from the general obligation to comply with fair labor standards is
not entirely consistent with the overall federal policy promoting
small business, which dates back to the beginning of the first
Eisenhower administration:
The essence of the American economic system of private
enterprise is free competition. Only through full and free
competition can free markets, free entry into business, and
opportunities for the expression and growth of personal
initiative and individual judgment be assured. The preservation and expansion of such competition is basic not only
to the economic well-being but to the security of this
Nation. Such security and well-being cannot be realized
unless the actual and potential capacity of small business
is encouraged and developed. It is the declared policy of
the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel,
assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of
small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and
services for the Government (including but not limited to
contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and
construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to
insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain
3 77
and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.
Revealingly, for purposes of implementing this congressional
policy and determining whether a business is small enough to be

376

Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987 ENTERPRISE

STATISTICS: COMPANY SUMMARY

19 tbl.3 (1991); U.S. BUREAU OF

THE CENSUS,

1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS-ENTERPRISE STATISTICS (pre-publication data emailed by U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dec. 1, 1997) (on file with author).
177 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994) (enacted 1953).
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eligible for government programs and preferences,37 the SBA has
established size standards for a large number of industries. For
general building contractors and heavy construction a small
business is defined as having annual receipts of less than $17
million, while special trade contractors must fall below $7
million.3 79 This standard-setting is particularly significant since
at the time the SBA knew that the average size of construction
firms was three employees and $300,000 in annual sales.3 80 If
Congress had adopted such a small-business standard for the FLSA,
fewer than 5,000 (or 1 percent of all) construction companies
would be covered and 75 percent of all construction employees
" ' Such an enormous breach
would be excluded from the statute.38
in labor standards was apparently too much even for the Bush
administration.
XII. THE QUANTITATIVE IMPACT OF THE EXEMPTION OF SMALL
BUSINESSES

The Committee bill also updates the provision in Section
3(s) of the Act that prevents newly exempt employers from
lowering their employees' wages below the previous
minimum wage rate under which they had been covered.
...This hold harmless provision will insure that not [sic]
employee will be adversely affected by the Committee
38 2
amendment.
The typographic carelessness of the House Committee on
Education and Labor in assuring workers that they would not suffer
any disadvantage as a result of the higher $500,000 exemption level
for their employers was a bad omen for the assertion's truthfulness.
But before its validity can be probed, its existence and meaning

371
179

380
381

13 C.F.R. § 121.101 (1997).
13 C.F.R. § 121.201.
49 Fed. Reg. 5026 (1984).
Estimated according to data in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992

(pre-publication data e-mailed by
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dec. 1, 1997). Since the SBA threshold size class fell
in the middle of one used by the Census Bureau, an estimate had to be made.
382 H.R. REP. NO. 101-260, pt. 1, at 18 (1989).
ECONOMIC CENSUS-ENTERPRISE STATISTICS
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must be known. Yet, even today many close observers of labor
standards legislation are surprised to learn that a significant proportion of construction workers work in firms doing less than
383
$500,000 of business.
Two years before Congress exempted small construction firms,
the Bureau of the Census's 1987 Census of ConstructionIndustries
ascertained that 1,256,597 employees were employed in establishments doing less than $500,000 worth of business. They accounted
for 25 percent of the slightly more than 5 million construction
employees, while the 388,687 establishments falling below the
$500,000 threshold represented 71 percent of all construction
establishments with payroll. 384 The next economic census, carried
out in 1992, two years after the small-business construction
exemption had gone into effect, revealed that the 1,157,141
employees in such establishment still accounted for 25 percent of
the estimated 4,668,280 construction employees, while the 413,435
establishments doing less than $500,000 of business represented 72
percent of all establishments with payroll.385 In Iowa, a state with
no overtime statute and a very weak minimum wage statute (which
was, coincidentally, not enacted until 1989),386 fully 30 percent
of all construction employees are excluded from the FLSA.38 7

383

E.g., Telephone Interview with Sarah M. Fox (Dec. 4, 1997).

114 U.S. BUREAU

OF THE

CENSUS,

1987

CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS

WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL
311

U.S.

8 tbl.2 (1990).
1992

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

CENSUS

OF CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS
WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 27-14 tbl.9 (1996).
386 IOWA CODE § 91.D (1997). Because the statute was enacted shortly

before the 1989 amendments to the FLSA and has never been amended, it seems
to apply only to retail and service employees of employers doing an annual
business of between $300,000 to $500,000. But see Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 198990, at 94 (Nov. 1, 1990) (on file with author). The regulations, which are largely
taken verbatim from the FLSA regulations, suggest that coverage is greater and
includes all construction firms falling below the FLSA threshold.
387

U.S. BUREAU OF THE

CENSUS,

1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRIES: GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES: WEST NORTH CENTRAL STATES

tbl.7 (1996).

IA-10
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In order to put the census data on the same enterprise basis as
the FLSA coverage definition, the data from the only Bureau of the
Census program that consolidates establishment data within
enterprises can also be used.388 They reveal that in 1992,
388

Since the economic censuses conducted by the Bureau of the Census are

based on establishments, whereas coverage under the FLSA is keyed to
enterprises, it might seem that the establishment data in the text vastly overstate
the effect of the small business exemption. Despite the definitional differences,
however, the construction establishment-based employment data are very close
approximations of enterprise-based coverage. The FLSA defines an enterprise as
"the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common
control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes
all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by one
or more corporate or other organizational units . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1)
(1994). The Bureau of the Census defines a construction establishment "as a
relatively permanent office or other place of business where the usual business
activities related to construction are conducted." U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: SUBJECT SERIES: LEGAL FORM OF
ORGANIZATION AND TYPE OF OPERATION v (1995). But these potentially
significant differences are neutralized by the fact that the establishments of multiestablishment companies, which accounted for fewer than 2 percent of all
establishments with payroll and fewer than 1 percent of all establishments, are,
on average, so much larger than single-establishment finms and so far exceed the
$500,000 exemption level that no appreciable number of them could have fallen
below that threshold. In 1992, the average value of construction work performed
by establishments (with payroll) of single-unit companies was $741,000
compared with $10.5 million for establishments of multi-unit companies. Id. at
8 tbl.2. This disparity also applies to the generally small special trade contractors.
In roofing, siding, and sheet metal work, for example, the average value of
construction work done was $567,000 and $3.6 million, respectively. Id. at 11
tbl.2. The disparity is also found regardless of how many establishments the
company owns. For example, in 1982, the average receipts of construction
establishments of companies owning or operating only two establishments were
more than seven times greater than those of single-establishment entities. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: GENERAL REPORT ON
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 214 tbl.5 (1986). Since, therefore, virtually all

establishments doing less than $500,000 of business are single-establishment
firms, employment data for such establishments are in effect enterprise-leveldata.
The Census Bureau's definition of a "company" is similar to the FLSA definition
of "enterprise": it includes all establishments under its ownership or control and,
if a parent company, all establishments of its subsidiaries. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: SUBJECT SERIES: LEGAL
FORM OF ORGANIZATION AND TYPE OF OPERATION 4 (1995).
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1,194,856 employees or 26 percent of all construction industry
employees were employed in the 73 percent of all companies in the
receipt size classes below $500,000. 389 Both of these proportions
were one percentage point higher than in 1987.390
Since the most concentrated impact of the small-business
exemption is on the so-called special trades contractors, which are
on average smaller than other building companies, the corresponding data for this sector are presented here. In 1992, the average
construction industry establishment with payroll did $941,000 of
business and employed eight employees; among special trades
contractors the corresponding figures were $600,000 and eight
employees. The special trades are, in other words, both smaller and
more labor intensive. Whereas in the construction industry as a
whole, establishments with payroll employing one to four workers
did $198,000 of business, similarly situated special trade contractors
did only $140,000 of business; the corresponding figures for
establishments employing five to nine employees were $591,000
and $436,000 respectively. Consequently, a larger proportion of
special trades contractors are exempt and a larger proportion of
their employees are excluded from the FLSA than for the industry
overall: 76 percent of establishments and 825,790 employees or 30

"9 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS-ENTERPRISE
STATISTICS (pre-publication data e-mailed by U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dec.

1, 1997).

390 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSuS, 1987 ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: COMPANY
SUMMARY 60 tbl.5 (1991). The annual Bureau of the Census data series, County

Business Patterns, yields similar results. According to the 1992 Census of
Construction Industries, 5.0 employees worked on average in establishments
doing $250,000 to $500,000 of business; conversely, establishments with 5 to 9
employees, did on average $591,000 of business. Thus a close correlation obtains
between doing $500,000 of business and employing 6 to 7 employees. Since
County Business Patternsuses size classes of 1-4 and 5-9, in 1994 approximately
900,000 employees were employed in construction firms with fewer than seven
employees; they represented about 19 percent of all construction employees U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1994: UNITED STATES

6 tbl. lb (1996). Similar proportions can be calculated from special tabulations
for the Small Business Administration. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: 1994 182-83 tbl.A7, 206-07 tbl.A8 (data for 1990
and 1991).
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percent of all employees.391 On an enterprise basis, 31 percent of
employees in 1992 were employed by the 77 percent of special
trade contractor companies with less than $500,000 in receipts.3 92
These figures represent the upper limit of the number of
construction workers lawfully excluded from mandatory minimum
wage and overtime compensation.3 93 Some employees of small
construction firms may work under collective bargaining agreements that provide for such payments. Employers of others may
make such payments voluntarily. A few may be covered because
they are individually engaged in commerce by virtue of unloading
trucks that crossed a state line to deliver materials.3 94 Still others
may be covered by state laws.
The fact that many states lack a statutory minimum wage or,
more importantly, a mandatory overtime law undercuts an argument
put forward by liberal supporters of compromise with the Bush
administration that most of the workers excluded by the higher
391 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRY SERIES: UNITED STATES SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENTS

WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL 27-12, 27-15 tbls. 8,9 (1996).
392 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS-ENTERPRISE

STATISTICS (pre-publication data e-mailed by U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dec.
1, 1997). Both proportions were the same in 1987. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1987 ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: COMPANY SUMMARY 61 tbl.5 (1991).
" The last set of coverage estimates that the DOL published, six months
after the 1989 amendments had gone into effect, were implausible: the 75,000
construction employees excluded from the minimum wage and the 120,000
excluded from the overtime represented only 1.4 percent and 2.5 percent,
respectively, of the total number of nonsupervisory employees in the industry.
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, MINIMUM
WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS STANDARDS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT, 27 tbl.7, 33 tbl.10 (1993).
31 "Workers employed on new construction not yet dedicated to interstate
commerce are not covered unless they are engaged in ordering and purchasing,
receiving and unloading materials from outside the state so as to make these
activities a part of interstate commerce." Statement of the Director, Wage and
Hour and Public Contracts Div. (Dec. 3, 1948), reprinted in 1 Lab. L. Rep.
25,150C.10, 37,366 (CCH, 1997). More recently the WHD stated that: "Of
course, employees engaged at the construction site in receiving materials which
are still moving [in] interstate commerce would be individually covered. .. "
2 WAGE AND HOUR Div., WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION FIELD OPERATIONS
MANUAL ch. I lcl0 (Apr. 24, 1994).
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exemption level would be held harmless by their coverage under
the state laws. 395 The Bush administration itself used this argument. As former Secretary of Labor Dole claimed: "Most states
have their own minimum wage laws (and some had higher
minimum wage levels than that provided
under Federal law) that
396
employers.
small
these
would reach
In fact, as of October 1, 1997, seven states (Alabama, Arizona,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee) had
no minimum wage statutes at all. In addition, eleven other state
minimum wage laws prescribe a minimum wage rate far below the
federal rate of $5.15: Georgia ($3.25), Indiana ($3.35), Kansas
($2.65), Kentucky ($4.25), Minnesota ($4.90 for enterprises with
annual receipts of under $500,000), Montana ($4.00 for businesses
with gross annual sales of $110,000 or less), New Mexico ($4.25),
New York ($4.25), Ohio ($2.80 to $4.25 depending on employer's
annual sales volume), Texas ($3.35), and Wyoming ($1.60).
Numerous states create coverage thresholds in the form of a
minimum number of employees that exclude large numbers of
employees: Arkansas (4), Georgia (6), Illinois (4), Indiana (2),
Michigan (2), Nebraska (4), Vermont (2), Virginia (4), and West
Virginia (6)."' Eighteen states have no overtime law at all. In the
states that do have overtime statutes, the aforementioned coveragerestricting conditions also apply. Moreover, additional overtime
coverage restrictions and exemptions further limit their applicability. For example, mandatory overtime does not apply to retail store
employees in Kentucky, employees in retail or service businesses

"9 When John V. Harvey, Jr., the chief majority counsel for Senate Labor
and Public Welfare Committee in 1989, made this argument during an interview
in 1997 and was informed that many states lack minimum wage and especially
overtime laws, he admitted that he had also been unaware of that fact in 1989.
Telephone Interview with John V. Harvey, Jr., Vice-President, Employee
Relations, Owens-Coming, Ohio (Dec. 9, 1997).
396 Letter from Elizabeth Hanford Dole to Marc Linder (Jan. 14, 1998).
'9'A Georgia state senator with plans to introduce legislation increasing the
state minimum wage observed that: "Many Georgians will be shocked to learn
that there are people around our state who are working for below the minimum
wage because .. .the company they work for is not subject to the federal
minimum wage law." SenatorKeys on the Minimum Wage, AUGUSTA CHRON.,
Jan. 10, 1998, at C3.
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with annual sales of less than $500,000 in Missouri, or retail or
service establishments in Vermont; employees are also excluded in
enterprises with annual sales below $250,000 in Nevada and
$150,000 in Ohio.398
Overall, then, the states have always offered and continue to
offer only spotty back-up protection to workers excluded from the
FLSA. Consequently, a large number of construction workers,
especially those in the nonmechanical trades such as roofing,
carpentry, and painting, and in (single-family) residential building
in general, 399 are no longer entitled to and do not receive premium wages for overtime.
XII.

WHY WAS AND IS THE EXCLUSION OF CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS IN SMALL FIRMS ALMOST UNKNOWN?

The Committee is aware that the low-wage worker, whose
economic status is in large part determined by the FLSA,
does not typically communicate with the Congress either
by testifying on bills or by writing letters outlining his
position on the legislation. [T]he Congress must represent
the public conscience in the matter
of low-wage workers
4
W
legislation.
wage
and minimum
Ignorance of the existence of the small construction firm
exemption, at the time of its enactment and even today, is extraordinarily widespread. Although even many legislative leaders and
their staffs were ignorant of the impact that the $500,000 threshold
would have on construction workers, Congress was not unaware of

391 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR Div., Div. OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, MINIMUM WAGE AND OVERTIME PREMIUM PAY STANDARDS
APPLICABLE TO NONSUPERVISORY NONFARM PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT

UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS Oct. 1,

1997 (Oct. 15, 1997). It was not

until December 1997 that the construction industry was added to the list of
industries covered by Colorado's minimum wage and overtime regulation.
Monique Tuttle, New Colorado Minimum Wage Order Includes Construction
Industry, COLORADO EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (Dec. 1997).
'99 Not surprisingly, homebuilding was, not so long ago, called The Industry
Capitalism Forgot, FORTUNE, Aug. 1947, at 61.
400 S. REP. NO. 93-690, at 34 (1974).
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the general wage-cutting consequences that restricted coverage
would bring in its wake. During the debate over H.R. 2 in 1989,
Representative Goodling inserted into the record the DOL's
estimate of the economic effects of the increase in the small
business exemption. The analysis presented by the Bush administration's DOL was subordinated to its speculation that increasing the
minimum wage to $4.25 would destroy 450,000 jobs. The higher
exemption threshold figured, together with the increased tip credit
and introduction of a so-called training wage, merely as "job loss
offsets." In other words, the DOL viewed the disentitlement to the
minimum wage solely as a positive development-as "sav[ing]"
jobs. The higher dollar volume was estimated to exempt 1.1 million
retail and service jobs from the minimum wage and two million
jobs in the other affected industries, for a total of about three
million lost jobs. The DOL viewed the new $500,000 threshold as
reducing job opportunity losses by a net of 4 percent or 18,000
jobs. This job-salvational effect would, according to the DOL, have
been greater if state minimum wage laws had not intervened: they
"effectively nullify" the increase in the coverage threshold by
preserving minimum wage protection for about half the affected
workers. 40 1 Thus instead of regarding the state laws as a safety
net for workers expelled from the FLSA, the DOL perversely
deemed them to be thwarting the effect that Congress had intended
for the higher threshold as a compensation for the higher minimum
wage.
Interviews with key congressional committee staff members and
employer and union lobbyists reveal how widespread the ignorance
of the exemption and its impact on construction workers was. The
chief counsel and staff director of the Subcommittee on Labor
Standards of the House Committee on Education and Labor in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, James Riley, was crucially involved in
drafting the amendments and writing the committee reports.
Although he knew that the bill extended the $500,000 coverage
threshold to the construction industry, not even he realized at the
time that the bill was taking away universal coverage from
construction workers. Indeed, the only interest that the $500,000

401

135 CONG. REC. 5243-44 (1989).
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threshold sparked in the House committee was a speculative one:
staffers worried that it might have been a "stalking horse" or trial
balloon for Republican efforts to increase the coverage threshold
under the Davis-Bacon Act. That law requires the payment of
locally "prevailing" wages, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, under all federal building contracts over the virtually
nominal level of $2,000. 02 Although Republicans continued to
seek an increase in the coverage threshold (in addition to repeal of
the statute altogether), they in fact never used the higher FLSA
threshold as a precedent. In retrospect, Riley conceded that "we
probably shot ourselves in the foot" with the $500,000 exemption,
which "you've now discovered is hurting construction work40 3
ers."
Experienced DOL enforcement and compliance officers are well
aware of the changes that the 1989 amendments wrought with
respect to the construction industry, but the current acting Wage
and Hour Administrator, a long-serving career civil servant, had not
realized that construction had not been in the group of industries
404
subject to the $362,500 threshold in the years before 1989.
Few people were closer to the lobbying concerning the FLSA
in 1989 than Robert McGlotten, the legislative director of the AFLCIO. For example, the AFL-CIO put out a news advisory on March
22, 1989, that McGlotten would be available to the media immediately after the House vote on the minimum wage in front of the
House press gallery.4 5 Yet in an interview eight years later, when
asked about the inclusion of construction in the $500,000 small
business exemption, Mr. McGlotten responded: "No one caught it.
40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1994).
Telephone Interview with Jim Riley (Dec. 9, 1997). John V. Harvey, Jr.,
the chief labor counsel on the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee,
disagreed. With the hindsight knowledge of how many construction workers have
been excluded from the FLSA, he still felt that everyone in 1989 recognized that
the expanded exemption would bring about some such consequences if not
precisely these. Telephone Interview with John V. Harvey (Dec. 9, 1997).
404 Telephone Interview with John Fraser (Dec. 8, 1997).
402

403

405

News Advisory, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 22, 1989. On Nov. 1, 1989,

McGlotten, on behalf of the AFL-CIO, wrote Representative Austin Murphy
supporting the compromise with the Bush administration on amending the FLSA.
135 CONG. REc. H7868 (1989).
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I'm hearing about it for the first time from you. ' 40 6 Other insiders contradict this claim. John Zalusky, an economist with the
AFL-CIO in 1989, called it "bullshit." Zalusky states that he
foresaw and raised "bloody murder" about the consequences of the
exemption, but was, despite his prediction that it would later "bite
them in the rear," unable to persuade officials of the Building and
Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO to focus on the
issue. 407 John Hr
Harvey, who was the chief labor counsel of the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in the late 1980s, also
characterized McGlotten's claim as "baloney'4 8
Jay Power, who was the AFL-CIO's chief lobbyist on the FLSA
in 1989, stated that since the building trades unions did not express
any interest in the issue, the inclusion of construction in the
enterprise coverage exemption was "not that big a deal" for the
AFL-CIO. 4 9 Donald Elisburg, who had been the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards in the Carter
administration and has remained close to the AFL-CIO, emphasized
that the building trades unions have always been so exclusively
focused on the Davis-Bacon Act that they deferred to the AFL-CIO
in all matters relating to the FLSA.41 ° Construction unions'
406

Telephone Interview with Robert McGlotten (Nov. 25, 1997). "After

nearly three decades at the AFL-CIO, the labor movement's top lobbyist" retired
in 1995 to become a lobbyist for Philip Morris and other clients. Labor's Private
Weapon, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at 5; Highlights of Recent Lobby
Registration, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 42.
407 Telephone Interview with John Zalusky (Dec. 9, 1997). Zalusky recently
retired from the AFL-CIO. Zalusky added that his own union, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, had complained but to no avail.
408 Telephone Interview with John V. Harvey, Jr. (Dec. 9, 1997). After
working for General Electric, Harvey became the vice president for employee
relations at Owens-Coming Glass. With respect to assessing plausibility and
credibility, it is unclear why McGlotten would untruthfully characterize himself
as having been an incompetent lobbyist in preference to stating that his
immediate constituents, the building trades, were indifferent, or that the
exemption was a necessary trade-off for an increase in the minimum wage.
409 Telephone Interview with Jay Power, AFL-CIO (Dec. 17, 1997). Power
himself came to the AFL-CIO from the Carpenters Union.
40 Telephone Interviews with Donald Elisburg (Nov. 1997). The building
trades unions' lack of familiarity with the FLSA and exclusive focus on DavisBacon are corroboratedby Zalusky and Terry Yellig, an attorney who represents
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neglect of the FLSA has in large part been a function of their
historical successes in securing far superior wage and hour
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements than the FLSA
offers. In that sense, the lack of coverage under FLSA could be
tool rather than a deficiency to
regarded as a desirable organizing
1
lobbying."
by
remedied
be
Against this background, it is hardly astonishing that in 1991,
when Zalusky was seeking to mobilize opposition to the Bumpers
bill (which would have eliminated individual coverage in retail and
service firms already exempted from enterprise coverage), his effort
to explain why the exemption from enterprise coverage for small
construction employers should be repealed "didn't really register"
with Robert Georgine, the president of the Building and Construction Trades Department. 412 The peripheral importance of the
FLSA is underscored by the fact that the director of research of the
Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO not
only had never heard of the small construction firm exemption, but
expressed strong doubt that it even existed.41 3 The vice president

the construction unions. Telephone Interview with Terry Yellig, Washington,
D.C. (Jan. 26, 1998). Support for this view is also found in 1976 NationalJobs
Conferenceofthe Buildingand Construction TradesDepartmentAFL-CIO93-95
(1976), which devotes the chapter, "Labor Standards-Protect the Tradesman,"
to Davis-Bacon, without ever mentioning the FLSA.
411 This logic is, to be sure, contradicted by construction unions' traditional
practice of organizing construction companies rather than workers. Until the
extraordinary successes of the antiunion open-shop movement in the 1970s, "the
building trades have organized relatively few workers, relying instead on the fact
that the construction market has been dominated by union contractors who get
their labor through union hiring halls." Open-Shop Construction Picks Up
Momentum, Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 1977, at 108. See also Jerry Flint, Building
Unions Plan Organizing Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1977, at A18.
412 Telephone Interview with John Zalusky (Jan. 26, 1998). Robert Georgine,
who is still president of the Building and Construction Trades Department, has
no independent recollection of the debates over the 1989 FLSA amendments.
Telephone Interview with Terry Yellig (Jan. 26, 1998).
413 Telephone Interview with Adam Pagnucco (Nov. 24, 1997). Despite this
obvious ignorance, the president of the Building & Construction Trades
Department asserted in 1998 that: "Since the early 90s, we have been working
on corrective strategies. .... " Letter from Robert Georgine to Marc Linder
(Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with author). Georgine did not identify these "strategies."
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in charge of organizing at the Roofers Union stated that he had
never heard of the de facto exemption of small contractors from the
FLSA. He suggested as the reason for his lack of familiarity with
the exclusion the fact that the union did not organize residential
roofing or small roofing contractors in general. He strongly
suspected that the kinds of employers with which the union dealt
had also never heard of the law.4 14 In the field, the answer was
the same. For example, the Roofers Union regional organizer in the
Midwest (including Iowa) had never heard of the amendment.4 5
Other unions of nonmechanical construction trades were
similarly in the dark about the small-business exemption. The
director of the legislative affairs for the United Carpenters and
Joiners Union stated that he knew of the $500,000 threshold, but
did not realize that it applied to construction.4 6 The general
counsel of the Painters Union, though unfamiliar with the exemption, suggested that educating employees of small construction
contractors as to their lack
of an entitlement to overtime would be
41 7
a good organizing tool.
Construction employers' associations were equally ignorant of
the exemption. Neither the executive director for congressional
affairs of the AGC, an organization of larger general contractors,
nor the legislative affairs official at the antiunion Associated
Builders and Contractors had ever heard of it.41 The director of
government relations at the National Roofing Contractors Association explained his ignorance of the threshold by reference to the
composition of the organization's membership: because the 3,500

According to an attorney for the Building & Construction Trades Department,
no such strategies existed precisely because the unions were unaware of the
small-business exemption. Telephone Interview with Terry Yellig (Feb. 20,
1998).
414 Telephone Interview with John Martini, United Union of Roofers,
Waterproofers, and Allied Workers (Nov. 21, 1997). On the relatively low degree
of unionization in single-family residential construction, see HERBERT NORTHRUP
& HOWARD FOSTER, OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION 49-71 (1975).
41' Telephone Interview with Carl Keeton (Nov. 26, 1997).
416 Telephone Interview with Jim Kolb (Dec. 17, 1997).
417 Telephone Interview with Dick Sigmond (Jan. 26, 1998).
418 Telephone Interview with Jeff Shoaf (Nov. 24, 1997); Telephone
Interview with Austin Fulk (Nov. 24, 1997).
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members averaged $3.5 million in annual business, the issue was,
as so many other lobbyists and congressional staffers also put it,
41 9
"below the radar" of larger contractors.
Ignorance of the small-business exemption from enterprise
coverage is by no means restricted to employers and workers
organizations. Seven years after the amendments were enacted,
even the highly respected Congressional Quarterly disseminated
false information about it. In reporting on the aforementioned
unsuccessful efforts in 1996 to eliminate individual employee
coverage in enterprises doing less than $500,000 of business, the
weekly magazine asserted that the 1989 amendment
ultimately ended up contracting the small-business exemption, not expanding it.... Since then, the Labor Department has interpreted the law to mean that any smallbusiness employee engaged in interstate commerce in any
way-including using materials produced in another state
or answering out-of-state phone calls-had to pay the
minimum wage and overtime. Wage and hour laws now
apply to virtually all U.S. workers.420
Every single statement in this quotation is false. 4 ' Before
1990, virtually all construction firms, for example, were covered by
the FLSA. From 1990 on, no construction firm doing less than
$500,000 in business has been subject to enterprise coverage. Only
construction workers individually engaged in commerce or
production of good for commerce would be covered. The DOL has
not interpreted the FLSA to mean that any small-construction (or
retail or service) business employee merely using materials
produced in another state is entitled to the minimum wage or
overtime: such an expansive interpretation is permissible only under

Telephone Interview with Craig Brightup (Nov. 26, 1997). The largest
roofing contractor in the United States, Centimark Corp., had revenues of $175
million in 1996-three times greater than the second largest. Gary Tulacz, The
Top 600 Specialty Contractors, ENR, Oct. 6, 1997, at 52.
420 Jonathan Weisman, Exemption for Small Business
...... Isolated,
Attacked and Defeated, CONG. Q., May 25, 1996, at 1462.
421 Two weeks later the magazine repeated the false statement.
Jonathan
Weisman, Senate May Reprise 1989 Fight Over "Training Wage, " CONG. Q.,
June 8, 1996, at 1600, 1601.
419

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

525

the inapplicable enterprise coverage standard. In fact, DOL
enforcement officers, all-too-well informed of the restrictiveness of
the 1989 amendment, bemoan the fact that precious few smallbusiness construction workers are still covered.422 Finally, contrary to the magazine's assertion, millions of employees of small
businesses are now uncovered in addition to the millions who had
been previously uncovered.
The same article in Congressional Quarterly goes on to quote
David Card, a labor economist who gained name recognition and
helped shape national minimum wage policy in recent years with
much criticized studies showing that an increase in the minimum
423
wage can lead to increased rather than diminished employment.
The magazine quoted Card as saying that "a company that grosses
$500,000 a year is very small, perhaps a two-man exterminator
firm or a carburetor cleaner." This cavalier comment, based on
empirical ignorance of how widespread and large such firms are,
trivializes an important problem. Although he might be right that
a McDonald's, if it were small enough to qualify for exemption
from enterprise coverage, would suffer from publicity over lawfully
paying subminimum wages, such exposure does not faze local
roofers.424
So thick is the confusion as to what the 1989 amendments
did-or perhaps, even more troublingly, what FLSA coverage and
exemptions are all about-that in a letter that took many weeks to
draft, former Secretary of Labor Dole explained the purpose behind
the single-level small-business enterprise coverage threshold as
4" Telephone Interview with Don Chleborad, DOL (Nov. 21, 1997). See
also Telephone Interviews with Gail Coleman, Solicitor's Office, DOL (Nov. 25,
1997); Leif Jorgenson, FLSA attorney, DOL (Nov. 1997); Frank Laruffa, WHD,
DOL (Nov. 1997).
421 DAVID CARD & ALAN KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995).
424 Weisman, supra note 421, at 1463. Card's claim that the exemption is

irrelevant in the sense that any employer that "does not want to pay the
minimum wage simply will not" regardless of whether it is exempt sounds
plausible, but when he adds that the only penalty for failure to pay is merely
paying the back wages due, he overlooks that in private suits brought by workers
employers in the vast majority of cases will have to pay double the wages owed
as well as the workers' attorney's fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994).
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eliminating "the crazy quilt of exemptions, such as complete
exemption for laundry firms., 42 ' Apparently, the Secretary of
Labor believed either that coverage of laundries was actually
expanded by the 1989 amendments or that first-dollar coverage
constituted a kind of exemption from exempt status.
At the other end of the disinformational spectrum, in 1996
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich disingenuously declared in a letter
to the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, that the proposal to
eliminate individual coverage in firms exempt from enterprise
coverage "'invites a return to the sweatshop conditions that
Americans abhor."' Magnifying his hyperbole in an interview with
The New York imes, Reich asserted that the exemption "would
create an incentive to a lot of businesses to subcontract their work
to new, tiny subcontractors paying 50 cents to a dollar an hour."
That, he said, would provide "another incentive for illegal immigration ''26 If any of these tactically opportunistic partisan assertions
were accurate,4 27 they applied with much greater force to the
original $500,000 exemption in 1989, which the Democratic
majority not only supported, but also described as a "true small
business exemption."4 8 In this context, Senator Bond was generous in 1996 in characterizing as "odd" Democrats' complaints
about the effort to exclude small-business employees from the
minimum wage increase: "Many of them happily voted for similar
poison" in 1989 when they agreed to exempt small businesses from
enterprise coverage.429

Letter from Elizabeth Hanford Dole to Marc Linder (Jan. 14, 1998).
426 Adam Clymer, Clinton Says He Will Veto RepublicanPlan in Wage Bill,
425

N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at B10.
427 If Reich was referring to manufacturing sweatshops, even if their owners
were lawfully able to take advantage of the exemption from enterprise coverage,
individual workers would still be covered because they produce for interstate
commerce. As his own agency notes: "It has been the experience of the Wage
and Hour Division that virtually all employees of manufacturers are covered by
the Act's provisions." Wage and Hour Div., FactSheet No. 9: Manufacturing
Establishments Under the FairLabor StandardsAct (FLSA) (visited Apr. 19,
1998) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/regs/compliance/whd/whdfs9.htm>.
428 H.R. REP. No. 101-260, pt. 1, at 18 (1989).
429 142 CONG. REC. S7411 (1996).
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If, in one disparaging view of the unscientific character of
congressional policymaking, Congress engages in "legislation by
anecdote," 430 the process culminating in the exclusion of small
construction firms from enterprise coverage in 1989 was not only
not guided by anecdotes, those who should have purveyed the
anecdotes or antidotes to them were nowhere to be seen. Small
contractors became, according to virtually all the participants, the
inadvertent beneficiaries of Senator Jeffords' drive to create a
uniform dollar-volume threshold. 431 Although Jeffords did not
have the construction industry specifically in mind, his goal of
simplifying enforcement by means of uniformity could, in the
abstract-that is, abstracting from the link to unemployment- have
been achieved even more readily by bringing the other industries
down to construction's zero-dollar threshold. However, since wealth
redistribution from workers to their small-business employers was
one of the priorities of the general small business lobby, to which
many legislators were committed, universal application of enterprise
coverage would have been politically impossible. Uniformity had
to be joined to an increase in the dollar volume. Because the
outcome of a compromise was, in this sense, preordained, no one
in construction had to spend political capital on this issue.
Contractors small enough to be eligible for the exemption did
not lobby for it-former Secretary of Labor Dole, for example,
does "not recall ... any meetings with construction industry
representatives to discuss the issue '432 -nor did their larger
competitors or construction unions oppose it. Since contractors of
430

Telephone Interview with Richard Brennan, DOL, Division of Policy and

Analysis, (Dec. 8, 1997).
41 Former Secretary of Labor Dole asserted that "while there was no
particular focus on small construction firms, the changes affecting them were not
inadvertent." Her reasoning, however, is a non sequitur. While conceding that
she does "not recall any focus on small construction firms," she derives the
intentionality merely from the perceived benefits: "By eliminating coverage for
the smallest of businesses; we both eliminated the burden of a higher minimum
wage on these businesses and reduced the Federal government's own regulatory
burden in dealing with a large number of businesses that do not have a
significant impact on interstate commerce." Letter from Elizabeth Hanford Dole
to Marc Linder (Jan. 14, 1998).
432 Letter from Elizabeth Hanford Dole to Marc Linder (Jan. 14, 1998).
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this size were, by and large, not members of any construction
employers association, they lacked the organizational wherewithal
to apply pressure in any event. (To the extent that small contractors
were violating various other labor-protective laws by unlawfully
classifying their workers as nonemployees, they would, in any
event, have had no incentive to call attention to themselves.) Since
associations of larger contractors believed that their members were
insulated from bid competition with such firms, and unions
believed that their members were insulated from labor market
competition radiating from such firms, the sudden withdrawal of
the entire under-$500,000-per-year sector from wage-and-hour
enforcement was, in the almost universally used locution, "underneath the radar" of their lobbyists. As a result, Congress was
deprived of even the pseudo-information generated by the carefully
choreographed personal presentation of point-counterpoint anecdotes characteristic of hearings. Since virtually no one in or around
Congress realized that after a quarter-century of universal coverage,
more than 70 percent of all construction firms would be reassigned
to the unfair labor standards regime,433 Congress could not even
pretend that it had weighed the consequences of such unmediated
and massive labor market deregulation. Whether such ignorancebased legislation generates a political-economical and moral
environment superior to that associated with the same exclusionary
outcome arrived at by an avowedly anti-labor process is a nice
question.
A radically different interpretation of these attitudes and
legislative policies, at least on the part of the unions, is, to be sure,
possible. To the extent that the AFL-CIO was aware of the
expansion of the small-business exemption in 1989, the labor
movement's acquiescence in, and the decision to subordinate any
opposition to, the amendment to the overriding need for an increase
in the minimum wage could be viewed as noble if not entirely
altruistic. After all, the vast majority of workers-such as migrant
farm laborers-who are actually paid the minimum wage and

413 According

to Gail Coleman, "no one focused on" the exclusion of the
construction industry. Telephone interview with Gail Coleman, Solicitor's Office,
DOL (Nov. 25, 1997).
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whose weak labor market position would generate subminimum
wages in the absence of a compulsory statutory norm,4 34 are not
union members. Increases in the minimum wage may help ratchet
up the whole wage structure for unionists. Nevertheless, the AFLCIO's or the building trades unions' willingness to sacrifice the
immediate interests of hundreds of thousands of construction
workers in coverage under the FLSA for the sake of a more livable
wage for millions of even more impoverished workers should be
acknowledged as an act of solidarity.

CONCLUSION

[E]very time we have had a minimum wage increase, we
have always... made the exceptions and the exemptions,
so that small businesses could provide those jobs for those
most in need, and so small businesses could create those
jobs that small businesses must create if as 435
a matter of fact
economy.
growing
a
have
to
going
we are
Focusing on the construction industry underscores one crucial
way in which the pernicious impact of unfair labor standards on the
rest of the economy may be different today than it was in the early
years of the FLSA. In 1949, the Truman administration, viewing
the President's election in 1948 as a repudiation of the antilabor
policies of the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress, proposed
amendments to the FLSA that would have significantly expanded
the universe of covered workers by pushing "the commerce power
of Congress exercised to its fullest constitutional extent ... "
In explaining the planned expansion to the House Committee on
Education and Labor, the Secretary of Labor, Maurice Tobin, noted
that one of the FLSA's original objectives was to guard fair
employers "from unfair wage chiseling by the few." Within the
414 MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS AND MINIMUM WAGES: REGULATING
THE EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
415 142 CONG. REC. H5534 (1996) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
436 WILLIAM S. TYSON, MEMORANDUM: SCOPE OF SECTION 3(N), in

Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the
House Committee on Education & Labor, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1949).
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"part of our industrial community" operating under the act's
"minimum ground rules" unfair competition had largely been
"wiped out." However:
there is another large part of the same general community
for whom the labor costs, the wage rates, the hours of
work, and the rules on child labor are whatever is required
by the forces of competition. In this group are the workers
who are not favored by State laws or self-organization. Yet
their employers are frequently in the same competitive
markets with those who must comply with the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
I cannot escape the conclusion that what is good for
one group of employers is equally good for those who
compete with them. I am impressed with the fact that it is
pretty hard for a fair employer to live by the rules and stay
in business in bad times when his competitor is free to cut
labor costs and undersell him. Moreover, the employers
and employees who are not subject to the act are left to be
the victims of the same type of vicious competition among
themselves which helped to create the greatest depression
in our history.437
There is little doubt that Tobin correctly assessed the depressed
conditions in the exempt sector both then and now. Less certain is
the continuing validity of his conceptualization of the competitively
ramifying effects of the substandard sector on the covered sector.
As recently as the 1960s, the relationship between the two sectors
assumed a different character than today. At that time, too, some
craft unions often refrained from organizing residential building,
but the strategic objective was accommodation. Unions "prefer that
small home builders find in the nonunion market the lower wages
and flexibility that craft lines deny. For the union man, the
nonunion sector serves as a buffer. When union-scale heavy
construction jobs are unavailable, craft union members can
temporarily move into the home-construction field. Such buffer

4" Amendments to the FairLabor StandardsAct of 1938: HearingsBefore
the House Committee on Education & Labor, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949)
(testimony of Maurice Tobin).
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arrangements also provide flexibility in bargaining with management, for the craft world provides a variety of escape hatches. A
craftsman can strike in the unionized sector while working in the
nonunionized."438 The "flexibility" characteristic of that period
would not have embraced today's prospect of temporarily working,
not merely below the high standards of union contracts, but in
derogation of statutory norms. Substandard conditions in residential
building may have rendered that sector almost as inaccessible to
union workers as it is to law-abiding employers.439
If, as the case of the construction industry today appears to
show, employers in the two sectors operate in noncompeting
product markets and do not compete for the same groups of
workers, it is possible that labor standards in the covered sector are
largely impervious to the corrosive impact of wage chiseling.
Whether this hypothesis is objectively true or not-and surely the
exemption from the FLSA of contractors doing less than $500,000
of business must exert a wage-depressing competitive impact on
covered employers doing somewhat more than $500,000 of
business--construction employers associations and unions, as the
aforementioned interviews reveal, seem to act on the assumption
that it is. For not only did construction employers not lobby for and
the unions against the small-business exemption in 1989, their
lobbyists and legislative directors were unaware of its inclusion in
the amendments. More astounding yet, eight years later, when
interviewed about their positions on the exemption, most of them
were flabbergasted to hear that it even existed. In self-exculpation,
union officials explained that they do not organize such small
firms, while employers' representatives stated that their members'

438

Margaret Chandler, Craft Bargaining, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING 50, 58 (John Dunlop & Neil Chamberlain eds., 1967). For evidence

that unionized workers sometimes forgo overtime as an accommodation to
employers, see Barry Whelchel, Informal Bargaining in Construction, 10 IND.
REL. 105, 107-109 (1971).
" The greater price sensitivity among house buyers and the associated
reduced ability of residential builders to pass their increased costs on have long
intensified competitive pressures and demands for downward wage flexibility in
residential construction. John Dunlop, Labor-ManagementRelations, in DESIGN
AND PRODUCTION OF HOUSES 270 (Burnham Kelly ed., 1959).
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businesses were far larger than the exemption threshold and did not
engage in the kind of building operations typically performed by
small contractors.
In fact, however, the groups do compete. Traditionally, during
cyclical downswings, large firms, "in order to maintain their level
of output, will not hesitate to bid on construction projects which are
normally left to the smaller firms." 440 For example, a reputable
roofing contractor in the Iowa City area observes that larger roofing
contractors could traditionally make a living from commercial
projects in upswings, but needed residential work to sustain
themselves during recessions. The domination of the residential
sector by unfair labor standards has deprived some larger and lawabiding firms of that safety valve, undermining their long-term
viability." And labor union economists agree that, regardless of
the sectoral organizing strategy of building trades unions, there is
a standards-depressing spill-over effect from the residential to the
commercial construction labor market. 442
Employers' and unions' subjective belief in the thesis of
noncompeting groups would bode well for the further evisceration
of the FLSA. Advocates of governmental deregulation would face
fewer obstacles to achieving their goals if organized capital and
labor were to remain indifferent to efforts to cut back coverage
incrementally. Such a scenario was conjured up a half-century ago,
when Ralph Gwinn, a Congressman from New York who detected
socialism in the most unlikely places, 443 engaged William
McComb, the Wage and Hour Administrator, in the following
colloquy:
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Peter J. Cassimatis, The Performanceof the ConstructionIndustry, 1946-
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Telephone Interview with Kurt Tjemeland, T & K Roofing, Ely, IA (Dec.
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'" Gwinn spoke of "socialist Federal regulation of prices and wages ...
1949 Hearings, supra note 36, at 98.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Mr. GWINN. It is because people chisel that you think
the Government must manage the economy to the extent
that you propose?
Mr. MCCOMB. It is because some employers will pay
as little as they can for their employee's work.
Mr. GwINN. How many?
Mr. MCCOMB. Well, it would just take a very small
percentage. You have spoken of free competition.
Mr. GwwN. How many of the employers, do you say,
are chiselers?
Mr. MCCOMB. A very small percentage of them.

Mr. GWiNN. How small?
Mr. McCoMB. Oh, less than 5 percent....
Mr. GWINN. All right; then you would subject our
whole economy in this area to management from
Washington,and all of your inspectors and all of the
expenses of the taxpayers that are involved, and all the
bookkeeping that is involved, and the uncertainties, and the
ill will because 5 percent of our employers, you say, are
chiselers?
Mr. MCCOMB... J will have to disagree with you, that
there would be a great deal of ill will. I know of many,
many employers who want to pay a decent wage, but if
they must compete with the man who is paying a very low
wage and has no regard for the living conditions under
which his workers must live, those employers must pay
low if they are going to compete with the others. ...
Mr. GWINN. You have great faith in our free economy
and in the honesty of 95 percent of our employers?
Mr. MCCOMB. Yes, I do.
Mr. GwINN. If a majority of them come forward in
these hearings and say they will take their chance on
competition with the 5 percent of the chiselers, are you
willing to leave this law to their judgment in that regard?
Mr. MCCOMB. I do not think you could. 4 "

' 1949 Hearings, supra note 36, at 103-04.
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The Wage and Hour Administrator may not have thought it
possible 50 years ago,445 but if unions and covered employers no
longer believe that they compete with and thus no longer need to
be "protected against the unfair methods of competition of those
who utilize sweatshop methods to gain a competitive advantage, ' 446 their indifference to the exemption of small firms may
help vindicate Gwinn's deregulatory program yet. If a rational
industrial policy of any kind underlies the expanded small-business
exemption, it must be based on the conclusion that such a rigid
"dual economy" has emerged that larger firms and primary-sector
unions can ignore wage-chiselers with impunity, many of whose
employees will increasingly become those whom Congress has
expelled from the welfare rolls. 47 Alternatively, the policy of
exempting small firms from the FLSA must also assume that all
small employers are willing to become wage-chiselers: for
Congress's decision to subject all employers below the
$500,000-and,
in the future, perhaps an even
8
higher" -threshold to the withering competition of unfair labor
standards tendentially compels even well-intentioned employers to
reproduce the conditions prevailing among their most rapacious
rivals.

44' At that time it was still de rigueur in the construction industry to fimd

that: "For the well-established employers, it is ...important to have a floor
under competitive labor costs. Otherwise, the threat is always present of a
competitor securing cost advantages through undercutting labor standards."
Frank Pierson, Building-Trades BargainingPlan in Southern California, 70
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 14, 14 (1950).
446 1937 Hearings,supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Robert
Jackson).
17 E.g., Tony Horwitz, PoorProspects:ParingWelfare Rolls Provesa Huge
Grindfor Everyone Involved, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1997, at Al.
44 Passage of bills introduced by Democrats in 1998 to increase the
minimum wage may, once again, be conditioned on an increase in the smallbusiness exemption threshold. S. 1573, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); H.R. 3100,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). Although an attorney to the Building &
Construction Trades Department recommended to the organization that it seek to
repeal the exemption, it did not follow that advice. Telephone Interview with
Terry Yellig (Feb. 20, 1998).
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Above all, however, a rational industrial policy informing
revision of the FLSA presupposes, at the very least, an explicit
economic theory and unbiased empirical studies, which have been
conspicuously absent." 9 A democratically organized discussion
comparing the class-based distribution of the benefits and deprivations of universal coverage and selected exemptions would require
a measure of honesty and comprehension on the part of legislators
and interest and intelligence on the part of intervening participants
that had never been particularly prominent in earlier FLSA debates,
and has virtually disappeared since the 1980s.
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